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According to the moral error theory, there are no moral facts: all (positive, 
atomic) moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. A popular 
strategy in recent years for arguing against the moral error theory is to deploy 
a companions in guilt (CG) argument. According to CG theorists, arguments for 
the moral error theory are insufficient, because either they rely on premises 
which do not warrant scepticism about moral facts, or they threaten to support 
an implausible error theoretic conclusion in other areas of discourse – areas 
which seem safe from such a conclusion. This thesis deploys a CG argument in 
order to defend moral realism – roughly, the view that moral judgements pur-
port to state facts and that some of those judgements have true contents – 
against one influential argument for the error theory: J. L. Mackie’s argument 
from queerness. The CG argument deployed depends on the assumption that 
doxastic normativism is true. Doxastic normativism is a metaphysical thesis ac-
cording to which norms are in some sense constitutive of, or essential to, belief. 
Since my CG argument only works (if it works) on the assumption that doxastic 
normativism is true, much of this thesis is spent defending normativism against 
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οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα 
καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα 
τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων; 
And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t his eyes hurt, 
and wouldn’t he turn around and flee towards the things he’s able to see, believ-
ing that they’re really clearer than the ones he’s being shown? 
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According to the moral error theory, there are no moral facts: positive, atomic 
moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. According to moral 
realism, however, there are moral facts: moral judgements (e.g. “torturing chil-
dren is wrong”) purport to state facts and some such judgements have true con-
tents. That is, moral judgements express beliefs which are apt for assessment in 
terms of truth and falsity, and some moral beliefs are indeed true. This thesis 
defends moral realism against one of the most influential arguments for the 
moral error theory – J. L. Mackie’s argument from queerness. I do not attempt 
to provide a positive account of moral realism; I only hope to defend it against 
the error theorist. 
In recent years, a popular strategy for arguing against the moral error theory 
is to deploy a companions in guilt (CG) argument. According to the CG theorist, 
arguments for metaethical anti-realism – such as the argument from queerness 
for the error theory, though some philosophers have developed CG arguments 
against other forms of anti-realism – are insufficient. Either they rely on prem-
ises which do not warrant scepticism about moral facts, or they threaten to sup-
port an implausible error theoretic conclusion in other areas of discourse – areas 
which appear safe from such a conclusion. 
Likewise, in recent years, the philosophy of normativity has seen much inter-
est in the metaphysical nature of belief. Doxastic normativism is the thesis that 
norms are (in a sense to be clarified) constitutive of, or essential to, belief, such 
that nothing not subject to those norms counts as a belief. This thesis attempts 
to develop a CG argument against the error theory based on doxastic norma-
tivism. Assuming normativism, I argue that if the argument from queerness 
were sound, then we could run the argument from queerness in the case of belief. 
A doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness would support the implau-
sible conclusion that doxastic judgements (e.g. “Marco believes that Mallory 
reached the summit”) are systematically and uniformly false. The upshot of this 
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conclusion would be the paradoxical one that there are no beliefs and no believ-
ers. This, I suggest, might constitute a reductio ad absurdum against the argu-
ment from queerness, because to commit to our doxastic analogue of the argu-
ment from queerness would be to commit cognitive suicide. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 presents the threat to the error 
theorist: I argue that, assuming normativism, a doxastic analogue of the argu-
ment from queerness supports the conclusion that doxastic judgements are sys-
tematically and uniformly false. In §1.2, I contrast the error theory with moral 
realism, along with ethical non-cognitivism – another form of metaethical anti-
realism. §1.3 outlines the argument from queerness as Mackie presents it. In 
§1.4, I give an overview of CG arguments. §1.4.1 presents a number of consider-
ations in favor of what we can call the parity premise – the premise in CG argu-
ments according to which moral facts and their companions stand or fall to-
gether. That is, the parity premise says that moral facts and doxastic facts (say) 
are sufficiently analogous for CG arguments to work: scepticism about the latter 
undermines scepticism about the former in such a way that warrants rejection 
of, for example, the moral error theory. §1.4.2 connects CG arguments with dox-
astic normativism, and clarifies what the latter amounts to. Although I do not 
defend normativism in this section, I argue that if normativism is true, then the 
argument from queerness would imply that nothing satisfies the norms which 
purport to be constitutive of belief. Finally, in §1.5, I flesh out a doxastic ana-
logue of the argument from queerness. The conclusion of this argument – that 
doxastic judgements are systematically and uniformly false – has the paradoxi-
cal upshot there are no beliefs and no believers. This section concludes by con-
sidering (and rejecting) just one way in which a defender of the error theory 
might rebut our CG argument. 
As will become clear at the end of Chapter 1, whether our CG argument works 
depends in large part on whether normativism is true. In Chapters 2 and 3, 
therefore, I defend normativism against some of its most influential detractors. 
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Chapter 2 considers the objections to normativism raised by Krister Bykvist and 
Anandi Hattiangadi. First, §2.2 further clarifies what doxastic normativism 
amounts to, following Paul Boghossian’s presentation of an argument for it. In 
§2.3, I outline Bykvist and Hattiangadi’s arguments against truth norms for be-
lief. According to them, belief is not constitutively normative (at least when nor-
mativism is construed along the lines of a truth norm) because truth norms for 
belief cannot be formulated without unpalatable consequences. This we might 
call the formulation problem. In §2.4, I suggest we might rebut the formulation 
problem by holding that knowledge, rather than merely truth, is the aim and 
norm of belief. Adoption of a particular knowledge norm, I argue, allows us to 
preserve the virtues of the truth norm while avoiding its unpalatable conse-
quences. Specifically, the knowledge norm does not succumb to the objections 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi raise against truth norms. Moreover, it is a plausible 
candidate for a constitutive doxastic norm – one that serves to distinguish belief 
from other cognitive attitudes. And finally, I argue that the knowledge norm can 
plausibly explain why the less controversial epistemic norms hold, since unlike 
the truth norm, the knowledge norm does not clash with the epistemic norms in 
some of the ‘hard cases’ (coin-toss and lottery cases, in particular). 
Chapter 3 defends normativism against objections from Kathrin Glüer and 
Åsa Wikforss. According to their ‘no guidance argument’, if truth norms are con-
stitutive of belief, then they must be capable of guiding belief formation; but if 
truth norms are in force, then they cannot guide belief formation, and so belief 
cannot be constitutively normative. Moreover, according to the ‘regress of moti-
vations’ argument, not all belief can be rule- or norm-guided, otherwise we get a 
vicious infinite regress. (Although I defend the knowledge norm in Chapter 2, 
the no guidance argument is quite independent of the particular norm we en-
dorse; so I assume the truth norm holds for most of Chapter 3.) In §3.2, I outline 
Glüer and Wikforss’ no guidance argument and regress of motivations argu-
ment. §3.3 offers further clarifications of the no guidance argument, since it is 
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important to be clear about what the argument amounts to and a number of 
commentators have been misled by it. §3.4 suggests a potential way of blocking 
some of Glüer and Wikforss’ arguments against normativism by an appeal to (a 
particular understanding of) the notion of blind rule-following. A foray into the 
literature on blind rule-following will be necessary in order to see how we might 
block some arguments against normativism. §3.4.1, therefore, outlines 
Boghossian’s ‘inference problem’ for rule-following and Alex Miller’s solution to 
it. In §3.4.2, I argue that Miller’s solution to the inference problem might provide 
us with the tools to block some of Glüer and Wikforss’ arguments against nor-
mativism. §3.5 considers a second way of blocking these arguments against nor-
mativism, from Teemu Toppinen. I argue that, although we might accept Toppi-
nen’s objections to Glüer and Wikforss, his own positive account of the way in 
which norms guide belief is likely to face difficulties. In §3.6, I conclude with a 
brief sketch of the way in which the knowledge norm defended in Chapter 2 
might guide belief formation, though this account is necessarily incomplete and 




1 AGAINST THE ERROR THEORY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to the moral error theorist, there are no moral facts: moral judgements 
are systematically and uniformly false. A popular strategy in recent years in 
arguing against the moral error theory is to develop a companions in guilt (CG) 
argument. According to CG arguments, arguments for the error theory are in-
sufficient: either they rely on premises which do not warrant scepticism about 
moral facts, or they threaten to support an implausible error-theoretic conclu-
sion in other areas of discourse – areas which seem safe from a sceptical conclu-
sion, such as epistemic or practical reasoning. This chapter attempts to develop 
a CG argument against the error theory, connecting the literature on CG argu-
ments (in the context of epistemic normativity) with the literature on doxastic 
normativism, the thesis that norms are in some sense constitutive of belief. In 
§1.2, I contrast the error theory with moral realism, and introduce what I call 
‘the problem of normativity’ – the problem of explaining what moral facts could 
possibly be. §1.3 outlines the argument from queerness, J. L. Mackie’s influential 
argument for the moral error theory. In §1.4, I give an overview of CG argu-
ments, and clarifications of the sort of argument I will be making (§1.4.1). I ar-
gue that, if doxastic normativism is true and the argument from queerness goes 
through, then a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness can be devel-
oped (§1.4.2). In §1.5, I flesh out this doxastic analogue of the argument from 
queerness. I argue that – assuming normativism – a doxastic analogue of the 
argument from queerness would be highly implausible. The conclusion of such 
an argument would be the paradoxical one that there are no beliefs and no be-
lievers; to believe it would be to commit cognitive suicide. The upshot is that if 
normativism is true, then the moral error theorist is in trouble, since a doxastic 
analogue of the argument from queerness (if sound) would prove too much: it 




1.2 MORAL REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY 
Discussions of the metaphysics and epistemology of normativity abound in con-
temporary philosophy.1 While ethics is perhaps the most obvious example of a 
normative area of thought and talk, normative concepts are numerous and var-
ied. On the face of it, a concept is normative when either certain ‘oughts’ or obli-
gations can be derived from judgements involving it, or when prior norms are in 
force that govern the application of the concept. Thus it has become standard in 
recent discourse for philosophers to proceed from the assumption that, inter alia, 
concepts such as virtue, justice, meaning, mental content, and knowledge are all 
intrinsically normative concepts.2 Take virtue, for example. According to 
Rosalind Hursthouse, the concept of a virtue “is the concept of something that 
makes its possessor good; a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent, or ad-
mirable person who acts and reacts well, rightly, as she should” (2000: 13). Vir-
tue, therefore, is a normative concept in that a virtuous agent is someone who 
has, in the course of becoming virtuous, incurred a certain disposition to act as 
she ought. So the key feature of normative concepts seems to be that they are in 
some sense prescriptive or action-guiding. This chapter draws a parallel between 
moral normativity and doxastic normativity. I shall say more about the sense in 
which belief purports to be normative below, as well as in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Some philosophers have claimed that a significant ontological challenge is 
borne by the moral realist: the challenge of explaining how there can possibly be 
normative facts of the sort required for the theory to be true. Call this the prob-
lem of normativity. Moral realism, in the sense discussed here, is the following 
view (Sayre-McCord 1986): 
                                                 
1 Cf. Finlay (2010). 
2 See Korsgaard (1996) for discussion. 
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(MORAL REALISM): Moral judgements (i) purport to state facts; and (i) some 
moral judgements are true.3 
For example, according to the moral realist, the moral judgement “torturing chil-
dren is wrong” expresses the belief, apt for assessment in terms of truth and 
falsity, that torturing children is wrong. Moreover, the judgement has the truth-
value true if and only if it is the case that torturing children is wrong. Moral 
realists are therefore cognitivists about moral judgement, i.e. the judgements in 
question express truth-apt beliefs. By contrast, non-cognitivists about moral 
judgement deny in the first place that moral judgements even purport to state 
facts; rather, the judgements in question express conative (rather than cognitive) 
mental states such as feelings, sentiments, or attitudes of approval and disap-
proval.4 Moral judgements, according to the non-cognitivist, are not even truth-
apt, so the moral judgement “torturing children is wrong” just expresses some-
thing like an attitude of disapproval towards torturing children. 
Moral realism is opposed by both cognitivist and non-cognitivist anti-realism. 
Cognitivist anti-realists accept (i) but deny (ii); non-cognitivists deny both (i) and 
(ii). The moral realist appears to face an explanatory burden not shared by anti-
                                                 
3 Of course, moral realism as understood here is very broad. In particular, (MORAL REALISM) 
as defined here says nothing about whether moral facts need to be mind-independent. Thus even 
Korsgaard’s (1996) Kantian constructivism, according to which moral facts are mind-dependent, 
would on the present picture count as moral realism. This might be controversial, but nothing 
in what follows will turn on this. 
4 The assumption underlying (our present understanding of) the distinction between cogni-
tivism and non-cognitivism, then, is this: the cognitivist endorses a factualist moral semantics 
which goes hand-in-hand with their psychological account of moral judgement. That is, in saying 
that moral judgements are truth-apt, the cognitivist is saying that those judgements express 
beliefs. On the other hand, the non-cognitivist endorses a non-factualist moral semantics which 
goes hand in hand with their account of moral judgement. That is, in saying that moral judge-
ments are not truth-apt, the non-cognitivist is saying that moral judgements express some con-
ative mental state which lacks truth-conditions. However, it is worth noting that some philoso-
phers separate their account of moral semantics from their account of moral psychology. For 
example, Richard Joyce (2001) combines factualism about moral semantics with cognitivism 
about moral psychology. While he maintains that cognitivism gives an accurate description of 
our current moral practice, he advocates a revolutionary moral fictionalism involving a revisal 
of our moral practice along non-cognitivist lines. By contrast, Mark Kalderon’s hermeneutic 
moral fictionalism (2005) combines factualism about moral semantics with non-cognitivism 
about moral psychology. See §6.7 and §6.10 of Miller (2013) for a discussion of these issues. 
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realists of both sorts: what could it possibly be that makes moral claims true? 
The moral realist is committed to the existence of moral facts, and so must give 
an account of their metaphysics and epistemology.5 J.L. Mackie (1977) is an eth-
ical sceptic who retains a commitment to cognitivism; he argues for an error 
theory about moral judgement, according to which moral judgements do purport 
to state facts, only they are systematically and uniformly false.6,7 The moral 
judgement “torturing children is wrong”, then, does express the belief that tor-
turing children is wrong, only it is false, since there is nothing in the world which 
acts as its truth-maker. On the other hand, early ethical non-cognitivists, such 
as A. J. Ayer (1946), argue for an emotivist theory of moral language, according 
to which moral judgements express sentiments or attitudes of approval and dis-
approval.8 This is sometimes – though often pejoratively – labeled the “boo!/hur-
rah!” theory of moral judgement: to say that torturing children is wrong is like 
saying “Boo! (torturing children)”; to say that one ought to give to charity is like 
saying “Hurrah! (giving to charity)”. This thesis focuses primarily on the error 
theory. A full defense of moral realism would need to rebut non-cognitivism, but 
I can only attempt to rebut Mackie’s arguments here. If we can show that the 
                                                 
5 Note that some moral realists – often those of a broadly Wittgensteinian bent – have a prior 
commitment to metaphysical or philosophical quietism, and so will feel no pressure to give such 
an account of the metaphysics and epistemology of moral facts. Non-reductionists such as John 
McDowell (1994, 1998), for instance, take normativity to be of a more primitive character and 
are unlikely to accept the explanatory burden being demanded here. I will not address such 
positions at present; rather, I want to concede that the explanation of normativity poses a (po-
tential) problem for moral realism and assess the implications of this for other kinds of realism. 
6 More precisely, the error theorist is committed to the claim that all positive, atomic moral 
judgements (e.g., “One ought to give to charity”) are systematically and uniformly false (cf. 
Pigden 2007). Nothing in what follows will turn on this, so I will not use the ‘positive, atomic’ 
qualification hereafter. 
7 Mackie is certainly not the only error theorist, nor is the argument from queerness the only 
argument for the error theory. I focus on Mackie, since the argument from queerness is by far 
the most influential argument for the moral error theory. However, see Hinckfuss (1987), Garner 
(1990, 2007), Joyce (2001), Olson (2014), and Streumer (2017). ‘The error theory’ hereafter refers 
primarily to Mackie’s version of it, unless otherwise specified. 
8 See also Stevenson (1944) and Hare (1952) for classic defenses of ethical non-cognitivism. 
Contemporary defenders of ethical non-cognitivism (though they eschew the label “non-cogni-
tivism” in favor of “expressivism”) include Blackburn (1984) and Gibbard (1990). 
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argument from queerness is unsound, then we will have taken some first steps 
towards solving the problem of normativity. 
 1.3 THE ARGUMENT FROM QUEERNESS 
Let us examine Mackie’s argument for the moral error theory: the argument 
from queerness. First, however, we need to examine Mackie’s prior, conceptual 
commitments. According to Michael Smith (1994: Chapter 3), what allows 
Mackie to argue for the error theory is a conceptual commitment to moral ra-
tionalism, or strong motivational internalism. Roughly put, moral rationalism is 
the thesis that there is an internal relation between what is morally right and 
agents’ reasons for action; and motivational internalism, roughly put, is the the-
sis that there is an internal relation between moral judgement and motivation. 
More precisely, Smith distinguishes three versions of the thesis, the first of 
which entails either the second or the third: 
(MORAL RATIONALISM): It is a conceptual truth that if it is right for agents 
to φ in circumstances C, then there is a reason for those agents to φ in C. 
(MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM*): It is a conceptual truth that if an agent 
judges it right for her to φ in circumstances C, then she is motivated to φ 
in C. 
(MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM**): It is a conceptual truth that if an agent 
judges it right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated 
to φ in C or she is practically irrational. 
Thus commitment to (MORAL RATIONALISM) is quite a strong commitment, while 
commitment to either form of motivational internalism on its own is a weaker 
10 
 
commitment.9 (MORAL RATIONALISM) makes no mention of the agents’ judge-
ments that φ-ing is right: if vegetarianism is morally right, then an agent A has 
a reason not to eat meat. (MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM*) is weaker – it mentions 
A’s judgement that φ-ing is right – but it is still fairly strong since it carries 
motivation with it simpliciter: if A judges vegetarianism to be right, her motiva-
tion not to eat meat cannot be defeated by such commonplace phenomena as 
weakness of the will. So while (MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM*) is weaker than 
(MORAL RATIONALISM), it is still fairly strong. (MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM**) 
puts a practicality requirement on moral judgement. It is defeasible in that it can 
accommodate weakness of the will and other motivation-sapping phenomena: if 
A judges vegetarianism to be right, then either she is motivated not to eat meat 
or she is practically irrational. Someone is practically irrational when they are 
suffering from weakness of the will or other sorts of practical akrasia that sap 
one’s motivation; if someone is depressed, for example, then we cannot expect 
their moral reasons to line up with the course of action (or lack of action) that 
they take. So, prima facie, (MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM**) seems to be the most 
plausible commitment out of the three.10 
It is important to emphasize that, for the rationalist and motivational inter-
nalist, (MORAL RATIONALISM) and both versions of motivational internalism are 
conceptual truths. Motivational externalists will accept as a contingent fact about 
human beings that, say, if A judges vegetarianism to be right, then either she is 
motivated not to eat meat or she is practically irrational. The difference is the 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that while (MORAL RATIONALISM) entails whichever version of moti-
vational internalism is true, one can be committed to motivational internalism without being 
committed to moral rationalism. Since moral rationalism entails (some version of) motivational 
internalism, someone who thinks that motivational internalism is false will have to say that 
moral rationalism is false by modus tollens. 
10 One might worry, however, that (MOTIVATIONAL INTERNALISM**) is too weak. As Anandi 
Hattiangadi puts it: “if one can make a normative judgement and still not be motivated (because 
one is practically irrational), then it seems as though there is no longer a conceptual or necessary 
link between normative judgements and motivation – normative judgements do not introduce a 
‘new relation’” (2007: 42). I cannot explore these issues properly here. As such, I will assume 
that some version of motivational internalism is plausible. 
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externalist denies that this is a conceptual truth.11 On their view, it is just a 
contingent fact about human beings that, barring any practical irrationality, 
they are motivated to act in accord with their moral judgements; there is no 
conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. 
Now, let us simply grant Mackie his commitment to (MORAL RATIONALSIM).12 
Smith points out that in order for the argument from queerness to get off the 
ground, Mackie must ask both a conceptual question and a substantive or onto-
logical question about the nature of putative moral facts. Consider an analogous 
case. Suppose we are interested in the question of whether there are any uni-
corns. In order to answer this question, we need to ask both a conceptual and a 
substantive/ontological question about the nature of unicorns. First, we ask 
what our concept of a unicorn is. We might say that our concept of a unicorn is 
the concept of a horse-like creature with a magical horn. Second, we ask whether 
there is anything in the world that instantiates that concept; that is, we ask 
whether there are really any horse-like creatures with magical horns. Since our 
answer to the second question will be no, we will say that there are no unicorns. 
Mackie follows essentially the same procedure. In order to answer the ques-
tion, “Are there any moral facts?” (or “objective values” as Mackie puts it), we 
need to first ask what our concept of a moral fact is, and second, whether there 
is anything in the world instantiating that concept. In answering the conceptual 
question, Mackie makes use of Kant’s distinction in the Groundwork of the Met-
aphysics of Morals between hypothetical imperatives, on the one hand, and cat-
egorical imperatives on the other.13 Hypothetical imperatives are imperatives 
that can be overridden by a change in one’s contingent desires; they are, in 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Sturgeon (1985), Railton (1986), and Brink (1986); cf. Foot (1972). 
12 Many philosophers who reject the error theory reject it precisely because they think this 
commitment is too strong. See, e.g., Finlay (2008), and Joyce (2011) for a reply to such criticism. 
13 Kant (1785: §II). For example: “[A]ll imperatives command either hypothetically or categor-
ically. The former represent the practical necessity [praktische Notwendigkeit] of a possible ac-
tion as a means to achieving something else that one wants (or at least that is possible for one 
to want). The categorical imperative would be the one that represented an action as objectively 
necessary [objectiv-notwendig] by itself, without reference to another end” (§II, 4.414, 57). 
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Kant’s terminology, “practically necessary” (praktisch-notwendig) and take the 
general form: “If you want X, then you ought to do Y”. But categorical impera-
tives have normative force independently of our desires; they are “objectively 
necessary” (objectiv-notwendig) and take the general form: “You ought to do Y”.14 
A categorical imperative to do Y would hold regardless of whether one desired 
X. For example, “Torturing children is wrong” contains a categorical imperative 
not to torture children; it holds regardless of any desire to (not) torture children. 
By contrast, the ought in the imperative, “If you want to get to the Octagon by 
5:30pm, then you ought to take the 5:00pm bus” is merely a hypothetical ought; 
its normative force comes entirely from the contingent desire you have to get to 
the Octagon by 5:30pm – if you have no desire to get to the Octagon by 5:30pm, 
then you have no reason to take the 5:00pm bus. 
Now, for Mackie, our concept of a moral fact is the concept of a fact about an 
objectively prescriptive feature of the world, where an objectively prescriptive 
feature of the world is a categorical reason for action.15 Recall Mackie’s commit-
ment to moral rationalism. If it is morally right to φ, then agents have a reason 
to φ. “A reason” here should be read as “a categorical reason”: for Mackie, cate-
gorical imperatives of the form “You ought to do Y” just say that there is a cate-
gorical reason to do Y, independently of any contingent desires for X. So Mackie 
has answered the conceptual question: our concept of a moral fact is the concept 
of an objectively prescriptive feature of the world, or a fact about a categorical 
                                                 
14 The distinction is not merely grammatical; the point is not that hypothetical imperatives 
are grammatically conditional, while categorical imperatives are not. Rather, it is that categor-
ical imperatives cannot be overridden by a change in one’s contingent desires. Indeed, categorical 
imperatives can sometimes be conditional in form: “If you see a drowning child, you ought to 
save him” is presumably a categorical imperative (if there are any categorical imperatives), be-
cause no facts about your contingent desires bear on whether you ought to save the child. 
15 I will assume in what follows that the relationship between (normative) reasons and oughts 
is this: reasons are facts that count in favour of some performance and explain what we ought to 
do (cf. Raz 1975). This assumption is not entirely uncontroversial (see, e.g., Railton 1986; Broome 
2000, 2004). However, it should be relatively harmless in the present context. Below, I draw a 
parallel between moral reasons or oughts and doxastic reasons or oughts. For this parallel to 
work, all we need is for belief to be categorically normative, regardless of whether the norma-
tivity in question is construed in terms of reasons or in terms of oughts. After all, Broome himself 
acknowledges that our most familiar normative concepts are ought and a reason (2000: 78). 
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moral reason for action (pace Foot 1972). But what of the substantive/ontological 
question? Mackie’s answer is that moral facts, if they existed, would be meta-
physically and epistemologically ‘queer’: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a 
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if 
we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or 
intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else (1977: 38).  
On the metaphysical side, moral facts would have to be sui generis, akin to 
Moore’s non-natural qualities (Moore 1903) or Plato’s Form of the Good. On the 
epistemological side, knowledge of the ‘authoritative prescriptivity’ of moral 
facts would have to come from some special faculty of moral perception or intui-
tion. If we had knowledge of some distinctively ethical premise, for example, the 
way we would have to have acquired this knowledge would be by some special 
sort of intuition: none of our ordinary ways of knowing (sensory perception, in-
trospection, confirmation of some explanatory hypothesis, and so on) would do. 
So objectively prescriptive features of the world would be epistemologically 
queer too. Moreover, according to Mackie, arguments for the existence of moral 
facts such as those of Plato and Moore provide us with a “dramatic picture” of 
what such facts would have to be: 
The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both a direc-
tion and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the person who knows 
this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by anyone 
who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every 
person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pur-
suedness somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and 
wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built 
into it (1977: 40).  
Thus if there were any objectively prescriptive features of the world, they would 
be metaphysically and epistemologically queer: they would provide one with a 
categorical moral reason for action or abstention, but it is not clear what such 
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things could possibly be or how we could possibly know them. The upshot of this, 
according to Mackie, is that there are no objectively prescriptive features of the 
world – i.e., there are no categorical moral reasons for action – so there are no 
moral facts. We can therefore (following Miller 2010) reconstruct the argument 
from queerness as follows: 
(1) Our concept of a moral fact is a concept of a reason for action. 
(2) If our concept of a moral fact is a concept of a reason for action, then our 
concept of a moral fact is a concept of an objectively prescriptive feature 
of the world. 
(3) Therefore, our concept of a moral fact is a concept of an objectively pre-
scriptive feature of the world. 
(4) But if our concept of a moral fact is a concept of an objectively prescriptive 
feature of the world and there are no objectively prescriptive features of 
the world, then moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. 
(5) There are no objectively prescriptive features of the world. 
(6) Therefore, moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. 
Subconclusion (3) follows straightforwardly from premises (1) and (2). And we 
can grant premise (4): it is obvious that moral judgements would be systemati-
cally and uniformly false if we accept the conceptual claim that moral facts 
would have to be objectively prescriptive but deny the ontological claim that 
there are any objectively prescriptive features of the world. (By analogy, our uni-
corn judgements are systematically and uniformly false because there is nothing 
in the world that instantiates our concept of a unicorn.) So if – contra the moral 
externalists – we can grant premise (1), then the argument turns on premise (5): 
we can get to the main conclusion (6) only if there really are no objectively pre-
scriptive features of the world. But we saw that, according to Mackie, there can 
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be no such features; for if there were, they would be metaphysically and episte-
mologically queer. So there are no moral facts: moral judgements are systemat-
ically and uniformly false. 
For our present purposes, let us suppose that the argument from queerness 
is sound or at least plausible – that is, suppose Mackie’s argument poses a sig-
nificant challenge to the moral realist (or at least to the moral realist who ac-
cepts premise (1)). The realist, then, faces the challenge of explaining what 
moral facts – if they exist – could possibly be. 
1.4 COMPANIONS IN GUILT ARGUMENTS 
A popular strategy in recent literature for arguing against the moral error the-
ory (or sometimes against other forms of metaethical anti-realism, such as non-
cognitivism) is to develop a ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) argument, according to 
which the argument from queerness is insufficient because it threatens to un-
dermine the idea that there are categorical epistemic or practical norms.16 The 
idea is that there are objectively prescriptive epistemic facts (or whatever), and 
since there is nothing ‘queer’ about these facts, there shouldn’t be anything queer 
about moral facts either. In other words, CG arguments identify an area of dis-
course which involves categorical norms but which is ‘safe’ from the argument 
from queerness. Mackie himself suggests that this is the most promising strat-
egy for rebutting the argument from queerness: 
[T]he best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade [the argument from queerness], 
but to look for companions in guilt. For example, Richard Price argues that it is not moral 
knowledge alone that such an empiricism as those of Locke and Hume is unable to account 
                                                 
16 Perhaps one of the most influential CG arguments, based on the parallel between moral 
and epistemic normativity, is due to Cuneo (2007). See also Stratton-Lake (2002: xxv-xxvi), Kelly 
(2003), Shafer-Landau (2003: 113), Rowland (2013, 2016), Greco (2015), Das (2016, 2017), 
Worsnip (2016), and Clipsham (201X). Heathwood (2009), Olson (2011), Husi (2013) and Cowie 
(2014, 2016) offer criticism of this sort of argument. Note that CG arguments need not neces-
sarily appeal to epistemic normativity: other CG arguments draw a parallel with mathematics 
(Clark-Doane 2012), prudence (Fletcher 2017), love (Keller 2017), or any type of normative judg-
ment (Bedke 2010; cf. Streumer 2017). See also Lillehammer (2007) for a comprehensive, critical 
survey of the literature on CG arguments. 
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for, but also our knowledge and even our ideas of essence, number, identity, diversity, 
solidity, inertia, substance, the necessary existence and infinite extension of time and 
space, necessity and possibility in general, power, and causation. If the understanding, 
which Price defines as the faculty within us that discerns truth, is also a source of new 
simple ideas of so many other sorts, may it not also be a power of immediately perceiving 
right and wrong, which yet are real characters of actions? […] This is an important counter 
to the argument from queerness. The only adequate reply to it would be to show how, on 
empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of the ideas and beliefs and knowledge 
that we have of all these matters (1977: 39). 
The idea behind “the only adequate reply” to this objection is that, for example, 
necessity and possibility might seem ‘queer’, and so in order to avoid an error 
theoretic conclusion about necessity and possibility, one would need to give an 
empiricist account of them. It is perhaps surprising that Mackie does not pursue 
this counter to the argument from queerness much further. Indeed, Mackie is 
clear that the argument from queerness does not undermine the objectivity of 
moral values alone: 
The claim that values are not objective, are not part of the fabric of the world, is meant to 
include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated with moral value, 
but also other things that could be more loosely called moral values or disvalues – right-
ness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action’s being rotten and contemptible, and so 
on. It also includes non-moral values, notably aesthetic ones, beauty and various kinds of 
artistic merit (1977: 15). 
But why stop at aesthetic value? This thesis discusses doxastic value and nor-
mativity: if there are objective or categorical doxastic norms, then the argument 
from queerness – if sound – will surely undermine them. Before we get into this, 
however, it is worth saying something more about precisely the sort of argument 




1.4.1 HOW COMPANIONS IN GUILT ARGUMENTS WORK 
In a comprehensive survey of the literature on CG arguments, Hallvard 
Lillehammer (2007) distinguishes two kinds of CG argument: those by entail-
ment, on the one hand, and those by analogy, on the other. Lillehammer gives 
the following characterization of CG arguments by entailment: 
Companions in guilt arguments by entailment work by showing that some set of philo-
sophically problematic claims are necessarily implied by a different set of claims that 
are agreed not to be philosophically problematic in the same way […] Arguments by 
entailment in ethics and the philosophy of value relate ethical or other evaluative claims 
to some different set of claims, the objectivity of which is not in serious doubt, and then 
purport to show that the relevant ethical or evaluative claims actually follow by necessity 
from the truth of these underlying claims. With respect to their truth and objectivity, 
the two sets of claims are companions in guilt as a matter of necessity (2007: 11). 
Lillehammer notes that entailment is not a matter of degree: the idea is that 
scepticism about ethical value necessarily implies scepticism about its compan-
ion, in an ‘all or nothing’ sort of way. By contrast, CG arguments by analogy 
identify companions which might in some respects be similar to ethical values 
and dissimilar in other respects, where similarity is a matter of degree: 
Arguments by analogy compare two sets of claims with the aim of showing that they are 
similar in some important respect […] Companions in guilt arguments by analogy in ethics 
and the philosophy of value compare evaluative claims with some set of claims generally 
assumed to be less problematic with respect to their objectivity, and then show that the 
two sets of claims exhibit the very same features that, in the evaluative case, have gener-
ated scepticism about their objectivity. With respect to the features in question, the two 
sets of claims are companions in guilt (2007: 13). 
In what follows, I focus primarily on CG arguments by analogy. Indeed, the ar-
gument I will be making relies on the claim that there is sufficient similarity 
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between moral and doxastic normativity in order for the argument from queer-
ness to be run against the latter.17 There are two issues here. First, we need to 
ask whether there is sufficient ‘parity’ between moral and doxastic facts for this 
strategy to work. Second, we need an account of the doxastic norms: are they 
categorical, and if so, what grounds them? These two issues correspond to two 
ways a defender of the error theory might block CG arguments. For one thing, 
the error theorist might deny that moral reasons and doxastic reasons are suffi-
ciently analogous: she might, for instance, identify some key respect in which 
moral norms and doxastic norms are dissimilar, thereby blocking the claim that 
they stand or fall together. Moreover, the error theorist might deny that doxastic 
norms are categorical: she might say that the doxastic ought is a mere hypothet-
ical ought that can be ‘translated away’ so as to give a naturalistic account of 
it.18 
Let us start with the first issue. To begin with, take two influential examples 
of CG arguments by analogy, based on a parallel between moral and epistemic 
normativity. The first is Terence Cuneo’s ‘core argument’ for moral realism 
(2007: 6): 
(i) If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. 
                                                 
17 Many extant CG arguments rely on a parallel between moral and epistemic normativity. 
My own CG argument, however, relies on a parallel between moral and doxastic normativity. I 
discuss epistemic normativity in the context of CG arguments only for illustrative purposes. But 
what is the difference between doxastic and epistemic normativity? Epistemic norms are norms 
the satisfaction of which is necessary in order for a subject to have justified beliefs. By contrast, 
as will become clear below, doxastic norms are the norms necessary in order for a subject to have 
beliefs proper. Similarly, epistemic reasons are reasons for belief, whereas doxastic reasons are 
reasons for ascription of belief. The distinction is subtle, but important, since my own CG argu-
ment (based on doxastic normativity) will if sound provide us with a different way of rejecting 
the argument from queerness, from that of many extant CG arguments. 
18 Indeed, the hypothetical imperative “If you want to get to the Octagon by 5:30pm, then you 
ought to take the 5:00pm bus” can be translated away as: “Taking the 5:00pm bus will get you 
to the Octagon by 5:30pm”. That is why hypothetical imperatives are generally thought to square 
neatly with naturalism. I cannot properly explore the issue of normativity vs naturalism here. 
For some classic discussions of the matter, see Hume on ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (1738: §3.1.1.27), Moore 
on the open-question argument (1903: Chapter 1), and Sellars on the distinction between the 
‘causal space of nature’ and the ‘normative space of reasons’ (1956). See also Darwall, Gibbard, 
and Railton (1992) for useful discussion. 
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(ii) Epistemic facts exist. 
(iii) Therefore, moral facts exist. 
(iv) If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. 
(v) Therefore, moral realism is true. 
The second influential CG argument by analogy is Richard Rowland’s ‘argument 
from epistemic reasons’ (2013: 1): 
(i) According to moral error theory, there are no categorical normative rea-
sons. 
(ii) If there are no categorical normative reasons, then there are no epistemic 
reasons for belief. 
(iii) But there are epistemic reasons for belief. 
(iv) Therefore, there are categorical normative reasons. 
(v) Therefore, moral error theory is false. 
It should be relatively clear – at least assuming there are epistemic facts/reasons 
for belief – that both arguments turn the same respective premise, (i) in Cuneo’s 
core argument, and (ii) in Rowland’s argument from epistemic reasons. Whether 
the CG argument goes through depends on the parity between moral facts and 
epistemic facts. The idea behind this is that epistemic reasons, like moral rea-
sons, purport to be categorically normative: for example, you ought (categori-
cally) to form beliefs in accordance with evidence. If epistemic reasons are indeed 
categorically normative and they exist, then the argument from queerness is 
unsound, since it relies on the premise the there are no categorically normative 
properties or objectively prescriptive features of the world (premise (5) in the 
argument from queerness above). Call the premise according to which moral and 
epistemic norms stand or fall together the parity premise. (I take it that our con-
siderations of the parity premise regarding moral and epistemic normativity will 
apply mutatis mutandis to doxastic normativity, if we can show that doxastic 
norms are categorically normative.) 
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Is the parity premise true? Suppose – at least for the moment – that the error 
theorist concedes that epistemic facts are categorical. Given this supposition, 
one worry might be that although moral and epistemic reasons are alike with 
respect to their categoricity, they are unlike in another respect: belief is about 
facts, ethics is about acts. In other words, moral reasons are reasons to perform 
some act, whereas epistemic reasons are reasons for belief. Thus there is a 
disanalogy between moral and epistemic reasons, and this counts against the 
parity premise being true. But this objection seems to miss the mark. As Row-
land argues: 
But moral error theorists are not, qua error theorists, skeptics about the facts (or proposi-
tions) that we take to be moral reasons. Nor are they skeptics about the acts for which we 
take these facts to be reasons. Rather, moral error theorists are skeptics about the reason 
relation that we take to hold between the facts and the acts. Some fact’s being a normative 
reason for an act is just its having the relational property of being a normative reason for 
an act […] Moral error theorists claim that categorical normative warranting relations do 
not exist. But if the moral error theorists’ skepticism is about categorical normative rela-
tions, they cannot be skeptical about categorical normative relations that have acts as one 
of their relata, but not about categorical normative relations that have beliefs as one of 
their relata (2013: 3-4). 
The idea is that, while it is true that in the moral case the reasons in question 
are reasons for action, and that in the epistemic case the reasons in question are 
reasons for belief, this does not undermine the parity premise. For we can think 
of reasons for belief and reasons for action as different relata of the same nor-
mative relation: that of being a reason for.19 (However, it seems correct to say 
that reasons’ being a kind of warranting relation does not preclude them from 
being facts, for relations can also be facts.) 
                                                 
19 According to Alan Millar (2009), the parity between moral and epistemic reasons is this: 
both reasons for intentional action and reasons for belief are defined by a constitutive aim, 
though they differ in what that aim is. Whereas belief is defined by the constitutive aim of truth, 
“the constitutive aim of intentional action is simply that the action should have a point, as being 
either a means to an end or the realization of some end of the agent” (2009: 143). I cannot 
properly pursue this line of argument here, though I discuss belief’s having an aim below. 
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 It has been suggested that there is a more fundamental issue with CG argu-
ments. By way of criticism, Christopher Cowie reconstructs a general CG argu-
ment by analogy as follows (2014: 408): 
(i) If the arguments for the moral error theory are sufficient to establish its 
truth, then those arguments (or appropriate analogues of them) are also 
sufficient to establish the truth of the epistemic error theory. (Parity 
premise.) 
(ii) The epistemic error theory is false. (Epistemic existence premise.) 
(iii) Therefore, the arguments for the moral error theory are not sufficient to 
establish that the moral error theory is true. 
Cowie argues that there is an internal tension between the parity premise (i) 
and the epistemic existence premise (ii) of the general CG argument. A conse-
quence of this, he claims, is that CG arguments cannot work: the internal ten-
sion between (i) and (ii) undermines either the soundness or the dialectical force 
of CG arguments. Cowie (2014: 410) gives two objections to the idea that prem-
ises (i) and (ii) of the general CG argument yield the conclusion (iii). On the one 
hand, there is the objection from disparity, according to which the arguments 
typically offered for the epistemic existence premise undermine the parity prem-
ise. On the other hand, there is the objection from redundancy, according to 
which there are some arguments for the epistemic existence premise which do 
not undermine the parity premise, but which nevertheless render CG arguments 
dialectically redundant. If either of these objections succeed, then they under-
mine either the soundness or the dialectical force of CG arguments, respectively. 
Let us examine each of Cowie’s objections in turn. 
To begin with, note that Cowie’s rebuttal of CG arguments takes the form of 
a dilemma. The idea is that affirming the reality of epistemic reasons does not 
undermine scepticism about moral reasons, because: 
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(a) Either the objection from disparity undermines the parity premise and 
hence the companions in guilt argument; 
(b) Or the objection from redundancy renders the companions in guilt argu-
ment dialectically redundant (Cowie 2014: 410). 
After fleshing out each objection, Cowie draws an ambitious conclusion from this 
dilemma: if there is an internal tension between (i) and (ii) such that we get a 
dilemma of the sort Cowie introduces, then CG arguments could not possibly 
work. Let us examine, then, both horns of the dilemma. 
Let us start with the first horn (a). According to Cowie’s disparity objection, 
many arguments typically offered for the epistemic existence premise end up 
undermining the parity premise. But what are these arguments for the epis-
temic existence premise? According to one influential line of argument, the ep-
istemic existence premise must be true because its denial would be self-defeat-
ing.20 Call this the argument from self-defeat. Here is Philip Stratton-Lake: 
If […] value is to be understood in terms of reasons, then (assuming one has no problem 
with actions and psychological attitudes) one’s scepticism about value would have to stem 
from scepticism about reasons. But if an error theory about value rests on an error theory 
about reasons, then the error theorist would be committed both to the view that we have 
good reason to deny the existence of reasons, and that this implies that all of our reasons 
judgements are false. But such a view seems to undermine itself, for it is to say that we 
have reason to be sceptical about reasons, and implies that it is false that we have reason 
to be sceptical about reasons (2002: xxv). 
Terence Cuneo makes a similar argument against a proponent of ‘epistemic ni-
hilism’, roughly the epistemic counterpart to Mackie’s error theory – the view 
that there are no epistemic facts, that there are no epistemic reasons for belief, 
and so on: 
                                                 
20 For reasons of space, I cannot possibly hope to outline all of the arguments for the epistemic 
existence premise. I focus, therefore, on just two: the argument from self-defeat, to be outlined 




Either epistemic nihilists hold that we have reasons to believe epistemic nihilism or that 
we do not. If epistemic nihilists hold that we do have reasons to believe their position, then 
their position is self-defeating in the sense that it presupposes the existence of the very 
sorts of entity that it claims do not exist. After all, if we have reasons to believe epistemic 
nihilism, then it follows by conceptual necessity that we rationally ought, all other things 
being equal, to believe it. But there are no rational oughts according to epistemic nihilists; 
there are no facts that imply that certain propositions are belief-worthy or that failing to 
believe something on good available evidence renders one (all other things being equal) 
irrational (2007: 117). 
The idea is that the epistemic existence premise is true because one cannot co-
herently deny it: if you deny that there are any epistemic reasons, for example, 
then you cannot coherently believe that there are no epistemic reasons, since 
you have epistemic reasons to believe that there are no epistemic reasons.21 
Cowie (2014: 411) reconstructs this general line of argument as follows: 
(1) If the epistemic error theory is true, then there are no epistemic reasons 
for belief. 
(2) If there are no epistemic reasons for belief, then there is no epistemic rea-
son to believe the epistemic error theory. 
(3) So, either the epistemic error theory is false or there is no epistemic rea-
son to believe it. 
(4) Therefore, we should reject the epistemic error theory. 
(5) Therefore, the epistemic existence premise is true. 
Cowie argues that the argument from self-defeat – if sound – has the upshot 
that we should reject the parity premise. For if the argument from self-defeat is 
successful, then it shows only that there is a sufficient reason for rejecting the 
                                                 
21 Granted, it doesn’t follow, from the fact that we have no reason to believe a given theory, 
that the theory is false (cf. Olson 2011; Streumer 2017). But we can assume for the sake of ar-
gument – as Cowie does (2014: 411) – that this reply to the argument from self-defeat misses the 
mark. Cowie wants to argue that, even if we concede that the argument from self-defeat war-




epistemic error theory. But this, according to Cowie, undermines the parity 
premise: 
[A]n analogue of [the argument from self-defeat] certainly would not show there to be a 
sufficient reason for rejecting the moral error theory. This is because the moral error the-
ory would have the consequence that there are no moral reasons. But it would not have 
the consequence that there are no epistemic reasons. And so, the truth of the moral error 
theory would be compatible with the existence of a reason to believe that theory. This 
disanalogy undermines the parity premise. It undermines the parity premise because it 
entails that there is a sufficient reason for rejecting the epistemic error theory (namely, 
that it is self-defeating), that is not also a sufficient reason for rejecting the moral error 
theory (2014: 411). 
This, according to Cowie, is one instance of the objection from disparity. Consider 
another argument for the epistemic existence premise: the argument from global 
scepticism (Rowland 2013; cf. Cuneo 2007: 119). According to the argument from 
global scepticism, the epistemic existence premise must be true, because if it 
were false, it would imply global scepticism. Essentially, the idea is that if there 
are no epistemic reasons (i.e. if the epistemic existence premise is false), then 
nobody knows anything. Since we do know some things, the epistemic existence 
premise must be true. 
The argument from global scepticism appeals to a connection between reasons 
for belief and epistemic justification. As Rowland (2013: 13) points out, the fol-
lowing claim is relatively uncontroversial in epistemology: 
(A) If S knows that p, then there is some epistemic justification for believing 
that p. 
We can only know that it is raining outside if we have some justification for 
believing that it is raining outside; I cannot know that snow is white unless I 
have justification for believing that snow is white; and so on. We can combine 
(A) with the following claim: 
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(B) If there is some epistemic justification for believing that p, then there is 
an epistemic reason for believing that p. 
Claim (B), too, seems plausible. Rowland writes: 
It is deeply plausible that for p to justify q just is for p to be a reason for q, and that 
epistemic justifications just are epistemic reasons, or that epistemic reasons are just epis-
temic justifications. But regardless, it seems that if there is justification for a belief, then 
there is a reason to believe it. It would be extremely odd to claim that I am justified in 
believing that dinosaurs once roamed the earth but there is no reason at all for anyone to 
believe this (2013: 13). 
So it looks like (B) is plausible. If both (A) and (B) are plausible, then we have 
an argument for the epistemic existence premise. For when we combine (A) and 
(B), we get the following hypothetical syllogism: 
(A) If S knows that p, then there is some epistemic justification for believing 
that p. 
(B) If there is some epistemic justification for believing that p, then there is 
an epistemic reason for believing that p. 
(C) Therefore, if S knows that p, then there is an epistemic reason for believ-
ing that p. 
That is, if there is an epistemic reason to believe that p, then the epistemic error 
theory is false, since the epistemic error theory would say that there are no ep-
istemic reasons for belief. The argument from global scepticism – if sound – con-
stitutes a defense of the epistemic existence premise because it entails a highly 
unpalatable consequence: the consequence that, if the epistemic error theory is 
true, then we have no knowledge. For simplicity’s sake, Cowie (2014: 413) recon-
structs Rowland’s argument from global scepticism as follows: 
(1) If the epistemic error theory is true, then there are no epistemic reasons 
for belief. 
(2) If there are no epistemic reasons for belief, then we are never justified in 
believing a proposition. 
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(3) If we are never justified in believing a proposition, then we have no 
knowledge. 
(4) Therefore, if the epistemic error theory is true, then we have no 
knowledge (1, 2, 3). 
(5) But we do have some knowledge. 
(6) Therefore, the epistemic error theory is false (4, 5). 
(7) Therefore, the epistemic existence premise is true. 
Cowie suggests, however, that the argument from global scepticism is really an 
instance of a more general argument, due primarily to Cuneo (2007: 119). It is 
worth briefly outlining this more general argument, since this is the argument 
Cowie attacks – and Cowie’s objections to the more general argument will, if 
successful, also undermine the argument from global scepticism. According to 
the more general argument, “the truth of the epistemic error theory entails the 
lack of any epistemic merits or demerits; any facts about justification, warrant, 
rationality, knowledge, epistemic reasons, and so forth” (Cowie 2014: 413). Here 
is Cowie’s reconstruction of the more general argument: 
(1) If the epistemic error theory is true, then there are no normative epis-
temic facts. 
(2) If there are no normative epistemic facts, then there are no epistemic mer-
its or demerits. 
(3) Therefore, if the epistemic error theory is true, then there are no epistemic 
merits or demerits (1, 2). 
(4) But there are some epistemic merits or demerits. 
(5) Therefore, the epistemic error theory is false. 
(6) Therefore, the epistemic existence premise is true. 
Call this more general argument the argument from epistemic merits and demer-
its (Cowie 2014: 414). Now, the objection from disparity will not work against 
the argument from epistemic merits and demerits. Cowie writes: 
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Suppose that the argument from epistemic merits and demerits is sufficient to warrant 
rejection of the epistemic error theory. What would follow? One might think that the parity 
premise would be undermined in another instance of the (now familiar) objection from 
disparity. In this case, however, the argument is too quick. The objection from disparity 
doesn’t work. This is because, plausibly, the argument from epistemic merits and demerits 
does have a moral analogue that warrants rejection of the moral error theory. Specifically, 
the lack of moral merits and demerits entailed by the moral error theory may be a suffi-
ciently undesirable result to warrant rejection of that theory. If there are no moral merits 
or demerits, then there is nothing morally non-meritorious about, for example, torturing 
babies merely for fun. But, this is clearly false, and warrants rejection of the moral error 
theory (2014: 414). 
The idea is that the objection from disparity does not work against the argument 
from epistemic merits and demerits, because unlike the argument from self-de-
feat, the argument from epistemic merits and demerits does have a moral ana-
logue: the argument from moral merits and demerits. 
However, Cowie argues that the immunity of the argument from epistemic 
merits and demerits to the objection from disparity leaves it open to another: the 
objection from redundancy. That is, while the argument from epistemic merits 
and demerits avoids the first horn of Cowie’s dilemma (a), it lands upon the sec-
ond (b). According to Cowie, the immunity of the argument from epistemic mer-
its and demerits to the objection from disparity is premised on the following 
claim: 
(P) The argument from epistemic merits and demerits has a moral analogue 
(the argument from moral merits and demerits) that warrants rejection 
of the moral error theory (2014: 415). 
Cowie argues that if (P) is true, then the argument from epistemic merits and 
demerits falls into the second horn of the dilemma (b): the companions in guilt 
argument becomes dialectically redundant. For if (P) is true, then there is a di-
rect argument against the moral error theory (where a ‘direct argument’ is one 
that doesn’t proceed by analogy), which might run as follows: 
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(1) If the moral error theory is true, then there are no moral merits or demer-
its. 
(2) There are moral merits and demerits. 
(3) Therefore, the moral error theory is false.22 
But if this argument gives us sufficient direct reason to reject the moral error 
theory, then the CG argument seems to be rendered dialectically redundant. 
Cowie writes: 
[The companions in guilt argument] becomes dialectically redundant in that one would 
have a reason to accept the parity premise, and hence, the companions in guilt argument, 
only if one already possesses a sufficient, direct, argument for the falsity of the moral error 
theory. The companions in guilt argument would, then, be an idling wheel. One would be 
rationally required to accept its conclusion that the moral error theory is false only if one 
already took oneself to have a sufficient reason to accept that the moral error theory is 
false (2014: 415). 
Cowie acknowledges, however, that there is a sense is which the CG argument 
is not dialectically redundant: it is not dialectically redundant in the sense that 
it would (if sound) provide further reasons for rejecting the moral error theory, 
for a philosopher who already rejects the moral error theory. Cowie concedes 
this, but notes that the CG argument is dialectically redundant relative to the 
aim of the argument. The aim of the argument is to provide reasons for rejecting 
the moral error theory for someone who does not already reject the error theory. 
This is the sense in which Cowie claims the CG argument is rendered dialecti-
cally redundant. 
                                                 
22 Granted, Mackie is not an eliminativist: he does not advocate for the elimination of moral 
concepts and moral discourse. Rather, he thinks we follow subsidiary norms based on a particu-
lar conception of human flourishing, and cashes out the point of moral discourse in terms of these 
subsidiary norms. Read most charitably, however, Cowie’s point is this: ‘epistemic merits and 
demerits’ includes facts about knowledge, justification, and so on; by analogy, therefore, ‘moral 
merits and demerits’ would include moral facts. Since Mackie clearly doesn’t think there are 




So, if Cowie is right, then companions in guilt theorists are in trouble: if they 
appeal to the argument from self-defeat in order to vindicate the epistemic ex-
istence premise, then they seem to end up undermining the parity premise. They 
succumb to the first horn of Cowie’s dilemma (a): the objection from disparity. 
But if, on the other hand, they appeal to an argument which does not succumb 
to the first horn of the dilemma – such as the argument from global scepticism 
or the argument from epistemic merits and demerits – then they fall into the 
second horn of the dilemma (b): the CG argument is rendered dialectically re-
dundant. Cowie suggests that a general (if ambitious) moral can be drawn from 
the foregoing story: it is not just that a few particular companions in guilt argu-
ments do not work, but that companions in guilt arguments – as such – cannot 
work, for “[a]ny instance of the companions in guilt argument will be under-
mined by either the objection from disparity or the objection from redundancy” 
(2014: 415).23 
But is Cowie right? In response to Cowie’s criticisms, defenders of CG argu-
ments have either attempted to show how, contra Cowie, CG arguments can 
work (Rowland 2016), or they have attacked Cowie’s own arguments (Das 2016). 
Let us look at just the first of these responses.24 Rowland (2016: 161) wants to 
defend the following argument25 against the objections Cowie raises: 
(i) According to the moral error theory, moral reasons are metaphysically 
problematic because they are categorically normative. 
                                                 
23 In order to further support the objection from disparity and the objection from redundancy, 
Cowie (2014: 416-21) draws an analogy with the philosophy of mathematics – in particular, the 
Putnam-Quine ‘indispensability thesis’, which concerns the indispensability of mathematical ob-
jects to natural science. While Cowie’s discussion is highly interesting, to outline it would be to 
take us too far afield. See Rowland (2016: 169-70) for a response. 
24 In more recent work, Cowie (2016) has attempted to develop a “master argument” against 
CG strategies. I cannot go into the details of this argument here, both for reasons of space and 
because I think it will take us too far afield. For a reply, see Das (2017), who argues that Cowie’s 
master argument fails and that there is little hope for any such forthcoming master argument. 
25 Note that this argument is formulated somewhat differently to Rowland’s original argu-
ment from epistemic reasons. It seems to be a synthesis of the companions in guilt argument as 
presented in Cuneo (2007), Cowie (2014), and Rowland (2013). Nothing should turn on this, since 
Rowland reads Cowie as disputing only the move from (iv) to (v) in this argument. 
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(ii) But epistemic reasons are categorically normative. 
(iii) And there are epistemic reasons. 
(iv) Therefore, there are categorically normative properties. 
(v) Therefore, moral error theorists’ scepticism about moral reasons, on the 
grounds of moral reasons’ categorical normativity, is unwarranted. 
According to Rowland, the difficulties Cowie raises for CG arguments concern 
the move from the subconclusion (iv) to the main conclusion (v), because Cowie 
accepts (for the sake of argument) that epistemic reasons are categorically nor-
mative and that they exist: 
The idea here is that the move from [iv] to [v] is not justified because to show that there 
are some categorically normative properties is not to show that categorically normative 
properties are not metaphysically problematic. And, so long as categorically normative 
properties are metaphysically problematic, showing that there are some facts E that are 
categorically normative will not show that there are no grounds for scepticism about facts 
M on the grounds of M’s categorical normativity (Rowland 2016: 161-2). 
First, according to Rowland, we should hold that “either epistemic reasons and 
moral reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation with different 
relata, or epistemic and moral reasons are metaphysically unproblematic” (2016: 
162). And if moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally 
the same relation with different relata, then according to Rowland, the main 
conclusion (v) follows (assuming there are epistemic reasons). Let us flesh this 
out. 
To begin with, recall the initial worry raised for the idea that epistemic rea-
sons and moral reasons stand or fall together: the former concern reasons for 
belief, whereas the latter concern reasons for action. Rowland’s way of dealing 
with this issue was to point out that both reasons for action and reasons for belief 
can be thought of as different relata of the same normative relation: that of being 
a reason for. (Again, reasons’ being relations does not mean they are not also 
facts.) As Stratton-Lake puts the point: 
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The difference between practical and epistemic reasons is not that they stand in different 
warranting relations to certain things (one relation queer and the other innocuous), but 
that they warrant different things. Practical reasons warrant pro-attitudes and actions, 
whereas epistemic reasons warrant beliefs (2002: xxv-vi). 
According to Rowland, we have good reason to accept that moral and epistemic 
reasons are instances of the same fundamental relation (2016: 163). For one 
thing, both proponents of CG arguments and Cowie accept that epistemic rea-
sons are categorical. (Cowie accepts this for the sake of argument.) Secondly, 
according to Rowland: 
[I]f we hold that epistemic and moral reasons are fundamentally different relations, then 
‘reason’ in ‘that there are dinosaur bones is a reason to believe dinosaurs once roamed 
the earth’ has as much in common with ‘reason’ in ‘that she’ll die if you don’t save her is 
a reason to save her’ as ‘bank’ in ‘that is a river bank’ has in common with ‘bank’ in ‘that 
is a financial bank’, that is absolutely nothing beyond sounding the same when pro-
nounced. But ‘reason’ in ‘that there are dinosaur bones is a reason to believe dinosaurs 
once roamed the earth’ and ‘reason’ in ‘that she’ll die if you don’t save her is a reason to 
save her’ do not have nothing in common (2016: 163). 
Now, either moral and epistemic reasons are instances of the same fundamental 
relation in the way just described, or they are metaphysically unproblematic. 
For we might think that moral and epistemic reasons are not of the same nor-
mative relation if it were easier to reduce epistemic reasons to natural or non-
normative facts than it is to reduce moral reasons to natural or non-normative 
facts (Rowland 2016: 164). But Cowie accepts for the sake of argument, and pro-
ponents of CG arguments have argued at length, that it is not easier to reduce 
epistemic reasons to natural or non-normative facts in this way (cf. Cuneo 2007; 
Rowland 2013; Cowie 2014: 410). Thus according to Rowland, “if both epistemic 
and moral reasons can be reduced to natural/non-normative facts, moral reasons 
are not metaphysically strange since they are identical to natural/non-normative 
facts” (2016: 164). 
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Rowland now argues that main conclusion of the above CG argument (v) fol-
lows from (iv) if moral and epistemic reasons are of the same fundamental rela-
tion. Suppose it is not obvious that moral and epistemic reasons are not meta-
physically problematic, and so we can say that they are instances of the same 
fundamental normative relation. Let relation R be the fundamental normative 
relation of which moral and epistemic reasons are instances. According to Cowie 
(2014: 416), proponents of CG arguments show that there are some cases of cat-
egorical reasons that have certain special properties, such as the property of be-
ing self-defeating (Cuneo 2007) or the property of being entailed by knowledge 
(Rowland 2013). But Cowie argues that to show that there are some cases of 
categorical reasons which have certain special properties only undermines scep-
ticism about the particular categorical reasons that have these properties. It 
does not undermine scepticism about other instances of categorical reasons – 
such as moral reasons. But according to Rowland: 
[I]f epistemic and moral reasons are both fundamentally Rs, and there are instances of 
relation R – as Cowie assumes – then the only thing that could metaphysically count as 
positing more instances of R on the bases of Rs’ categorical normativity is a requirement 
of quantitative parsimony. That is, a requirement according to which it is better not to 
posit more of the same kind of thing, rather than a requirement of qualitative parsimony 
according to which it is better not to posit new kinds of things. (Since, to hold that there 
are more Rs is not to hold that there is a new kind of thing.) (2016: 165). 
To illustrate this, we can consider two theories: 
(THEORY A): There are categorical reasons beyond epistemic reasons. 
(THEORY B): The only categorical reasons that exist are epistemic reasons. 
According to Rowland, if quantitative parsimony “is a consideration that can be 
outweighed by any competing consideration, then the fact that [THEORY B] is 
more quantitatively parsimonious than [THEORY A] will be outweighed by the 
fact that [THEORY B] entails that much of our discourse and practice is in vast 
error; since we believe that there are moral reasons to do things” (2016: 165). 
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However, according to Rowland it is difficult to see how such a quantitatively 
parsimonious theory would provide a better explanation of anything, when it 
comes to epistemic reasons. Indeed, since such a quantitatively parsimonious 
theory would not be able to able to explain how much of our discourse is not in 
error, it seems less explanatory when it comes to epistemic reasons. Thus Row-
land maintains that without further justification it is difficult to see why we 
should hold that there are as few categorical reasons of the same fundamental 
sort as possible: 
It might seem that Cowie’s point is that proponents of companions in guilt arguments 
such as Cuneo do not show that there are instances of relation R tout court. But rather 
only show that there are particular kinds of instances of relation R, namely instances of 
R that have further ‘special’ properties such as the property of being self-defeating to 
deny the existence of (Cuneo) or the property of being entailed by knowledge that there 
must be (Rowland). But it could only be quantitative parsimony that would count against 
positing such instances of R that do not have these properties. Since to hold that there 
are instances of R that do not have these ‘special’ properties is not to posit a new type of 
relation, but merely to posit more instances of a relation that there must be, that we 
should already be committed to there being instances of, or that it is self-defeating to not 
be committed to. And, it is not plausible that an instance of R that is entailed by 
knowledge that there must be or is an instance of R that it is self-defeating to deny the 
existence of is a fundamentally distinct relation from instances of R that do not have 
such properties (Rowland 2016: 166). 
Of course, more needs to be said, but we at least have a prima facie case against 
Cowie’s objections to CG arguments: if moral reasons and epistemic reasons are 
instances of the same fundamental normative relation, then CG arguments can 
work. And that is all we need for our present purposes. 
1.4.2 DOXASTIC NORMATIVISM AND COMPANIONS IN GUILT 
We have seen, then, that the first issue – the issue of whether there is sufficient 
parity between moral and epistemic facts in order for a CG argument to work – 
does not undermine CG strategies: contra Cowie, there is no internal tension 
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between the parity premise and the epistemic existence premise. It seems plau-
sible that something similar works in the case of doxastic normativity. But what 
of the second issue, the issue of whether there are categorical doxastic norms? 
And if there are categorical doxastic norms, what grounds them? It is to this 
issue that we now turn. 
In recent years, epistemology has taken a normative turn. As in ethics, in 
epistemology there are epistemic deontologists (e.g. Boghossian 2003), virtue the-
orists (e.g. Zagzebski 2003), and consequentialists (e.g. Petersen 2013). Natu-
rally, CG theorists appeal to epistemic deontology, since on this view, there are 
categorical norms according to which you ought to believe in accordance with 
your evidence, for example, or you ought to believe what it is rational to believe.26 
I want to develop a CG argument based on a certain metaphysical thesis: doxas-
tic normativism. Doxastic normativism is the thesis that norms are constitutive 
of, or essential to, belief. Belief, some say, has a mind-world ‘direction of fit’ (cf. 
Anscombe 1957: 56 ff.); it ‘aims at truth’ (cf. Williams 1973: 136-7). There are 
two issues which arise from the slogan ‘belief aims at truth’, one metaphysical 
and one epistemological (Hattiangadi 2010). The epistemological issue is about 
the epistemic evaluation of belief – it is about whether truth, knowledge, or 
whatever, is of fundamental epistemic value. The metaphysical issue, however, 
is about the essential nature of belief, and this is the issue with which we shall 
primarily be concerned. Doxastic normativists interpret the slogan ‘belief aims 
                                                 
26 One might worry that there is a more fundamental issue here. Doesn’t the idea that there 
are norms on belief presuppose a strong form of doxastic voluntarism, the view that we have 
voluntary control over our beliefs? Indeed, in his classic presentation of the issue, Bernard Wil-
liams (1973) invokes the slogan “belief aims at truth” in order to explain why we cannot believe 
at will. It might be objected, therefore, that before CG arguments can even get off the ground, 
we need to deal with the question of doxastic voluntarism. I cannot do this here. As such, I will 
assume that we have some level of voluntary control over our beliefs. However, it is worth noting 
that a number of philosophers have argued explicitly against the idea that belief’s having an 
aim, or there being norms on belief, presupposes doxastic voluntarism. McHugh (2012a), for ex-
ample, argues that doxastic voluntarism is false, but that this does not undermine epistemic 
deontology. And Reisner (2013) argues that belief’s having an aim – whether that aim is truth 
or knowledge – is not in tension with doxastic voluntarism. See also Owens (2000) and Chrisman 
(2008) for relevant discussion. 
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at truth’ metaphorically.27 After all, beliefs are not agents, and so do not literally 
aim at anything; and nor does it seem to be believers that do the aiming, since 
believers typically do not form their beliefs with the conscious aim of getting at 
the truth. Teleologists about the aim of belief, on the other hand, interpret ‘belief 
aims at truth’ literally: either believers typically aim at truth when forming their 
beliefs, or natural selection has endowed them with truth-conducive belief-form-
ing mechanisms (Velleman 2000; Steglich-Petersen 2006). Teleologists want to 
give a naturalistic account of the aim of belief, normativists a normative account. 
According to the doxastic normativist, categorical norms are in some sense 
constitutive of belief. 28 Doxastic normativists typically accept (some version of) 
the truth norm: 
(TRUTH): For any subject S and proposition p, S ought to believe that p if 
and only if p is true.29 
The teleologist, on the other hand, will accept the truth norm, only deny that it 
is categorical (Steglich-Petersen 2010: 749). Rather, the norm is instrumental as 
a means of getting at the truth: essentially, beliefs require having an aim or 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), 
Engel (2007), and Whiting (2010). 
28 Although in Chapter 2 I will say more about what constitutivity in this context amounts 
to, the notion of constitutivity or essentiality we are working with remains imprecise and some-
what unclear. According to Glüer and Wikforss (2013: 81), constitutivity or essentiality in this 
context need not amount to anything more than metaphysical necessity. Moreover, some philos-
ophers hold that the relevant notion of necessity is conceptual necessity (Boghossian 2003; Shah 
2003; Shah and Velleman 2005). But we can assume for the sake of argument that conceptual 
necessity entails metaphysical necessity. Glüer and Wikforss note that while this assumption is 
not entirely uncontroversial, it is harmless in this context, since it is endorsed by those norma-
tivists (op. cit.) who construe normativism as a conceptual truth. The idea is that we want to say 
something about the nature of belief, not the concept of belief. But if conceptual necessity entails 
metaphysical necessity, then our considerations of the concept of belief will apply mutatis mu-
tandis to the nature of belief. 
29 Note two things. First, (TRUTH) seems obviously too strong, but let us assume it for the 
moment. I discuss the formulation of doxastic norms in Chapter 2. Second, I argue in Chapters 
2 and 3 that knowledge, rather than merely truth, is the aim and norm of belief. Again, let us 
postpone discussion of this in order to keep matters simple. 
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intention to believe only the truth, and norms like (TRUTH) are instrumental as 
a means to this end. 
But before saying more about normativism, and how it bears on CG argu-
ments, it is worth giving some context, since the context will become especially 
relevant later on. Doxastic normativism emerges as one strand of the so-called 
‘rule-following considerations’ (cf. Boghossian 1989). Since the publication of 
Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) – an influen-
tial reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) – much 
discussion has been generated over the alleged normativity of linguistic mean-
ing, though many take the normativity thesis to apply also to mental content.30 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) presents a ‘sceptical paradox’ according to which 
there are no facts in virtue of which speakers mean anything by their linguistic 
expressions; there is no fact which constitutes, or makes it the case that, a 
speaker means one thing rather than another by a given expression. To use 
Kripke’s example, suppose a bizarre sceptic queries an interlocutor as to what 
makes it the case that he means addition, rather than quaddition, by ‘plus’ and 
‘+’, where quaddition (symbolized by ‘⊕’) is defined as follows: 
 x ⊕ y = x + y, if x, y < 57 
 
   = 5 otherwise 
 
If our interlocutor means addition by ‘plus’, then when queried about the answer 
to the question ’68 + 57 = ?” he should answer with the sum: ‘125’. If, on the other 
hand, he means quaddition, then he should answer with the quum: ‘5’. KW’s 
sceptical challenge is to point to some fact – about my mental state or behavioral 
dispositions – which constitutes, or makes it the case that, I mean addition ra-
ther than quaddition by ‘plus’, green rather than grue by ‘green’, and so on. 
                                                 
30 Arguably, something like the normativity thesis can be traced back to Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781). See Brandom (1994) for such a reading of Kant. 
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Essentially, Kripke argues by a process of elimination: he considers all the 
sorts of fact which purport to constitute meaning and finds none of them ade-
quate. Among those facts which purport to constitute meaning are facts about 
dispositions. According to semantic dispositionalism (at least in its crudest 
form), facts about speakers’ dispositions constitute what they mean: I mean ad-
dition by ‘plus’ and ‘+’ if I am disposed to use ‘plus’ to answer addition-queries 
with the sum of the relevant numbers, rather than to answer according to some 
other function. But Kripke argues, among other things, that one of the ways in 
which dispositionalism falters is in its failure to account for the normativity of 
meaning: 
Suppose I do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the relation of this supposition to the question 
how I will respond to the problem ‘68 + 57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account 
of this relation: if ‘+’ meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’. But this is not the proper 
account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant 
addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of 
‘+’, I should answer ‘125’ […] The relation of meaning and intention to future action is 
normative, not descriptive (1982: 37). 
The idea is that if a speaker is to accord with her past meaning of ‘plus’ in the 
present, then she ought to answer addition-queries with their sum; in particular, 
she should respond to the above query with ‘125’. This seems to suggest that 
there is something essentially normative about meaning, for we can derive 
oughts from meanings: if I mean addition by ‘plus’, then I ought to answer with 
the sum. Of course, the example need not be a mathematical one: if I mean green 
by ‘green’, then I ought to apply ‘green’ only to green things. 
More recently, however, Kripke’s normativity thesis in the semantic case has 
come under scrutiny.31 Instead, the focus has shifted to mental content (Glüer 
and Wikforss 2009: 31-2). Just as some claim that norms are essential to mean-
ing, some claim that norms are essential to content. Doxastic normativism is one 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Glüer (1999), Glüer and Pagin (1999), Wikforss (2001), and Hattiangadi (2007). 
See Hlobil (2015) for a response to some of these criticisms. 
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strand of content normativism, though either thesis can be endorsed quite inde-
pendently of the other: one can be a doxastic normativist without being a content 
normativist, and vice versa. (Granted, arguments for content normativism often 
go hand-in-hand with those for doxastic normativism – for instance, some phi-
losophers, such as Boghossian (2003, 2005), argue that the normativity of con-
tent can be defended via the normativity of belief.) 
Doxastic normativism (‘normativism’ hereafter) if true provides a neat picture 
of why we ought to follow the epistemic norms, such as norms of evidence or 
rationality. As we shall see, normativists such as Boghossian (2003, 2005) hold 
that the ‘objective’ norm of truth grounds the ‘subjective’ epistemic norms and 
supplies their ‘rationale’ (more on this in Chapter 2). The epistemic norms hold 
because the truth norm does. If normativism is true, then, we have an account 
of the epistemic norms. Moreover, one of the motivations for normativism is that 
the normativity of belief purports to distinguish belief from the other cognitive 
attitudes, such as imagining, wishing, or hoping. The idea is that belief is truth-
directed, but involves norms: when you imagine that p, you imagine that p is 
true, but there are no oughts constraining what you are permitted to imagine. 
When you believe that p, you believe that p is true, but you ought to believe that 
p iff p. (Again, more on this in Chapter 2.) 
How is all this relevant to CG arguments? According to normativism, categor-
ical norms such as (TRUTH) are constitutive of belief; that is, part of what it is to 
be a belief or a believer is to be governed by these norms. Nothing not governed 
by these norms is a belief. Extant CG arguments conclude that the argument 
from queerness is insufficient, because there are categorical epistemic norms, 
and the error theorist relies on the premise that there are no such norms. But if 
normativism is true, then the conclusion of a CG argument is far more radical 
than that: a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness can be run in the 
belief case, which has the paradoxical upshot that there are no beliefs and no 
believers. For the normativist holds that categorical norms are constitutive of 
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belief, and that this is a conceptual truth; but if the argument from queerness is 
sound, then there is nothing in the world which instantiates our concept of a 
doxastic fact (i.e., there are no categorical norms which constitute belief). Dox-
astic judgements (for example: the belief “Sarah believes that snow is white”) 
would be systematically and uniformly false.32 
This, then, is the threat to the error theory: assuming normativism, the argu-
ment from queerness (if sound) can be run in the doxastic case, and so would 
threaten to support an error theoretic conclusion about belief. This is bad, and 
so I take it that this constitutes something of a reductio against the argument 
from queerness. In the next section, I will flesh this out. 
1.5 COGNITIVE SUICIDE 
How might normativism allow for a doxastic analogue of the argument from 
queerness? A doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness would threaten 
to undermine what we might call doxastic realism. Let doxastic realism be the 
following view: 
(DOXASTIC REALISM): Doxastic judgements (i) purport to state facts; and (ii) 
some doxastic judgements are true. 
According to (DOXASTIC REALISM), in making a doxastic judgement (e.g. “Sarah 
believes that snow is white”) the judgement purports to truly attribute a belief 
to the agent, and the belief attribution is true just in case the agent does hold 
that belief. When, for instance, I judge that Sarah believes that snow is white, 
my judgement expresses a second-order belief to the effect that Sarah believes 
that snow is white, and it has a true content if and only if Sarah does believe 
                                                 
32 This thesis thus seeks to complement the discussion of Evans and Shah (2012). According 
to them, the ‘normativity of the attitudes’ – which includes belief as such a normative attitude – 
greatly limits the number of options in metaethics. In particular, Evans and Shah argue that 
(their version of) normativism is incompatible with metaethical anti-realism: “none of the tradi-
tional anti-realist metaethical views can fully accommodate certain central features of mental 
agency – features that every human thinker is closely familiar with” (2012: 80). I will not go into 
the details of this argument here. 
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that snow is white. (DOXASTIC REALISM) is thus a straightforward analogue of 
(MORAL REALISM). 
Now, recall that Mackie asks both a conceptual question and an ontological 
question about the nature of putative moral facts. Likewise, in order to develop 
a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness, we need to ask, first, what 
our concept of a doxastic fact is, and second, whether there is anything in the 
world which instantiates that concept. Now, many normativists construe nor-
mativism as a conceptual truth about belief (Boghossian 2003; Shah 2003; Shah 
and Velleman 2005). On this view, (TRUTH), or something like it, is part of the 
very concept of belief; it is constitutive of belief.33 And if this is right, we can 
imagine a doxastic analogue of moral rationalism which gets the argument from 
queerness off the ground.34 It might read as follows: 
(DOXASTIC RATIONALISM): It is a conceptual truth that if S believes that p, 
then S has a reason to believe that p if and only if p is true. 
Thus according to (DOXASTIC RATIONALISM), it is a conceptual truth that if Sarah 
believes, for instance, that snow is white, then she has a reason to believe that 
snow is white iff snow is white. As in the moral case, we can grant the doxastic 
error theorist her commitment to (DOXASTIC RATIONALISM). If we grant this, 
then it is plausible that our concept of a doxastic fact is the concept of a reason 
for belief, i.e. a reason for believing only the truth. But is it a categorical reason 
for belief – that is, an objectively prescriptive feature of the world? Assuming 
                                                 
33 Again, I will assume for the sake of argument in this chapter that (TRUTH) is the constitu-
tive norm of belief. I argue in Chapters 2 and 3 that knowledge is the aim and norm of belief. 
However, this shouldn’t affect our present considerations: I will argue that, assuming norma-
tivism, a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness can be developed, regardless of 
whether the normativity in question is construed along the lines of the truth norm or along the 
lines of the knowledge norm. 
34 See Mitova (2011) for a highly interesting discussion of classic metaethical debates trans-
posed onto epistemology. One such debate is the debate over motivational internalism: Mitova 
fleshes out a position she calls epistemic internalism, which should be complementary to the 
arguments of this Chapter. It seems plausible that, just as in the moral case, (DOXASTIC RATION-
ALISM) will entail some version of what we might call doxastic internalism, but we need not flesh 
this out for our present purposes. 
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normativism, then it is plausible that this is our concept of a doxastic fact. For 
if normativism is true, then it is a conceptual truth that belief is norm-governed. 
Given this assumption, then, we might reconstruct a doxastic analogue of the 
argument from queerness as follows: 
(1*) Our concept of a doxastic fact is a concept of a reason for belief. 
(2*) If our concept of a doxastic fact is a concept of a reason for belief, then 
our concept of a doxastic fact is a concept of an objectively prescriptive 
feature of the world (i.e., a categorical reason for belief). 
(3*) Therefore, our concept of a doxastic fact is a concept of an objectively 
prescriptive feature of the world. 
(4*) But if our concept of a doxastic fact is a concept of an objectively prescrip-
tive feature of the world and there are no objectively prescriptive features 
of the world, then doxastic judgements are systematically and uniformly 
false. 
(5*) There are no objectively prescriptive features of the world. 
(6*) Therefore, doxastic judgements are systematically and uniformly false. 
The first hurdle this argument faces is in defending premise (2*). Whether (2*) 
is true seems to depend on whether normativism is true, since normativism is 
the view that it is part of our concept of belief that belief is norm-governed and 
that such norms are constitutive of belief. However, let us grant (2*) for the mo-
ment. And if we grant this, then subconclusion (3*) follows straightforwardly 
from (1*) and (2*). Premise (4*) seems obvious: just as our unicorn judgements 
are systematically and uniformly false because there are no unicorns, our dox-
astic judgements (e.g. the judgement “Sarah believes that snow is white”) would 
be systematically and uniformly false if there were nothing in the world that 
instantiates our concept of a doxastic fact, i.e. if there were no objectively pre-
scriptive features of the world or categorical reasons for belief. As for (5*), this 
is just the same as premise (5) in Mackie’s argument from queerness: the idea is 
that if there were any objectively prescriptive features of the world, they would 
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be metaphysically and epistemologically queer. And the main conclusion (6*) 
follows from (3*), (4*), and (5*). 
Now, suppose this doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness is 
sound. What would the upshot be? I take it that – given normativism and our 
foregoing discussion of the parity premise in CG arguments – the conclusion of 
the doxastic argument from queerness is sufficiently unpalatable to warrant re-
jection of the moral error theory. For the conclusion of the doxastic argument 
from queerness is an error theoretic one: doxastic judgements are systematically 
and uniformly false. This has the consequence that there are no doxastic facts – 
that there are no beliefs and no believers. For if doxastic judgements or belief 
ascriptions are always false, then it is false that: 
I believe that it rained today. 
Sarah believes that snow is white. 
Marco believes that Mallory reached the summit. 
Bilbo believes he hasn’t had his second breakfast. 
And so on. If it is false that anyone has ever believed anything, then it seems to 
follow that there are no doxastic facts – just as it follows, from the conclusion 
that moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false, that there are no 
moral facts. In other words, (DOXASTIC REALISM) would be false. 
But why is the conclusion that there are no doxastic facts (i.e., that there are 
no beliefs and no believers) really so unpalatable? For one thing, it is highly 
counterintuitive. But this does not mean the doxastic error theory is false. How-
ever, the conclusion that there are no beliefs and no believers would amount to 
a denial of the common sense conception of the mental – the conception according 
to which there are beliefs, desires, and other mental states familiar to folk psy-
chology. According to Lynn Rudder Baker (though in the context of physicalism), 
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such a denial would amount to a kind of cognitive suicide: “Since cognition with-
out content is empty, denial of the common sense conception of the mental may 
be a kind of cognitive suicide that we are constitutionally unable to commit to” 
(1998: 18). We are constitutionally unable to commit to the doxastic error theory 
because its upshot is the paradoxical one that there are no beliefs and no believ-
ers.35 This upshot is paradoxical because it is logically impossible to truly believe 
that there are no believers. For if you believe that there are no believers, then it 
is false that there are no believers; and if it is true that there are no believers, 
then you don’t believe that there are no believers. 
The upshot of the supposition that our doxastic analogue of the argument 
from queerness is sound, then, can be represented with the following argument 
– an argument which purports to show that, assuming normativism, the proper 
conclusion of a CG argument is far more radical than its proponents take it to 
be: 
(1) If normativism is true, then it is part of the concept of belief that it is 
constituted by categorical norms. 
(2) Normativism is true (or so we are supposing). 
(3) Therefore, it is part of the concept of belief that it is constituted by cate-
gorical norms (1, 2). 
(4) But if the argument from queerness is sound, then there are no categori-
cally normative features of the world. 
(5) Therefore, if the argument from queerness is sound, then there is nothing 
in the world instantiating our concept of belief (3, 4). 
(6) Therefore, if the argument from queerness is sound, then there are no 
beliefs and no believers. 
The conclusion of many extant CG arguments, such as that of Rowland (2013), 
is that moral error theorists’ scepticism about moral reasons is unwarranted, 
                                                 
35 Indeed, “There are no believers” is a standard example of a Moore-paradoxical proposition, 
or ‘blindspot’ (Sorensen 1988). I discuss blindspots in Chapter 2. 
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because there are categorical epistemic reasons: if there were no categorical ep-
istemic reasons, then judgements of the form “The belief that p is justified” 
would be systematically and uniformly false. But if what I have said above is 
correct, then assuming normativism, the conclusion of a CG argument is far 
more radical than that: it is not that moral error theorists’ scepticism about 
moral reasons on the grounds of their categorical normativity is unwarranted, 
but that the argument from queerness must be unsound because it has the par-
adoxical consequence that there are no beliefs and no believers. Belief ascrip-
tions of the form “S believes that p” would be systematically and uniformly false. 
If this is right, then this consequence, I take it, constitutes a reductio ad absur-
dum against the argument from queerness. 
In response to CG strategies, we have seen that some philosophers attack ei-
ther the parity premise or the idea that there are categorical epistemic norms. 
But Jonas Olson (2011) – one of the few philosophers in the debate over CG ar-
guments who explicitly links these arguments to normativism – accepts for the 
sake of argument that the CG strategy goes through and assesses its implica-
tions. According to him, the implications of epistemic error theory are not so un-
palatable as to warrant rejection of the moral error theory: 
Since epistemic error theory holds that no claims about what there is reason for agents to 
believe and not to believe are true, normativism seems to imply that according to epistemic 
error theory no belief ascriptions are true […] The simplest and most plausible response 
on behalf of the epistemic error theorist is to agree with the normativist that [norms of 
evidence, rationality, etc.] are distinctive of belief and belief ascriptions. But the error 
theorist should insist that these are immanent [i.e., hypothetical] and not transcendent 
[i.e., not categorical] norms. In order to distinguish belief from other attitudes such as 
conjecture, imagining, supposition, wishful thinking, and the like, it is not necessary to 
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assume that the norms associated with belief are transcendent; it suffices to assume that 
they are immanent (Olson 2011: 92).36 
In essence, the idea is that epistemic reasons are hypothetical reasons, and that 
this is enough to distinguish belief from other cognitive attitudes (this, recall, is 
one of the motivations for normativism). According to Olson, “moral error theory 
recognizes the wrongness of torture relative to UN declarations, but rejects cat-
egorical reasons to comply with such declarations” (2011: 88). Olson’s way of 
dealing with CG arguments is the epistemic counterpart to this: epistemic rea-
sons are (in Olson’s terminology) immanent, rather than transcendent. 
To speculate somewhat, Mackie is likely to accept a strategy of this sort. After 
all, most of his Ethics is devoted to normative ethical theorizing; just because 
(according to Mackie) there are no categorical norms does not mean we need to 
give up on normative ethics. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons describe Mackie’s 
position as follows: 
Mackie argued that all affirmative moral sentences are false because they involve (so he 
thought) metaphysical commitments to ontologically ‘queer’ properties, [but] he did not 
advocate eliminating the use of moral concepts and moral discourse; rather, he went on to 
propose a normative ethical system based on a certain conception of human flourishing 
(2000: 143-44). 
Olson seems to suggest the epistemic error theorist be committed to something 
like this strategy: just because there are no categorical epistemic reasons does 
not mean that there are no reasons to believe in accordance with one’s evidence 
(for example), only that the reasons in question are hypothetical, not categorical. 
                                                 
36 Olson prefers the terms ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ rather than ‘hypothetical’ and ‘cat-
egorical’, respectively, for reasons we need not get into here (cf. 2011: 79-80). Transcendent 
norms are just those norms that apply to agents categorically and have reason-giving force which 
transcends agents’ desires, ends, activities, etc. Immanent norms are those norms which imply 




But this response seems to miss the mark, at least when it comes to the CG 
argument under present consideration – the argument which allows us a doxas-
tic analogue of the argument from queerness. The reason is that the error theo-
rist is still committed to the existence of beliefs. In the moral case, the conclusion 
of the argument from queerness is that our moral judgements are systematically 
and uniformly false. It follows that there are no moral facts because these judge-
ments are false: judgements of the form “You ought to do Y” are always false, so 
there are no moral facts. But doesn’t the idea that our moral judgements are 
systematically and uniformly false imply, or presuppose, that there are moral 
beliefs that can be false? This presents no problem for the moral error theorist, 
since the facts about which moral error theorists are sceptical are moral facts: 
they are sceptical about the normative warranting relation between, for exam-
ple, the suffering caused by torture and the wrongness of torture. But it seems 
the doxastic error theorist cannot concede that doxastic judgements express be-
liefs without undermining her own position. If the doxastic error theorist’s claim 
were only that there are no categorical doxastic reasons, then there would pre-
sumably be no problem here. Like Olson, the doxastic error theorist could main-
tain that doxastic judgements only imply hypothetical reasons. But that is not 
the doxastic error theorist’s claim, at least if we assume normativism. If we as-
sume normativism, then part of the concept of belief is that belief is norm-gov-
erned; but a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness would imply that 
nothing satisfies the norms which purport to be constitutive of belief, and so 
imply that there are no beliefs or believers. The doxastic error theorist, then, 
cannot coherently maintain that doxastic judgements are cognitive, expressing 
beliefs about beliefs, without undermining her own position. For example, ac-
cording to the doxastic error theorist, the doxastic judgement “Sarah believes 
that snow is white” expresses the belief that Sarah believes that snow is white, 
i.e. it expresses a second-order belief. But our doxastic analogue of the argument 
from queerness concludes that doxastic judgements are systematically and uni-
formly false, which implies that there are no beliefs. It seems incoherent or self-
47 
 
defeating for the doxastic error theorist to maintain that doxastic judgements 
express beliefs and at the same time endorse an argument which implies that 
there are no beliefs. 
The foregoing objection to the doxastic error theory seems to be an instance of 
the argument from self-defeat, discussed above. Nishi Shah gives a similar ar-
gument against the doxastic error theorist, which takes the form of a dilemma: 
The error theorist about doxastic reasons faces a dilemma. He claims that all normative 
judgements attributing doxastic reasons are false, that there are no normative truths that 
would make some of our normative judgements about reasons for belief true. He must 
decide whether these normative judgements express beliefs or not. If he decides that they 
do not, then he must admit that normative statements about doxastic reasons, contrary 
to surface appearances, do not express propositions. If normative statements about rea-
sons for belief do not express propositions, then it is not the case that they are false, con-
trary to the error theorist’s central contention. But if the error theorist decides that nor-
mative judgements about doxastic reasons express beliefs, and attributing a belief entails 
making a normative judgement, he cannot consistently claim that there are no reasons for 
belief (2011: 102). 
To make things simple, we can represent Shah’s dilemma for the doxastic error 
theorist as follows: 
(a) Either the doxastic error theorist holds that normative judgements ex-
press beliefs, in which case she cannot coherently claim that there are no 
reasons for belief, since she accepts that belief attribution involves mak-
ing normative judgements; 
(b) Or the doxastic error theorist denies that normative judgements express 
beliefs, in which case doxastic judgements are not false, since if normative 
judgements do not express beliefs or propositions, then they are not apt 
for assessment in terms of truth and falsity. 
If the doxastic error theorist takes option (a), then she seems to undermine her 
own position – she succumbs to the argument from self-defeat because she main-
tains that normative judgements express beliefs (cognitivism), while accepting 
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that belief attribution involves making a normative judgement and denying that 
there are any (normative) reasons for belief. Her position becomes self-defeating. 
If, on the other hand, the doxastic error theorist takes option (b), then she too 
faces difficulties. For one thing, she again seems to undermine her own position, 
because the conclusion of the doxastic argument from queerness is that doxastic 
judgements are systematically and uniformly false. But she has to deny that 
normative judgements express truth-apt propositions, which means doxastic 
judgements cannot be false (nor can they be true). But this brings us into a sec-
ond and (perhaps) more significant issue: if the doxastic error theorist takes op-
tion (b), then she seems to have undermined what is distinctive about her brand 
of metaethical anti-realism – its cognitivism. Error theorists are cognitivists: 
they hold that the relevant judgements express propositions, but that they are 
all of them false. However, if the doxastic error theorist denies that normative 
judgements express propositions, then her position is no longer recognizable as 
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an error theoretic one. Rather, it would seem to be a form of doxastic non-cogni-
tivism.37 
If all this is right, then the moral error theory looks implausible: if the argu-
ment from queerness is sound, then – assuming normativism – a doxastic ana-
logue of the argument from queerness can be developed. But this has an implau-
sible upshot: the doxastic argument from queerness implies that there are no 
beliefs and no believers, and to believe that there are no beliefs and no believers 
would be to commit cognitive suicide. And this worry cannot be assuaged by ap-
peal to the idea that doxastic normativity involves only hypothetical reasons, 
since even the doxastic error theorist needs to concede that there are beliefs and 
that normative judgements express beliefs, otherwise her position becomes ei-
ther self-defeating or indistinguishable from non-cognitivism. I have, however, 
been assuming that normativism is true throughout this Chapter. It should be 
relatively clear that whether the foregoing is right depends largely on whether 
normativism is indeed true. But it remains to be seen that it is. As we shall see 
                                                 
37 According to Frank Jackson (2000), the combination of non-cognitivism and the normativity 
of belief also yields the unpalatable consequence that there are no beliefs and no believers. The 
idea here is that, if non-cognitivism is true, then there is no such thing as satisfying normative 
constraints, where satisfying constraints is a matter of having the relevant properties. For ex-
ample, being enrolled in university courses is a constraint on being awarded credit for those 
courses. To satisfy this constraint is to have the property of being such that you are enrolled in 
those courses. But there seem to be normative constraints on belief: if you believe that p, and 
that p implies q, then either you ought to believe that q, or you ought to revise your belief that p 
or that p implies q. To satisfy the relevant constraint in this situation is to have the normative 
property of being such that you ought to believe that q, or revise one of your antecedent beliefs. 
This, according to Jackson, poses a problem for non-cognitivism: “if non-cognitivism is true, there 
are no normative properties to have, or fail to have. Non-cognitivism is precisely the view that, 
although the language of normativity is meaningful, there are no properties corresponding to 
normative predicates. Equivalently, non-cognitivism about normativity is the view that norma-
tive predicates when attached to subject terms do not serve to make claims about how the sub-
jects are; in consequence, there is no such thing as being how things are claimed to be by nor-
mative predicates and normative language in general. But then there is no such thing as subjects 
being how normative predicates say they are, and so no satisfying the normative constraints on 
being a believer. By Modus Tollens, therefore, we reach the conclusion that there are no believers 
and no beliefs” (2000: 102-3). This looks very much like a companions in guilt argument against 
non-cognitivism, though I cannot go into the details here. I take it that, if Jackson is right, then 
this makes option (b) in Shah’s dilemma highly unattractive for the doxastic error theorist. And 
if she takes option (a), her position seems to become self-defeating. Either way, the doxastic error 
theorist is in trouble. 
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in the remaining two Chapters, normativism faces significant difficulties. I will 
argue that at least some of the main difficulties normativism faces can be met. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
We have seen that, according to the moral error theorist, there are no moral 
facts: moral judgements are systematically and uniformly false. CG arguments 
(by analogy) typically purport to show either that the moral error theorist’s scep-
ticism about moral facts is unwarranted, or that arguments for the error theory 
are insufficient because they threaten to support an implausible error theoretic 
conclusion in other areas of discourse. I have argued that, assuming norma-
tivism, we can develop a doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness, and 
this has the paradoxical upshot that there are no beliefs and no believers. The 
argument from queerness, therefore, looks unsound, because if it were sound, it 
would support such an error theoretic conclusion about doxastic facts. This, of 





2 TRUTH NORMS AND KNOWLEDGE NORMS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter, we saw that the threat to the moral error theorist is that, if 
normativism is true and the argument from queerness succeeds, then this im-
plies an implausible doxastic analogue of the argument from queerness. This 
companions in guilt argument, however, relies on the assumption that norma-
tivism is true. In this chapter, I defend normativism against influential objec-
tions from Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi. §2.2 clarifies what norma-
tivism amounts to, and what it means for a concept to be constitutively norma-
tive. Following Paul Boghossian’s presentation of the theory, we shall see that a 
concept is constitutively normative just in case it is a condition of grasping the 
concept that one grasps statements explicable in normative or deontic vocabu-
lary. I also explore some of the motivations for normativism. In §2.3, I present 
Bykvist and Hattiangadi’s objections to the idea that belief is constitutively nor-
mative. According to them, truth norms for belief cannot be properly formulated 
without unpalatable consequences: truth norms are either false or impose un-
satisfiable requirements on believers. In §2.4, I argue that knowledge, rather 
than merely truth, is the aim and norm of belief. If this is right, then three mor-
als can be drawn from our story about the knowledge norm: (i) our version of the 
knowledge norm does not succumb to the objections Bykvist and Hattiangadi 
raise against truth norms; (ii) the knowledge norm is a plausible candidate for a 
constitutive doxastic norm; and (iii) unlike the truth norm, the knowledge norm 
does not clash with the less controversial epistemic norms in the ‘hard cases’ – 
lottery and coin-toss cases, in particular. The knowledge norm thus allows us to 





2.2 BOGHOSSIAN ON THE NORMATIVITY OF BELIEF 
According to Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005), the concept of mental content is con-
stitutively normative. A type of judgement is constitutively normative if and only 
if it is impossible that one understands judgements of that type without under-
standing statements that imply statements involving normative or deontic vo-
cabulary (‘ought’, ‘may’, or ‘reason’). So a concept is constitutively normative if 
grasping the statements in which it features requires one to grasp oughts, mays, 
or reasons. Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of content has two parts. 
First, Boghossian argues that the concept of belief is constitutively normative. 
Normativism, we have seen, is the view that it is constitutive of, or essential to, 
belief that it is genuinely normative. By ‘genuinely normative’, I mean that the 
concept in question is prescriptive or action-guiding. Second, Boghossian argues 
that belief enjoys a certain conceptual primacy, so that the normativity of belief 
implies the normativity of mental content more generally.38 Let us look only at 
the first part of the argument. To begin with, consider the following proposition 
concerning doxastic correctness: 
(a) It is correct to believe that Mallory reached the summit if and only if Mal-
lory reached the summit. 
According to the normativist, a belief is correct if and only if the proposition 
believed is true.39 We can express this in general terms with the following cor-
rectness principle: 
                                                 
38 Since my focus here is primarily on the normativity of belief, rather than the normativity 
of content proper, I will not go into the details of Boghossian’s argument for the conceptual pri-
macy of belief. See Miller (2008) and Glüer and Wikforss (2009) for criticism of this strategy. 
39 More precisely, a belief is correct iff its propositional content is true. It should be relatively 
uncontroversial that beliefs are psychological states with contents that can be true or false; when 
I say that belief is truth-apt (i.e., apt for assessment in terms of truth and falsity) I mean that a 
belief is true when its content is true, and false when its content is false. It is not obvious that 
truth is a normative concept, and this is why many normativists about belief hold that ‘correct’ 
does not simply mean ‘true’. As Nishi Shah puts it, for example, “beliefs are normatively assess-
able as correct or incorrect in virtue of the non-normative property that their propositional con-
tents have of being true or false” (2011: 100). 
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(CORRECT): For any proposition p, the belief that p is correct if and only if 
p is true. 
Correctness, according to Boghossian and other normativists,40 is a normative 
notion: “[I]t seems right to say both that correctness is a normative matter, a 
matter of whether one ought to do what one is doing, and that the correctness 
conditions of one’s thought are constitutive of what one is thinking” (Boghossian 
2003: 35). Allan Gibbard makes a similar point: 
For belief, correctness is truth. Correct belief is true belief. My belief that snow is white is 
correct just in case the belief is true, just in case snow is white. Correctness, now, seems 
normative […] The correct belief, if all this is right, seems to be the one [the subject] ought, 
in this sense, to have (Gibbard 2005: 338-9; cf. Gibbard 2012: Chapter 4). 
The idea that correctness is a normative notion has intuitive pull: when we say 
that a belief is incorrect, we might mean that it is in some sense defective, or 
that it should be revised. Indeed, the fact that we can criticize others for having 
incorrect beliefs seems to require us to presuppose that, pre-theoretically, when 
someone believes a falsehood, they are doing something wrong. Now, if correct-
ness is indeed a normative notion, then (a) seems to yield: 
(b) One ought to believe that Mallory reached the summit if and only if 
Mallory did reach the summit. 
Once again, we can express this in general terms as a norm of truth for belief: 
(TRUTH): For any subject S and proposition p, S ought to believe that p if 
and only if p is true.41 
Now, Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of belief is contained partially 
in his response to Gibbard (2003). According to Gibbard, the difficulty with (b) 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Wedgwood (2002), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005), Engel (2007), Whiting 
(2010). For criticism of the idea that correctness is a normative notion, see Hattiangadi (2007) 
and Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013). 
41 To keep matters simple, I will omit “For any subject S and proposition p” from the various 
iterations of doxastic norms in what follows. If such norms are in force, they should be thought 
of as necessarily so. 
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and norms like (TRUTH) is that the ought involved seems to express an objective 
norm, rather than a subjective one; and if we suppose that objective norms are 
genuinely constitutive of mental content and that they are genuinely normative, 
then this seems to yield the highly implausible result that all facts are norma-
tive. First, why is (b) an objective norm? Objective norms are those norms that 
hold in virtue of what is the case; it is not always transparent to the subject how 
she might follow them. Suppose I am thinking about the exact number of blades 
of grass per square foot in my garden, and suppose that there are, in fact, 4,871 
of them. The belief that there are 4,871 blades of grass per square foot in my 
garden is the correct belief to have. But given (TRUTH), the belief that there are 
4,871 blades of grass per square foot in my garden is the one I ought to have: I 
ought to have it only in virtue of what is, in fact, the case. But this is quite dif-
ferent from the claim that I ought to have this belief given the available evidence 
– indeed, I have no idea how many blades of grass are in my garden, and apart 
from counting each of them, I would have no way to know this. (TRUTH) and (b), 
then, are objective norms: if Mallory reached the summit, then I ought to believe 
that he did, regardless of whether I have any evidence that he did. 
By contrast, subjective norms hold in virtue of considerations available to the 
subject; they are subjective only insofar as they engage with the subject’s per-
spective. These considerations include facts about the evidence the subject has, 
the consistency of her beliefs, what it is rational for her to believe, and so on.42 
Consider, for example, the following subjective norms: 
                                                 
42 To be clear: the objective/subjective distinction in this context has nothing whatsoever to 
do with the question of whether there are objective normative facts. An objective doxastic norm 
is simply one that holds in virtue of what is the case: I ought to believe that p because it is the 
case that p. Subjective epistemic norms are subjective only insofar as they engage with the sub-
ject’s perspective: I ought to believe that p because I have overwhelming evidence that p, because 
it is rational for me to believe that p, and so on. I will say more below about cases in which the 
objective and the subjective norms can clash, e.g. cases in which the evidence misleads one to 
believe a falsehood. 
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(EVIDENCE): S ought to believe only that which is supported by the availa-
ble evidence. 
(CONSISTENCY): S ought to believe that (p and q) only if p and q are con-
sistent. 
(RATIONALITY): S ought to believe that p only if it is rational for S to believe 
that p. 
And so on. Gibbard’s worry is that if (b) is an objective norm, then if the ‘ought 
to believe’ is genuinely normative and constitutive of the belief that Mallory 
reached the summit, then this yields the unpalatable result that all facts are 
normative. For according to Gibbard, there is an analytic equivalence between 
both sides of the biconditional: the left-hand side purports to describe a norma-
tive fact and so, given analytic equivalence, the right-hand side also describes a 
normative fact. According to (b), therefore, “One ought to believe that Mallory 
reached the summit” and “Mallory did reach the summit” both describe norma-
tive states of affairs. The problem is that the second claim quite clearly describes 
a non-normative state of affairs, and so Gibbard rejects this line of reasoning.43 
Now, Boghossian objects that Gibbard’s argument rests on two questionable 
assumptions. First, Gibbard assumes that the relation between correctness con-
ditions and normativity must take a biconditional form; and second, he assumes 
that constitutivity is a matter of analytic implication (Boghossian 2003: 36). 
Boghossian points out that (b) can be broken down into two conditionals: 
(b*) One ought (objectively) to believe that Mallory reached the summit 
only if Mallory reached the summit. 
                                                 
43 Note that Gibbard is a normativist, only he locates the normativity of content in the relation 
between content and rules, whereas Boghossian wants to locate it in the relation between con-
tent and correctness. For a sustained defense of his most recent view of the matter, see Gibbard 
(2012), though see, e.g., Wikforss (2018) for criticism. 
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(b**) If Mallory reached the summit, then one ought (objectively) to believe 
that Mallory reached the summit. 
According to Boghossian, (b*) and (b**) are not on a par: the first claim, gener-
alized, says that one ought to believe only what is true, whereas the second gen-
eralization says that one ought to believe everything that is true. It is not the 
case that for every fact about correctness, there is a corresponding ought fact, 
for ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, while ‘correct’ does not have the same implication. More 
precisely, (b**) violates the following intuitive and widely accepted principle: 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’): If S ought to φ, then it is possible for S to φ.44 
Boghossian writes: “although it is true that, for any p, if p, then it is correct that 
p, it doesn’t follow that if p, one ought to believe that p, for it’s clearly impossible 
to believe everything that’s true […] I’m inclined to hold, therefore, that one can 
infer p from ‘One ought to believe that p,’ but not the other way round” (2003: 
37). This is Boghossian’s objection to Gibbard’s first assumption. 
Gibbard’s second worry is that a correctness-based normativity thesis will 
overgeneralize: if true, it will prove that all facts are normative – it will prove 
that the clearly non-normative claim “Mallory reached the summit” is, in fact, 
normative. But Boghossian suggests this problem only arises given an improper 
account of constitutivity, the account according to which a concept is constitu-
tively normative when it analytically implies normative statements, i.e. state-
ments involving deontic modalities such as obligation and permission. Regard-
ing semantic normativity, Gibbard writes: 
If meaning is “fraught with ought”, the point is not just supposed to be the obvious one 
that oughts can depend on meanings. Oughts after all, can depend on all sorts of things 
that are clearly natural. Whether we ought to take a walk can depend on the weather; 
                                                 
44 Although (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’) is widely accepted, it is not entirely uncontroversial. For 
instance, Engel (2007) questions whether the principle is always true; and Mizrahi (2012) argues 
that, from an epistemic point of view, (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’) is subject to counterexamples. I 
cannot explore these issues here, so I shall assume in what follows that norms like (b**) are false 
since they prescribe believing all the truths, including ungraspably complex ones. 
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that doesn’t make the weather normative in any philosophically special sense. The claim 
of normativity is that oughts are somehow constitutive of meaning, that what something 
means is a matter of certain oughts’ obtaining (2003: 84-5). 
Gibbard’s idea, according to Boghossian, is this: “q is constitutive of p just in case 
p analytically implies q – i.e., just in case facts about the meaning of ‘p’ and the 
meaning of ‘q’, along with logic, suffice to derive q from p” (Boghossian 2003: 33-
4). However, Boghossian argues that this is not the proper account of constitu-
tivity. Rather, constitutivity here should be understood as follows: q’s being con-
stitutive of p means not that p analytically implies q, but that it is a condition 
on understanding what it is for p to obtain that one understands what it is for q 
to obtain. To say that q is constitutive of p is to say that understanding or grasp-
ing the concept of a p-fact requires that one understand or grasp the concept of 
a q-fact. Note that this account is stricter than the analytic implication account: 
[T]he concepts ingredient in Snow is white or grass is green are sufficient for seeing that 
Snow is white or grass is green follows from Snow is white. But Snow is white or grass is 
green needn’t be constitutive of Snow is white because it needn’t be a condition on under-
standing Snow is white that one have the concept or or that one have the concept grass or, 
for all I know, that one have the concept green (Boghossian 2003: 38). 
Mental content, according to Boghossian, is constitutively normative in this 
sense: content is constitutively normative if and only if it is a condition on un-
derstanding a particular content-attribution that one understands that, if the 
content attribution is true, then the relevant normative claim is true. The idea, 
for example, is that it is impossible that Marco understands what it is for 
Ebenezer to believe that Mallory reached the summit without also understand-
ing that Ebenezer ought to believe that Mallory reached the summit only if Mal-
lory did reach the summit. 
Now, (b*) still seems like an objective norm, and it will not always be clear 
how one might follow it (more on this below and in Chapter 3). But the fact that 
this is not clear does not mean that (b*) does not express a genuine norm. Indeed, 
according to Boghossian “the holding of this norm is one of the defining features 
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of belief: it’s what captures the idea that it is constitutive of belief to aim at 
truth. The truth is what you ought to believe, whether or not you know how to 
go about it, and whether or not you know if you have attained it” (2003: 38). 
Furthermore, Boghossian holds that the subjective epistemic norms are 
grounded in the objective ones. For example, it may be the case that we ought to 
believe what only what is supported by the evidence we have. The objective norm 
says that one ought to believe only what is true, and there may be subjective 
norms to believe only what one has evidence for. But, intuitively, beliefs for 
which there is good evidence are more likely to be true (as are beliefs that it is 
rational to hold, beliefs that are consistent, etc.), so by hypothesis, subjective 
norms such as norms of evidence will typically track what, according to the ob-
jective norm of truth, we ought to believe.45 
Thus an important motivation for defending truth norms is that they explain 
why the less controversial subjective epistemic norms hold: the objective norm 
of truth explains why we ought to seek evidential justification for our beliefs, 
why our belief formation ought to be rational, why our beliefs ought to be con-
sistent, and so on. Nearly all normativists in this debate endorse some version 
of this strategy.46 Indeed, a common proposal is that the objective truth norm 
guides our belief formation and revision indirectly, via the subjective epistemic 
norms. As Boghossian puts it: 
[T]he “objective” norm that one ought to believe only what’s true […] is not a rule that can 
be followed directly, but that can only be followed by following certain other rules, the so-
called norms of rational belief. For example: that we ought to believe that which is sup-
ported by the evidence and not believe that which has no support; that we ought not to 
                                                 
45 There will, however, be cases of conflict – cases in which the subjective norms prescribe 
believing what subjects (objectively) ought not to believe, i.e. falsehoods. For evidence can be 
misleading: plausibly, there are cases in which you have good evidence for the truth of a propo-
sition, but that proposition turns out to be false. More on this in §2.4 below. 
46 In addition to Boghossian’s papers (op. cit.), see Wedgwood (2002: 276; 2013a: 124; 2013b: 
219 ff.), Shah (2003: 471), Millar (2004: 43 ff.), Shah and Velleman (2005: 519-20), Engel (2007: 
181; 2013a: 36; 2013b: 207), Whiting (2010: 220-22; 2012: 289 ff.; 2013: 122), McHugh (2012b: 
9), and Raleigh (2013: 256-7). 
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believe p if some alternative proposition incompatible with p has a higher degree of sup-
port; that we ought to believe p only if its degree of support is high enough, given the sort 
of proposition that it is. And so on (2005: 101). 
If normativism can be defended, therefore, we will have a neat picture of what 
constitutes belief and why following norms of evidence, rationality, and so on is 
something we ought to do. Moreover, doxastic norms – if they can be shown to 
be constitutive of belief – will explain why false beliefs are faulty or defective: 
they are faulty or defective because holding them violates the norm. Let us look 
first at one influential argument against normativism. 
2.3 TRUTH NORMS AND THEIR LOGICAL FORMS 
Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi (‘B&H’ hereafter) object to arguments 
of the sort made by Boghossian on the grounds that truth-norms cannot be 
properly formulated without unpalatable consequences (2007, 2013). Let us now 
examine this line of argument, which we might call the formulation problem. 
Recall that Boghossian is committed to the claim that a belief’s correctness lies 
in its truth-conditions. If correctness is an essentially normative notion, then 
(TRUTH) follows from (CORRECT). Boghossian showed that the norm I am calling 
(TRUTH) breaks down into two conditional claims and argued that (b*) is the 
more plausible one – the one that is constitutive of belief. B&H want to reject all 
such formulations on the grounds that their requirements are unsatisfiable. 
They argue, first, that (TRUTH) is ambiguous in that the ought which features in 
it can take either a wide or a narrow scope over the biconditional. The narrow 
scope reading (TRUTHN) and the wide scope reading (TRUTHW) can be formulated 
as follows: 
(TRUTHN): S ought to (believe that p) if and only if p is true. 
(TRUTHW): S ought to (believe that p if and only if p is true). 
The narrow scope reading requires us to believe that p on the condition that p is 
true. The wide scope reading, by contrast, requires us unconditionally to respect 
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the entire biconditional. Let us first examine the narrow scope reading. As with 
(b) above, (TRUTHN) can be broken down into two conditionals: 
(TRUTHN*): If p is true, then S ought to (believe that p). 
(TRUTHN**): If S ought to (believe that p), then p is true.47 
Now, given (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’), (TRUTHN*) is highly implausible, since it says 
that for any true proposition, one ought to believe it. But there are presumably 
infinitely many propositions – probably most of them trivial – and there are 
propositions which are simply too complex for a human being to believe. Suppose 
that p is a proposition far too complex for any human being to believe. Now, 
insofar as ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it cannot be the case that S ought to believe that 
p, so (TRUTHN*) looks highly implausible, if not manifestly false. 
What about (TRUTHN**)? This, recall, was the norm that Boghossian ends up 
endorsing. B&H object that it is not obvious that (TRUTHN**) captures the intui-
tions Boghossian thinks it captures: whereas (TRUTHN*) “places too demanding 
a requirement on believers, [TRUTHN**] places no requirement at all” (2007: 280). 
They explain: 
Obviously, if p is true, nothing whatsoever follows from [TRUTHN**] about what S ought to 
believe. Less obviously perhaps, if p is false, nothing whatsoever follows about what S 
ought to believe. For, if p is false, it only follows that it is not the case that S ought to 
believe that p. It does not follow, from the falsity of p, that S ought not to believe that p. 
There is an important difference between ‘it is not the case that S ought to believe that p’ 
and ‘S ought not to believe that p’ – the former states that S lacks an obligation to believe 
that p and the latter states that S has an obligation not to believe that p. The former is 
compatible with its being permissible for S to believe that p, while the latter is incompat-
ible with its being permissible for S to believe that p. Hence, whether p is true or false, 
[TRUTHN**] does not tell S what to believe (2007: 280). 
                                                 
47 Alternatively: S ought to (believe that p) only if p is true. 
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(TRUTHN) is simply the conjunction of (TRUTHN*) and (TRUTHN**). Since, according 
to B&H, (TRUTHN*) is false and (TRUTHN**) is too weak, (TRUTHN) itself is unten-
able. 
Furthermore, B&H dispute a proposal from Ralph Wedgwood48 which seems, 
initially, to dissolve the objection according to which the truth norm violates 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’). Wedgwood suggests that we restrict the true proposi-
tions one ought to believe to the propositions which one has actually considered: 
(TRUTH*): If S considers whether p, then S ought to (believe that p) if and 
only if p is true. 
The problem with (TRUTHN*) was that it entails that we ought to believe all the 
truths (of which there are infinitely many), including truths which are too com-
plex for us to believe. Insofar as ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it cannot be the case that 
we ought to believe everything that is true. But (TRUTH*) is more plausible: in-
tuitively, it is possible to believe propositions which one has actually considered; 
but it is not possible to consider infinitely many propositions, nor is it possible 
to consider propositions too complex for human beings to believe. That one can 
believe only what one can consider seems, prima facie, to be a psychological fact 
about human beings. If you consider a true proposition, then you ought to believe 
it; if you consider a false proposition, you ought not to believe it. 
B&H dispute this suggestion as follows. There are some propositions – Moore-
paradoxical propositions, or ‘blindspots’ as Sorensen (1988) calls them – which 
it is logically impossible to believe truly: “if they are true, then you don’t believe 
them, and if you believe them, then they are false” (B&H 2007: 281). Standard 
examples of blindspot propositions include the following: 
It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining. 
                                                 
48 Wedgwood (2002) and personal communication with Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007: 280). 
See Wedgwood (2013a) for a reply. 
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There are no believers. 
If it is true that there are no believers, then you do not believe that there are no 
believers; if it is true that it is raining but nobody believes that it is raining, it 
follows that you do not believe that it is raining. Likewise, if you believe these 
propositions, then they are false. Now, Wedgwood’s suggestion will not help 
here, for according to B&H, one can consider whether it is raining and nobody 
believes it is raining, or whether there are no believers, but it is not the case that 
these propositions can be truly believed. B&H note that the problem is not that 
the propositions in question cannot be believed, but rather that the obligation to 
believe p iff p is true cannot be satisfied. The objection is not that ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’, but that ‘ought’ implies ‘can satisfy’ (B&H 2007: 282): 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’): If S ought to φ, then it is possible for S to 
φ while still being obligated to φ.49 
Why does (TRUTH*) violate (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’)? Suppose that p is 
the proposition “It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining”. Now, if you 
believe that p, then p is false, in which case you are no longer obligated to believe 
that p. So, if one believes true blindspots, it is not possible to φ while still being 
obligated to φ. In other words, in cases in which you consider a proposition, you 
ought to believe it iff it is true. But it is impossible that you believe a true blind-
spot while still being obligated to believe true blindspots. For if you believe blind-
spots, then they are false, and so it is not the case that you ought to believe them. 
Now, B&H consider and reject an alternative way to formulate Wedgwood’s 
suggestion which purports to accommodate blindspots. Consider the following 
modification to (TRUTH*): 
(TRUTH**): If S considers whether p, and p is truly believable, then S ought 
to (believe that p) if and only if p is true. 
                                                 
49 See Bykvist (2007) for discussion of this principle in an ethical context. 
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If p is the proposition “It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining” and it 
is true, then (TRUTH**) does not imply that S ought to believe that p, since p is 
not truly believable. However, B&H claim that (TRUTH**) is too weak: it does not 
tell S that she ought not to believe that it is raining and nobody believes that it 
is raining. For even if p is true – as we have supposed – (TRUTH**) tells us noth-
ing about what we ought not to believe. But the intuitive response to p would be 
that S ought not to believe that p, even if it is true. Furthermore, B&H claim 
that (TRUTH**) conflicts with a similarly plausible principle: 
(TRUTH***): If S considers whether p, and p is not truly believable, then S 
ought not to (believe that p). 
It is possible, according to B&H, that there are true propositions which are not 
truly believable but which consist of conjuncts which are themselves truly be-
lievable. Suppose that S considers the proposition “It is raining and nobody be-
lieves that it is raining” and that this proposition is true. According to 
(TRUTH***), S ought not to believe that it is raining and nobody believes that it 
is raining, since this proposition is not truly believable. But considering a con-
junction requires that one consider each of its conjuncts: if the conjunction is 
true, each of its conjuncts must be true, and so even if the conjunction is not 
truly believable, each of the conjuncts is truly believable (B&H 2007: 282-3). 
Now, according to (TRUTH**), S ought to believe the proposition “It is raining” 
and the proposition “Nobody believes that it is raining”. But if we combine 
(TRUTH**) and (TRUTH***), it follows that S ought to believe the conjunct “It is 
raining” and the conjunct “Nobody believes that it is raining”, but S ought not to 
believe the conjunction “It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining”. More 
formally, the combination of (TRUTH**) and (TRUTH***) violates the following in-
tuitive principle: 
(AGGLOMERATION): If S ought to (believe that p) and S ought to (believe 
that q), then S ought to (believe that p and q). 
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B&H note that even though (AGGLOMERATION) is intuitively plausible, it is not 
entirely uncontroversial. “However,” they write, “many of those who defend the 
normativity of belief have reason to accept this principle, since they also defend 
the normativity of content […] If content is constituted by norms, it is plausible 
that [AGGLOMERATION] will be constitutive of the ordinary concept of and” (2007: 
283). The idea is that (AGGLOMERATION) is a plausible candidate for a ‘norma-
tivized’ version of the conjunction-introduction rule in propositional logic (B&H 
2013: 111).50 
Moreover, even if the normativist denies (AGGLOMERATION), she still needs to 
accept the existence of doxastic dilemmas – scenarios in which subjects believe 
the propositions that they ought to believe but end up in situations in which they 
believe the propositions they ought not to believe in that situation. Suppose that 
it is raining, and that S considers the proposition that it is raining. Suppose 
again that the proposition that it is raining is a proposition no one believes. Since 
it is true that it is raining, and since – we can assume – (TRUTH**) is also true, 
it follows that you ought to believe that it is raining. That is, from the truth of 
the following proposition (which S has considered): 
It is raining. 
Combined with (TRUTH**): 
If S considers whether p, and p is truly believable, then S ought to (believe 
that p) if and only if p is true. 
It follows that: 
S ought to believe that it is raining. 
Now, given (TRUTH**) and our supposition that no one believes that it is raining, 
it likewise follows that you ought to believe that no one believes it is raining. 
But: “if you satisfy the first obligation – to believe that it is raining – then, given 
                                                 
50 Conjunction-introduction: p, q, therefore (p & q). 
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[TRUTH***] and the fact that you now believe that it is raining, you ought not to 
believe that no one believes that it is raining” (B&H 2007: 283). That is, from 
the truth of the following proposition (which S has considered): 
No one believes that it is raining. 
Combined with (TRUTH***): 
If S considers whether p, and p is not truly believable, then S ought not to 
(believe that p). 
It follows (since “No one believes that it is raining” is not truly believable) that: 
S ought not to believe that no one believes that it is raining. 
The first obligation (to believe that it is raining) and the second obligation (to 
believe that no one believes that it is raining) are satisfiable separately, but they 
are not satisfiable jointly: whereas each obligation on its own conforms to 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’), these obligations do not jointly conform to this 
principle. So, the normativist needs to accept the existence of this sort of doxastic 
dilemma: if you believe what you ought to believe, you end up in a situation in 
which you believe what you ought not to believe in that situation. 
According to B&H, therefore, the narrow scope reading (TRUTHN) is untenable. 
What of (TRUTHW)? B&H note that there are two combinations of states of affairs 
which can satisfy the requirements of (TRUTHW): either S believes that p and p 
is true, or it is not the case that S believes that p and p is false. Furthermore, 
there are two more combinations that should be avoided: either S believes that 
p and p is false, or it is not the case that S believes that p and p is true. Now, 
the same objections B&H lodge against (TRUTHN) do not apply to (TRUTHW) in 
any obvious way, since the ought in (TRUTHW) takes wide scope over the bicondi-
tional and so cannot be broken down into two separate conditionals, such as 
(TRUTHN*) and (TRUTHN**). 
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B&H object to (TRUTHW) on the grounds that it does not capture the intuition 
that the truth is what you ought to believe. We are unconditionally required by 
(TRUTHW) to respect the entire biconditional, and so the only way for a believer 
to satisfy the norm is to satisfy one of the combinations noted above. But – since 
the ought takes wide scope – this means that we cannot detach from (TRUTHW) 
the obligation to believe that p, even when p is true (cf. Broome 2000). By anal-
ogy, consider the following syllogism: 
(i) S ought (if S believes that p and that p implies q, to believe that q) 
(ii) S believes that p and that p implies q. 
(iii) Therefore, S ought to believe that q. 
Given the wide scope of the ought operator in (i), (iii) does not follow from (i) and 
(ii). That is, we cannot detach S’s obligation to believe that q from (i) and (ii). 
B&H write: 
[…] q might well be an absurd proposition, in which case what you ought to do is not 
believe that p, or not believe that p implies q. Similarly, it does not follow from [TRUTHW] 
that you ought to believe that p, even when p is true, and [TRUTHW] does not therefore 
capture the thought that the truth is what you ought to believe. Nor, for that matter, does 
[TRUTHW] capture the thought that a false belief is defective. From the falsity of p and 
[TRUTHW] it does not follow that you ought not to believe that p. [TRUTHW] says that when 
you believe a falsehood, all is not as it ought to be, but this does not imply that it is the 
belief which is faulty or defective (2007: 284).51 
Moreover, B&H argue that there are instances in which (TRUTHW) does violate 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN’) after all, “for values of p such that the truth of p is una-
voidable, yet p is unbelievable” (2007: 284). Suppose that p is the conjunction of 
all necessary truths. Obviously, this would be far too complex for a human being 
to believe; but according to (TRUTHW), you ought either to bring it about that p is 
false or bring it about that you believe that p. But this does not seem possible. 
Intuitively, the conjunction of all necessary truths is itself a necessary truth, 
                                                 
51 See also Kalantari and Luntley (2013) for relevant discussion. 
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and so you cannot bring it about that p is false. Moreover, the conjunction of all 
necessary truths is presumably too complex for a human being to grasp, so you 
cannot believe that p either. Insofar as ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then, B&H maintain 
that (TRUTHW) is false. 
2.4 KNOWLEDGE AS THE AIM AND NORM OF BELIEF 
We have seen that B&H’s formulation problem constitutes a significant chal-
lenge to the normativist. In this section, I want to suggest we hold that 
knowledge, rather than merely truth, is the aim and norm of belief.52 This, I shall 
argue, might allow us to solve the formulation problem and preserve all the vir-
tues of the truth norm, while avoiding its unpalatable consequences. 
According to Hattiangadi (2010), there are two issues arising from the idea 
that belief has an aim: one epistemological, and one metaphysical. The episte-
mological issue is about the epistemic evaluation of belief: it is about whether 
truth, knowledge, or whatever is of fundamental epistemic value. I am primarily 
concerned, however, with the metaphysical issue, which is about the essential 
nature of belief. As we have seen, normativists interpret the slogan “Belief aims 
at X” as a normative, metaphorical claim. If, as per the present suggestion, 
knowledge is the aim of belief – and assuming we can give this claim a normative 
interpretation – then what is the knowledge norm for belief? Suppose we have 
the following knowledge norm: 
(KNOWLEDGE): S ought to believe that p if and only if S knows that p.53 
                                                 
52 Of course, I have not considered all the ways we might formulate the truth norm. For 
example, some philosophers have opted for a weaker deontic modality that ‘ought’ in formulating 
the truth norm (Whiting 2010, 2012, 2013). On this view, the truth norm is not about what we 
ought to believe, but rather what we are permitted to believe. For criticism of permissive truth 
norms, see McHugh (2012b), Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2013), and Greenberg (201X). 
53 Different versions of the knowledge norm are defended by Williamson (2000: Chapter 11), 
Sutton (2007), Smithies (2012), Gibbons (2013: Chapter 8), Engel (2013a), and Littlejohn (2013). 
According to Littlejohn (2013: 294), the difficulties Bykvist and Hattiangadi raise for truth 
norms do not seem to arise for knowledge norms. In fact, however, we shall see presently that 
many of these difficulties do arise for knowledge norms (but not, I think, all of them). 
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One might worry, however, that there is something strange about this norm, 
since knowledge entails belief: if you know that p, then you believe that p. There 
is something dubious about the left-to-right reading of the biconditional. How-
ever, let us postpone discussion of this. Perhaps a more pressing issue is that, 
like (TRUTH), (KNOWLEDGE) is ambiguous, since the ought operator can take ei-
ther a narrow scope or a wide scope over the biconditional. The narrow scope 
reading (KNOWLEDGEN) and the wide scope reading (KNOWLEDGEW) run as fol-
lows: 
(KNOWLEDGEN): S ought to (believe that p) if and only if S knows that p. 
(KNOWLEDGEW): S ought to (believe that p if and only if S knows that p). 
Just like (TRUTHN), (KNOWLEDGEN) prescribes believing that p on the condition 
that one knows that p. (KNOWLEDGEW), on the other hand, obligates subjects to 
respect the entire biconditional. (KNOWLEDGEN) is the conjunction of two condi-
tionals: 
(KNOWLEDGEN*): If S knows that p, then S ought to (believe that p). 
(KNOWLEDGEN**): If S ought to (believe that p), then S knows that p.54 
On the face of it, (KNOWLEDGEN*) is attractive, since unlike (TRUTHN*), it does 
not prescribe believing everything that is true, nor does it prescribe believing 
ungraspably complex truths. This is so precisely because we cannot know all the 
truths, and we cannot have knowledge of ungraspably complex ones. (Granted, 
(KNOWLEDGEN*) will prescribe believing some trivial truths, because we can have 
knowledge of trivial truths.) Thus (KNOWLEDGEN*) does not violate (‘OUGHT’ IM-
PLIES ‘CAN’). 
However, (KNOWLEDGEN*) faces difficulties. For one thing, it is not possible to 
violate the norm, since knowledge entails belief: if you know that p, then you 
                                                 
54 Alternatively: “S ought to (believe that p) only if S knows that p”. 
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believe that p. But any plausible norm implies the possibility of violation: nor-
mative force goes hand-in-hand with normative freedom (Railton 2000). In other 
words, just as ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, ‘ought’ implies ‘can not’: 
(‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN NOT’): If S ought to φ, then it is possible for S to fail 
to φ. 
Thus (KNOWLEDGEN*) looks implausible.55 What of (KNOWLEDGEN**)? The prob-
lem with (TRUTHN**) was that the norm is too weak, and so does not capture the 
intuition that the truth is what one ought to believe (B&H 2007: 280). A similar 
problem arises in the present case. Suppose S knows that p. Now, 
(KNOWLEDGEN**) does not tell S whether she ought to believe that p. Consider 
the following (invalid) syllogism: 
(1) If S ought to (believe that p), then S knows that p. 
(2) S knows that p. 
(3) Therefore, S ought to (believe that p). 
Obviously, this argument affirms the consequent. So if it is the case that S knows 
that p, nothing follows from (KNOWLEDGEN**) about what S ought to believe. 
Moreover, if S does not know that p, nothing follows about what she ought to 
believe either. For if it is false that S knows that p, all that follows is that it is 
not the case that S ought to believe that p. To make this clear, consider the fol-
lowing (valid) syllogism: 
(1) If S ought to (believe that p), then S knows that p. 
(2) It is not the case that S knows that p. 
(3) Therefore, it is not the case that S ought to (believe that p). 
                                                 
55 The norm also faces another difficulty. If S doesn’t know that p, it doesn’t follow from 
(KNOWLEDGEN*) that S ought not to believe that p. The intuition behind the knowledge norm, 
however, is meant to be that beliefs which do not amount to knowledge are faulty or defective. 
Intuitively, this cannot be captured by a norm which doesn’t tell you that you ought not to believe 
a proposition that you don’t know. 
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As B&H point out in the case of the truth norm, there is a difference between “It 
is not the case that S ought to believe that p” and “S ought not to believe that 
p”: according to the former, S lacks an obligation to believe that p, whereas ac-
cording to the latter, S has an obligation not to believe that p. Thus (3) is com-
patible with it being permissible for S to believe that p. Like (TRUTHN**), there-
fore, (KNOWLEDGEN**) does not tell the subject what she ought to believe, regard-
less of whether she knows that p. 
It seems to me, then, that both (KNOWLEDGEN*) and (KNOWLEDGEN**) are im-
plausible. If that is right, then (KNOWLEDGEN) is untenable, since this norm is 
simply the conjunction of (KNOWLEDGEN*) and (KNOWLEDGEN**). But is this fatal 
for the narrow scope reading of (KNOWLEDGE)? A natural next step for the nor-
mativist might be to modify the knowledge norm with the proviso that subjects 
must have considered the propositions they ought to believe: 
(KNOWLEDGE*): If S considers whether p, then S ought to (believe that p) if 
and only if S knows that p. 
On the face of it, (KNOWLEDGE*) is attractive, though it ultimately faces difficul-
ties. First, here is why it is attractive. B&H, we have seen, lodge a ‘blindspot’ 
objection against (TRUTH*) – the alethic equivalent to (KNOWLEDGE*). Blindspot 
propositions are such that it is logically impossible to believe them truly: if they 
are true, then you don’t believe them; if you believe them, then they are false. In 
the case of the truth norm, (TRUTH*) violates (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’): 
you cannot believe a true blindspot p and still be obligated to believe that p be-
cause, once you believe that p, p is false, in which case you lack the obligation to 
believe that p. But (KNOWLEDGE*) faces no such difficulty. It will never prescribe 
believing blindspots because we cannot have knowledge of blindspots. Suppose 
that p is the blindspot proposition “It is raining and nobody believes that it is 
raining”. If you believe that p, then p is false, and so you do not know that p. 
Knowledge, after all, is factive (Williamson 2000); it entails truth. Moreover, if 
p is true, then you do not believe that p, and so it follows that you do not know 
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that p. For knowledge entails belief. (KNOWLEDGE*), therefore, will never pre-
scribe believing blindspots because its consequent will never be satisfied in the 
case of blindspot propositions: if you consider some blindspot proposition p, then 
it is not the case that you know that p, so you will lack the obligation to believe 
that p. 
But this is precisely the difficulty with (KNOWLEDGE*): when you do not know 
that p, all that follows from the norm is that you lack an obligation to believe 
that p. It does not follow that you have an obligation not to believe that p. Thus 
by modifying the knowledge norm with the proviso that subjects consider the 
proposition in question, we simply push the problem raised for (KNOWLEDGEN**) 
back a step. Suppose that p is the proposition “It is raining and nobody believes 
that it is raining” and that S considers whether p. Now, we can illustrate the 
difficulty here with the following argument: 
(1) If S considers whether p, then S ought to (believe that p) if and only if S 
knows that p. 
(2) S considers whether p. 
(3) Therefore, S ought to (believe that p) if and only if S knows that p. 
(4) It is not the case that S knows that p.56 
(5) Therefore, it is not the case that S ought to (believe that p). 
But now it should be clear that (KNOWLEDGE*) faces essentially the same diffi-
culty as (TRUTHN**) and (KNOWLEDGEN**), only the problem has been pushed 
back a step: when p is a blindspot, nothing follows from (KNOWLEDGE*) about 
what subjects ought to believe, even after they have considered the propositions 
in question. 
So it seems as if the narrow scope reading of the knowledge norm is hopeless. 
What of the wide scope reading (KNOWLEDGEW)? This, too, faces difficulties. Re-
call that in the case of (TRUTH), there are two combinations of states of affairs 
                                                 
56 Because p is a blindspot proposition. 
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which satisfy the requirements of the norm: either you believe that p and p is 
true, or it is not the case that you believe that p and p is false. Moreover, there 
are two combinations of states of affairs which ought to be avoided: either you 
believe that p and p is false, or it is not the case that you believe that p and p is 
true. B&H, we saw, argued that (TRUTHW) does not capture the intuition that the 
truth is what one ought to believe, nor the thought that false beliefs are faulty 
or defective. Since (TRUTHW) deals in combinations, and since the ought takes 
wide scope over the biconditional, we cannot detach from (TRUTHW) the obliga-
tion to believe that p, even when p is true. 
A similar problem arises for (KNOWLEDGEW). The wide scope knowledge norm 
requires subjects unconditionally to respect the entire biconditional. Thus there 
are two combinations of states of affairs which satisfy the norm: either S knows 
that p and she believes that p, or S does not know that p and it is not the case 
that she believes that p. And there are two combinations of states of affairs 
which ought to be avoided: either S does not know that p and she believes that 
p, or S knows that p and it is not the case that she believes that p.57 But precisely 
because the norm deals in combinations, more or less the same difficulty arises 
for (KNOWLEDGEW) as for (TRUTHW): when you believe a proposition that you do 
not know, all is not as it ought to be, but we do not know whether it is the belief 
that is defective. Suppose, for example, that you believe that p without knowing 
that p. There are two ways to remedy this situation: either you give up the belief 
that p, or you acquire knowledge that p. The norm, however, does not enjoin one 
option rather than the other: we cannot be sure whether it is the belief which is 
defective, as opposed to one’s lack of knowledge that p. Thus (KNOWLEDGEW) does 
not capture the intuition that we ought to believe what we know, just as 
                                                 
57 The latter combination (“S knows that p and it is not the case that she believes that p”) is 
of course not an option; you avoid it by default. For knowledge entails belief: if you know that p, 
then you believe that p. So you never know that p without believing that p. 
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(TRUTHW) does not capture the intuition that the truth is what you ought to be-
lieve. Likewise, (KNOWLEDGEW) does not capture the thought that beliefs which 
do not amount to knowledge are faulty or defective.  
So (KNOWLEDGEW) looks implausible. Is there a way out for the normativist? 
At the beginning of this section, I raised one potential worry for the knowledge 
norm: knowledge entails belief, so if you know that p, then you already believe 
that p. There is perhaps something odd about a norm which prescribes forming 
a belief which the subject has already formed. The ‘way out’ for the normativist 
that I want to suggest involves dealing with this issue. Perhaps it makes more 
sense to talk about what we are in a position to know, rather than what we know, 
in the context of doxastic norms. This, at least, will not entail that one has al-
ready formed the very belief the norm tells them they ought to form. Hattiangadi 
(2010: 431) considers and rejects the following knowledge norm for belief: 
(KNOWLEDGE**): If S considers whether p, then 
(i) S ought to (believe that p) if she is in a position to know that p; and 
(ii) S ought not to (believe that p) if she is not in a position to know that p. 
To say that you are in a position to know that p is to say that, if you were to 
believe that p, you would know that p. But Hattiangadi lodges the following ob-
jection to this norm: 
The semantics of this conditional can be given in terms of possible worlds. We do not want 
to say that you are in a position to know that p just in case all possible worlds at which 
you believe that p are worlds at which you know that p. For, this condition would rarely 
be met, and you would rarely be in a position to know that p. Instead, it makes more sense 
to say that you are in a position to know that p just in case all of the closest worlds at 
which you believe that p are worlds at which you know that p. This means that even if you 
are in a position to know that p, it is still possible that you will believe that p, and yet fail 
to come to know that p. In such a situation, [KNOWLEDGE**] implies that you ought to 
believe that p. However, if when you believe that p you realize a world at which you do not 
know that p, then you will be in a state that is not epistemically ideal, although you will 
have formed your doxastic attitudes in accordance with [KNOWLEDGE**] (2010: 31). 
74 
 
But it is not clear that this objection succeeds. For it seems that, if when you 
believe that p you realize a world at which you do not know that p, you are in a 
state that is not epistemically ideal, but you have violated (KNOWLEDGE**): you 
have not, contra Hattiangadi, formed your doxastic attitudes in accordance with 
the norm. Suppose that Jones is in a position to know that p. That is, in all close 
possible worlds in which Jones believes that p, he knows that p. Now, 
(KNOWLEDGE**) implies that in some close possible world W1, Jones knows that 
p. But, we can suppose, there is a distant possible world W2 in which Jones be-
lieves that p but does not know that p. In W2, Jones is in a state that is not 
epistemically ideal. Jones is not in a position to know that p because W2 is a 
distant world (from the actual world and W1), and in the closest possible worlds 
to W2, Jones will not know that p. But it is not clear, then, that in W2 Jones has 
formed his doxastic attitudes in accordance with (KNOWLEDGE**): since Jones is 
not in a position to know that p, the norm implies that Jones ought not to believe 
that p in W2. So, contra Hattiangadi, we have a violation of (KNOWLEDGE**) in 
this case. 
According to Hattiangadi, the problem with (KNOWLEDGE**) is that it ex-
presses an obligation we have under certain conditions, rather than a condi-
tional obligation. The idea is that knowledge norms are meant to capture the 
thought that knowing that p while believing that p is an epistemically ideal 
state, whereas believing that p without knowing that p is an epistemically de-
fective state. Hattiangadi (2010: 431) argues that we can capture this with the 
following wide scope knowledge norm: 
(KNOWLEDGE***): If S considers whether p, then S ought to (believe that p 
only if she knows that p). 
(KNOWLEDGE***) tells us which states are epistemically permitted (believing that 
p and knowing that p) and epistemically forbidden (believing that p and not 
knowing that p). Hattiangadi suggests we be committed to (KNOWLEDGE***) as 
a criterion of rightness, rather than as a decision-making procedure (more on 
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this in Chapter 3). If we think of the norm this way, (KNOWLEDGE***) does not 
succumb to a ‘detachment’ objection, since it does not itself prescribe anything. 
Rather, the subjective epistemic norms do the prescribing; the objective criterion 
of rightness (KNOWLEDGE***) sets the standard for which epistemic norms to fol-
low. However, if what I have said about (KNOWLEDGE**) above is correct, then 
we have been given no reason to prefer (KNOWLEDGE***) over (KNOWLEDGE**). 
I take it that at least three morals can be drawn from the foregoing story. 
First, (KNOWLEDGE**) does not succumb to the objections Bykvist and Hatti-
angadi raise against truth norms, nor does Hattiangadi’s (2010) objection to it 
succeed. Second, (KNOWLEGDGE**) is a plausible candidate for a constitutive 
doxastic norm that serves to distinguish belief from other cognitive attitudes. 
Finally, (KNOWLEDGE**) can explain why the less controversial epistemic norms 
hold: it explains, for instance, why we ought to seek evidential justification for 
our beliefs, why our belief formation ought to be rational, and so on. In short, it 
seems to me that (KNOWLEDGE**) preserves all the virtues of the truth norm 
while avoiding its unpalatable consequences. Let me defend each of these three 
claims. 
To begin with, (KNOWLEDGE**) does not succumb to the objections B&H raise 
against truth norms. For one thing, (KNOWLEDGE**) does not violate (‘OUGHT’ 
IMPLES ‘CAN’): it does not prescribe believing everything that is true, nor un-
graspably complex propositions. There are two reasons for this. First, the norm 
is modified with the proviso that subjects consider the propositions in question. 
Since we cannot consider every proposition, the norm does not violate (‘OUGHT’ 
IMPLIES ‘CAN’). Moreover, we are never in a position to know ungraspably com-
plex truths, precisely because they are ungraspable. Thus the norm does not 
prescribe believing ungraspably complex truths. Nor does (KNOWLEDGE**) vio-
late (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’). As argued above, we can never have 
knowledge of blindspot propositions. I take it that this entails that we are never 
in a position to know blindspots. For to say that S is in a position to know that p 
76 
 
is to say that, were S to believe that p, she would know that p. But if one believes 
a true blindspot p, then p is false, and so one would not know that p (knowledge 
entails truth). Thus (KNOWLEDGE**) does not prescribe believing blindspots, and 
so does not violate (‘OUGHT’ IMPLIES ‘CAN SATISFY’). (Moreover, (KNOWLEDGE**) 
has a narrow scope ought, so it does not succumb to a ‘detachment’ objection.) 
The norm, therefore, does not succumb to the objections B&H raise against truth 
norms. 
As for our second moral, (KNOWLEDGE**) seems a plausible candidate for a 
constitutive doxastic norm – one that serves to distinguish belief from the other 
cognitive attitudes. On the foregoing account of constitutivity, a concept is con-
stitutively normative just in case it is a condition on grasping the statements in 
which it features that one grasps normative or deontic statements. It seems at 
least prima facie plausible that, in order to have: 
Ebeneezer understands that Marco believes that Mallory reached the sum-
mit. 
We need something like the following: 
Ebeneezer understands that (if Marco considers whether Mallory reached 
the summit, then if Marco is in a position to know that Mallory reached the 
summit, then he ought to believe that Mallory reached the summit; and if 
Marco is not in a position to know that Mallory reached the summit, then 
he ought not to believe that Mallory reached the summit). 
Though of course more needs to be said. However, it at least seems plausible 
that (KNOWLEDGE**) can distinguish belief from the other cognitive attitudes. 
For the following norms seem patently false (assuming S considers whether p, 
and simplifying somewhat): 
(IMAGINE): S ought to (imagine that p) iff S is in a position to know that p. 
(WISH): S ought to (wish that p) iff S is in a position to know that p. 
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(HOPE): S ought to (hope that p) iff S is in a position to know that p. 
And so on. We can imagine, hope, or wish whatever we want: we can imagine 
that a state of affairs obtains (say) without asking ourselves whether or not we 
are in a position to know that the state of affairs does in fact obtain. Whether or 
not we are in a position to know that p has no bearing on whether or not we are 
permitted to imagine, wish, or hope that p. We might put the point in terms of 
commitment (cf. Gibbons 2013: Chapter 8). To believe that p entails commitment 
to p’s being true, whereas when you imagine that p, you imagine that p is true, 
but you are not committed to p’s being true. Likewise for wishing and hoping. 
Since knowledge entails both truth and belief, (KNOWLEDGE**) distinguishes be-
lief from the other cognitive attitudes in this way: if you believe that p when you 
are in a position to know that p – and thereby acquire knowledge that p – you 
are committed to p’s being true. For your knowledge that p entails commitment 
to p’s being true via your belief that p. 
Finally, (KNOWLEDGE**) can explain why the subjective epistemic norms hold. 
It is worth spending more time on this. As noted previously, a number of philos-
ophers have pointed out that the strategy according to which norms like (EVI-
DENCE) are explained by the objective norm of truth is problematic, since the 
objective norm can clash with the subjective ones in some cases.58 Evidence, for 
example, can be misleading: you might have excellent evidence for a falsehood. 
Norms like (EVIDENCE), therefore, cannot be explained in terms of the truth 
norm in all cases, and this casts doubt on the idea that the objective norm of 
truth explains why the subjective epistemic norms hold – or to use Boghossian’s 
terminology, that it supplies their ‘rationale’. Of course, following evidential 
norms will generally lead to the truth; it is just that they cannot lead to the truth 
in all cases, because there are some instances in which following the epistemic 
norms will violate the truth norm. 
                                                 
58 In this section, I will focus on Hattiangadi’s (2010) presentation of the problem. I discuss 
the objections of Glüer and Wikforss (2013) in the next chapter. See also Gibbons (2013). 
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First, let us examine in more detail the idea that the objective norm of truth 
can clash with the epistemic norms, before looking at the way in which 
(KNOWLEDGE**) helps to deal with this problem. To begin with, consider the ale-
thic counterpart to (KNOWLEDGE**): 
(TRUTH+): If S considers whether p, then 
(i) If p is true, S ought to (believe that p) 
(ii) If p is false, S ought not to (believe that p) (Hattiangadi 2010: 425). 
We have already seen that, according to Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007), norms 
like (TRUTH+) will run into difficulties in the case of true blindspot propositions. 
However, Hattiangadi (2010) assumes for the sake of argument that (TRUTH+) 
holds, since in her view, this is the most plausible extant truth norm. For unlike 
(TRUTH*), when p is false and you consider whether p, (TRUTH+) implies that you 
ought not to believe that p, whereas (TRUTH*) only says that it is not the case 
that you ought to believe that p. 
According to those normativists who are sympathetic to epistemic deontology 
(e.g. Boghossian 2003), norms construed in terms of obligation and permission 
are essential to belief. Moreover, the objective norm explains why the subjective 
epistemic norms hold. Although there might be difficulties with permissive truth 
norms (McHugh 2012b; Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2013; Greenberg 201X), it is 
plausible that among the epistemic norms which purport to be explained by the 
objective norm is, for instance, (some version of) the following permissive evi-
dential norm: 
(PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE): S is permitted to believe that p only if she has 
sufficient evidence that p. 
The problem is that (TRUTH+) cannot explain why we ought to form beliefs in 
accordance with norms like (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) in all cases, because there 
are instances in which (TRUTH+) and (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) clash. I will argue, 
however, that (KNOWLEDGE**) does not face this difficulty. 
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Suppose you have excellent evidence for a false proposition p. According to 
(PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE), you are permitted to believe that p. But according to 
(TRUTH+), you ought not to believe that p. Since (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) and 
(TRUTH+) yield different permissions and prescriptions (respectively) in this 
case, the objective norm (TRUTH+) cannot explain and supply the ‘rationale’ for 
(PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) in all cases. Focusing on coin-toss and lottery cases, 
Hattiangadi (2010) argues that (KNOWLEDGE***) does not clash with (PERMIS-
SIVE EVIDENCE) in this way. But if what I have said is right, then we have no 
reason to prefer (KNOWLEDGE***) over (KNOWLEDGE**). It remains to be seen 
that (KNOWLEDGE**) does not clash with (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) in the hard 
cases (i.e. coin-toss and lottery cases). I will argue that it does not. 
First, we need to see why – in these hard cases – (TRUTH+) cannot explain 
(PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE). (I will outline Hattiangadi’s (2010: 425-7) argument to 
show this.) We can begin with coin-toss cases. Suppose you partake in a fair coin-
toss, and that you do not yet know the result. In fact, the coin lands on heads. 
Intuitively, the rational thing to do is to suspend judgement about whether the 
coin landed on heads until you know the result of the toss. But according to 
(TRUTH+), you ought to believe that the coin landed on heads, since you consider 
this proposition and it is true. However, (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) implies that 
you ought to suspend judgement about whether the coin landed on heads, since 
you have no evidence either way. Thus (TRUTH+) and (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) 
yield different prescriptions: the latter, therefore, cannot be explained by the 
former in all cases. The idea, then, that the objective norm of truth explains why 
we ought to seek evidential justification for our beliefs faces a difficulty. (That 
the objective and subjective norms can clash also casts doubt on the idea that 
the objective norm guides belief formation indirectly, via the subjective epistemic 
norms. I discuss guidance in Chapter 3.) One might agree that following norms 
like (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) generally allows believers to satisfy (TRUTH+). The 
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point is merely that the strategy of explaining (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) in terms 
of (TRUTH+) cannot work in all cases. 
The same difficulty, however, does not arise for (KNOWLEDGE**). According to 
(PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE), you ought to suspend judgement about whether the 
coin landed on heads. But (KNOWLEDGE**) also implies that you ought to sus-
pend judgement. To see this, let p be the proposition “The coin landed on heads”. 
Keeping in mind that, to say that you are in a position to know that p means 
that, if you were to believe that p, you would know that p, we can argue as fol-
lows. If you were to believe that p in this case, (KNOWLEDGE**) implies that you 
would not know that p – you have no evidential justification for believing that p, 
or p might be false – and so believing that p violates (KNOWLEDGE**). The best 
means of conforming to (KNOWLEDGE**) in this case is to suspend judgement 
about whether p, and this lines up with what, according to (PERMISSIVE EVI-
DENCE), you ought to do. Likewise, disbelieving that p (i.e., believing that not-p) 
will not satisfy (KNOWLEDGE**) in this case. If you disbelieve p, it doesn’t follow 
that you are in a position to know that p is false, and so it doesn’t follow from 
(KNOWLEDGE**) that you ought not to believe that p. Just as you have no eviden-
tial justification for believing that p, you have no justification for disbelieving p 
either. The best means of conforming to (KNOWLEDGE**) and (PERMISSIVE EVI-
DENCE), therefore, is to suspend judgement about whether the coin landed on 
heads. Unlike (TRUTH+), then, (KNOWLEDGE**) gives the right results in the coin-
toss case: it prescribes believing what it is intuitively rational to do in this case 
(i.e., it prescribes suspending judgement). 
What about lottery cases? First, let us look at why (TRUTH+) does not give the 
right results in lottery cases (again following Hattiangadi’s presentation of the 
argument). Lottery propositions are propositions of the form “N’s ticket will 
win”. Suppose that you and 99 of your friends each buy a fair ticket, of which 
there are 100 in total. Your options with respect to satisfying (TRUTH+) are as 
follows (Hattiangadi 2010: 429): 
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(a) Believe each lottery proposition. 
(b) Disbelieve each lottery proposition. 
(c) Suspend judgement about each lottery proposition. 
(d) Disbelieve all but one lottery proposition. 
According to Hattiangadi, if our aim is to satisfy (TRUTH+), then the best meth-
ods of doing so with respect to lottery propositions are option (b) or (d). Option 
(a) is hopeless, since if only 1 of the 100 tickets will win, then you acquire 99 
false beliefs by following (a), and you fail to satisfy (TRUTH+) 99% of the time. 
Option (b) is more promising, but still problematic. Following (b) means you will 
acquire 99 true beliefs, and so you will satisfy (TRUTH+) 99% of the time. But you 
believe that the lottery has a single winner, and if you disbelieve all lottery prop-
ositions, you can infer that all the tickets will lose by conjunction-introduction 
(Douven 2008). This means you will not satisfy (TRUTH+), because one of the 
lottery propositions is true, and so you ought to believe it. To see the problem, 
suppose you believe that: 
T1 will lose 
T2 will lose 
… 
Tn will lose 
It follows that: 
(T1 will lose & T2 will lose & … Tn will lose) 
However, Hattiangadi argues that this objection to (b) only works if belief is 
closed under logical consequence. But, according to her, it is not clear that belief 
is closed under logical consequence. Nevertheless, Hattiangadi argues that there 
might be further reasons for rejecting (b). For one thing, if (b) is the rational 
strategy, then (b) implies that it is always irrational to buy a lottery ticket no 
matter the odds. For according to (b), the rational thing to do is to disbelieve 
every lottery proposition – it will be irrational to believe that so-and-so’s ticket 
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will win, even if the odds of their winning are extremely high. But suppose you 
enter a fair lottery with 10 tickets. The prize is 1 million dollars, but the ticket 
only costs 10 cents. Option (b) implies that it would be irrational to buy this 
ticket, since according to (b), you epistemically ought to believe that each lottery 
ticket will lose – buying a ticket that you ought to believe will lose would be 
irrational according to (b).59 Intuitively, however, it is not irrational to buy this 
ticket, since the price of a loss is extremely low and the benefit of a win extremely 
high. If (b) is the rational strategy, then, it has counterintuitive implications for 
our judgements about whether buying a lottery ticket is ever rational (Hatti-
angadi 2010: 429). Moreover, the truth norm purports to explain a variety of 
epistemic norms. Arguably, any plausible system of epistemic norms will include 
a norm forbidding inconsistent or contradictory beliefs. For example: 
(CONSISTENCY*): If p and q are inconsistent, then S ought not to believe 
that (p & q). 
The problem is that if (TRUTH+) also explains (CONSISTENCY*), then (CON-
SISTENCY*) clashes with (b). For in our lottery case, you believe that only 1 ticket 
will win; but according to (b), you ought not to believe this – you ought to disbe-
lieve every lottery proposition. And so option (b) violates (CONSISTENCY*). One 
way to save (b) might be to deny that it is always irrational to hold inconsistent 
or contradictory beliefs. Consider, for example, one solution to the so-called 
“preface paradox”. Hattiangadi writes: 
Authors of books commonly take responsibility, in the preface, for any errors that might 
remain in the book. Indeed, it seems rational for an author to say this in the preface. 
However, if you think of a book as a series of sincere assertions, and that the author be-
lieves each of the propositions asserted in the book, then if the author expresses the belief 
that not all of the sentences in the book are true – that at least one of them is false – the 
                                                 
59 Hattiangadi notes that buying the ticket in this case would be pragmatically irrational, not 
epistemically irrational. But according to her, this is not to conflate pragmatic and epistemic 
irrationality: “The point is rather that if [b] is assumed to be the epistemically rational strategy, 
it will have counterintuitive implications for our judgements regarding whether buying a lottery 
ticket can ever be practically rational” (2010: 429). 
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author seems to have expressed inconsistent beliefs. If this is indeed a case in which it is 
rational to hold inconsistent beliefs, the foregoing explanation for why [b] is not the best 
method is less compelling. Perhaps there is no norm forbidding contradictory beliefs in the 
best system of epistemic norms, so [b] is, after all, the best method of belief formation 
(2010: 429).60 
But Hattiangadi claims that this would be going too far. Indeed, she argues that 
– in cases in which it seems rational to hold inconsistent beliefs – we can think 
of (CONSISTENCY*) as a prima facie norm, i.e. a norm that can be overridden by 
other norms. On this picture, (CONSISTENCY*) might hold in most cases, but it 
can be overridden in cases such as the preface paradox. As Hattiangadi puts it, 
“It is less costly to accommodate the preface paradox by treating the non-contra-
diction norm as being prima facie than to deny that the best system of epistemic 
norms contains a norm forbidding contradictory beliefs” (2010: 429). So, (b) 
seems to be vindicated. 
Option (c) seems intuitively best in the lottery case: your evidence counts 
against each lottery proposition, and so you ought to suspend judgement about 
whether your (or anyone’s) ticket will win. You ought not to disbelieve each lot-
tery proposition, both because this yields counterintuitive results about practical 
rationality and because a simply inference will lead you to contradict yourself. 
So, suspension of judgement is intuitively the best option. But this conflicts with 
(TRUTH+), since according to (TRUTH+), you ought to believe that so-and-so’s 
ticket will win; it is not the case that you ought to suspend judgement about 
whose ticket will win. 
What about option (d)? As Douven (2008) points out, if you disbelieve all but 
one lottery proposition, you will at worst acquire 98 true beliefs and at best 100 
                                                 
60 Granted, authors of books don’t usually sincerely assert that there are some false proposi-
tions in their book, just that they take responsibility for any false propositions in the book that 
there may be. But let us simply grant the thought experiment and imagine a bizarre author 
sincerely asserting that there are some false propositions in the book. Indeed, the preface para-
dox is especially relevant in the present context, since many claim that any solution to the lottery 
paradox must yield a solution to the preface paradox, and vice versa (Sutton 2007: 67-70). 
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of them. So with respect to satisfying (TRUTH+), option (d) is better than the in-
tuitively rational method (c): suspending judgement means that you will not 
form any beliefs, and so you will not satisfy (TRUTH+), but disbelieving all but 
one lottery proposition gives you a high chance of satisfying (TRUTH+). 
So, according to Hattiangadi, options (b) and (d) are the best means of satis-
fying (TRUTH+). However, both (b) and (d) conflict with intuitions about the ra-
tionality of buying lottery tickets and the rationality of holding contradictory 
beliefs. Intuitively, the best option is (c): you ought to suspend judgement about 
what to believe, and this is also what (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) tells you to do (you 
have no evidence about whose ticket will win). Therefore, according to Hatti-
angadi (2010: 430), the sophisticated explanation of the subjective epistemic 
norms in terms of the objective norm of truth cannot supply an adequate expla-
nation of intuitively rational norms like (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE). For according 
to (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE), you ought to suspend judgement about what ticket 
will win; but according to (TRUTH+), you ought to take either option (b) or option 
(d). 
We are now in a good position to see that, unlike (TRUTH+), (KNOWLEDGE**) 
gives the right results in lottery cases. As in the coin-toss case, both 
(KNOWLEDGE**) and (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) will prescribe suspending judge-
ment about lottery propositions. That is, option (c) is the best means to avoid 
violating (KNOWLEDGE**) with regard to lottery propositions. Let p be the prop-
osition “N’s ticket will win”. If you believe that p, you violate (KNOWLEDGE**), 
since by believing that p, you do not acquire knowledge that p. You have no evi-
dential justification or warrant for believing that p, nor would it be (intuitively) 
rational for you to believe that p – the lottery is random – and so you are not in 
a position to know that p. Thus suspension of judgement seems to be the best 
option, and this lines up with what (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE) prescribes. Like-
wise, disbelieving p will also violate (KNOWLEDGE**). For just as in the coin-toss 
case, from your disbelieving p, it doesn’t follow that you are in a position to know 
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that p is false. So if you disbelieve p, it doesn’t follow from (KNOWLEDGE**) that 
you ought not to believe that p. The best means to avoid violating 
(KNOWLEDGE**) in the lottery case is still option (c), or suspension of judgement. 
Unlike (TRUTH+) and (PERMISSIVE EVIDENCE), then, (KNOWLEDGE**) and (PER-
MISSIVE EVIDENCE) do not clash in lottery cases. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has defended normativism against the objections of Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi, arguing that a particular knowledge norm does not succumb to 
those objections. When knowledge is understood as the aim and norm of belief, 
we preserve the virtues of the truth norm while avoiding its unpalatable conse-
quences: (i) the knowledge norm does not succumb to the objections of Bykvist 
and Hattiangadi; (ii) it is a plausible candidate for a constitutive doxastic norm; 
and (iii) it gives the right results in the hard cases (i.e. coin-toss and lottery 
cases), the upshot of which is that – unlike the truth norm – the knowledge norm 




3 TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, AND GUIDANCE 
 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, we saw that normativism can potentially be defended against the 
objections Bykvist and Hattiangadi raise for truth norms. This chapter considers 
a second influential argument against normativism, from Kathrin Glüer and 
Åsa Wikforss. I want to defend normativism against these objections. In §3.2, I 
outline the ‘no guidance argument’ and the related ‘regress of motivations’ argu-
ment from Glüer and Wikforss. §3.3 offers further clarification of the no guid-
ance argument, since it is important to be clear about what the argument 
amounts to, and a number of commentators have found it puzzling. In §3.4, I 
suggest one potential way of blocking the objections of Glüer and Wikforss 
(§3.4.2), following a foray into the literature on ‘blind’ rule-following (§3.4.1). In 
§3.5, I outline a different way we might block these anti-normativist arguments, 
from Teemu Toppinen. I argue that, while we might accept Toppinen’s response 
to Glüer and Wikforss, his own positive account of the way in which norms might 
guide belief is likely to face significant difficulties: in particular, it relies on an 
expressivist treatment of ‘epistemic ought thought’. Although in this chapter I 
will assume that the truth norm holds – since the issues discussed here are quite 
independent of the question whether truth, knowledge, or whatever is the proper 
norm of belief – in §3.6 I briefly sketch a cognitivist account of the way in which 
the knowledge norm defended in Chapter 2 might guide belief indirectly. Since 
my positive account will be necessarily incomplete and subject to a number of 
provisos, I conclude with a sketch of the sort of work that would need to be done 
in order to make the account convincing. 
 3.2 THE NO GUIDANCE ARGUMENT 
Doxastic normativism is the thesis that it is constitutive of, or essential to, belief 
that it is norm-governed. According to an influential argument from Kathrin 
Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (‘G&W’ hereafter), normativism is problematic because 
the norms which purport to guide belief formation and revision can offer no such 
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guidance.61 Call this the no guidance argument. According to G&W, there are 
two ways one might argue for normativism. On the one hand, one might appeal 
to a constitutive norm of belief, such as a norm of truth, in order to show that 
belief is essentially normative. On the other hand, one might appeal directly to 
the ‘rules’ of rationality, such as (EVIDENCE). But presumably, if belief is essen-
tially normative, then our belief formation and revision must be guided by the 
norms in question; that is, it must be the case that we form and revise our beliefs 
in accordance with them. G&W hold that we cannot do this. I will focus primarily 
on G&W’s objections to the first way of arguing for normativism – the appeal to 
constitutive norms – since this is the strategy adopted in the preceding chap-
ter.62 
Now, both the formulation problem (discussed in Chapter 2) and the no guid-
ance argument proceed from highly intuitive assumptions about the prescriptive 
nature of normative concepts and what it is for a rule or norm to guide belief. 
Thus it seems that the normativist faces a dilemma: 
(a) Either she needs to give some novel construal of normativity, in which 
case she must motivate the departure from intuition.63 
(b) Or she rejects the arguments of both B&H and G&W, in which case her 
own defense of normativism must proceed from similarly intuitive as-
sumptions. 
                                                 
61 Glüer and Wikforss (2009, 2010a, 2013, 2015). I will focus primarily on the presentation of 
the no guidance argument in their 2010a, 2013, and 2015 papers, since Glüer and Wikforss 
acknowledge that their presentation of the no guidance argument in their 2009 is “condensed” 
and “somewhat obscure” (2010a: 758). This, according to them, is what has puzzled a number of 
commentators (e.g., Steglich-Petersen 2010, 2013). 
62 Framing G&W’s strategy in the way I have done here may invite some confusion, since 
when outlining their argument against the appeal to truth norms, G&W still talk about ‘rule’ 
guidance. In this context, we should understand ‘rule’ as synonymous with ‘norm’: to say that 
you are guided by a rule is just to say that you are guided by a norm. On the other hand, in the 
context of the second strategy – the appeal to the ‘rules’ of rationality – the rules in question are 
just the familiar epistemic norms. G&W have in mind arguments such as Gibbard’s (2005), ac-
cording to which the objective ought reduces to the subjective one: the subjective ought is ana-
lytically prior to the objective one and defines it. Since I will not discuss the latter strategy here, 
‘rule guidance’ should be understood as ‘norm guidance’. 
63 G&W suggest that this would amount to accepting their conclusion (2013: 82). 
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For the norms which purport to be constitutive of belief are typically construed 
as genuine norms – that is, norms which are prescriptive or action-guiding. Ac-
cording to G&W, as we shall see, this is difficult to square with some basic intu-
itions about rule- or norm-guidance (2013: 82). In Chapter 2, I opted for strategy 
(b): the knowledge norm can be formulated, in accord with intuition, in a way 
that does not succumb to the objections of B&H. But it remains to be seen that 
the knowledge norm does not succumb to the no guidance problem. I want to 
suggest, instead, that there may be ways of blocking some of G&W’s arguments 
against normativism. 
Let us examine first the no guidance argument in the context of the truth 
norm. Suppose we have the following truth norm for belief: 
(TRUTH): S ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.64 
G&W argue that, given some intuitively plausible assumptions about what rule- 
or norm-guidance amounts to, we cannot form or revise our beliefs in accordance 
with (TRUTH). That is, (TRUTH) does not guide our beliefs. Intuitively, according 
to G&W, to be guided by a rule or norm R in our performances requires that R 
“influences, or motivates, or provides reasons for, these performances”; and 
moreover, “R intuitively needs to ‘tell us’ what to do under given circumstances” 
(2010a: 758. Italics in original). Guiding norms have the following generic form: 
(R) Do X when in C. 
Let C be the ‘antecedent conditions’ that must obtain in order to be guided by 
the norm. Now, the problem is as follows. Some subject S looks to R for guidance 
when she is deliberating about whether to X. But in order for S to figure out 
whether to X on the basis of R, she must first form a belief about whether the 
                                                 
64 In Chapter 2, we saw that (TRUTH) as it stands is both ambiguous and too strong, and thus 
normativists typically opt for alternative formulations. The no guidance argument, however, is 
quite independent of these issues, and so we can assume that (TRUTH) holds for our present 
purposes. Nor does the no guidance argument challenge the idea that truth norms ever hold in 




antecedent conditions obtain, i.e. she needs to form a belief about whether C is 
satisfied. If S believes that C is satisfied, then this belief combined with R pro-
vides S with a reason to X. For instance: 
[B]eing guided by the rule ‘buy low, sell high’ requires, among other things, forming a 
belief about the market. If I believe that the market is at a low, the rule gives me a reason 
to buy. This belief may of course be false, but this does not prevent the rule from influenc-
ing, or motivating, my behavior. Rather, it just means that, if the belief is false, I will 
(inadvertently) do the wrong thing. Guidance does not necessarily amount to correct per-
formance (G&W 2010a: 758). 
This is all well and good, but G&W argue that a problem arises when we apply 
this picture of guidance to norms like (TRUTH). (TRUTH) is supposed to guide the 
subject as to whether to believe that p. Whether or not she ought to believe that 
p is determined by the question of whether p is true or false. But being guided 
by (TRUTH) requires the subject to form a belief about whether the relevant an-
tecedent conditions obtain. But, in the case of (TRUTH), determining whether the 
relevant antecedent conditions obtain amounts to determining whether p is true, 
i.e. determining whether C amounts to forming a belief as to whether p. And so, 
according to G&W, there are two related reasons this makes it intuitively odd to 
think of (TRUTH) as guiding belief formation and revision. First: 
For one thing, in order to receive guidance as to whether to believe that p from [TRUTH], I 
must first form a belief as to whether p. But that was the very question I wanted guidance 
on! Once I have formed a belief as to whether p, I simply do not need such guidance any-
more. More precisely, since the very belief the formation of which [TRUTH] is supposed to 
influence, or motivate, needs to have been formed before [TRUTH] can exert any such in-
fluence, [TRUTH] cannot influence, or motivate, its formation (G&W 2010a: 758). 
Second: 
But it is not only that [TRUTH]’s guidance, so to speak, necessarily comes too late. [TRUTH], 
secondly, is such that whatever conclusion I come to as to whether p, [TRUTH] ‘tells me’ 
that that is the belief I ought to form. That is, whenever I conclude that p is true, [TRUTH] 
‘gives me a reason’ to believe that p. And whenever I conclude that not-p, it ‘gives me a 
reason’ to believe not-p. Hence, [TRUTH] never gives me a reason to believe anything but 
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what I have already come to believe anyway. Intuitively, no more guidance is to be had 
from [TRUTH] than from an oracle that invariably tells you to figure out what to do for 
yourself (G&W 2010a: 759). 
The idea, then, is that (TRUTH) cannot guide believers as to whether they should 
believe p, because in order to follow the norm which tells you to believe that p 
on the condition that p is true, you need to have already formed a belief as to 
whether p is true. Once you have formed the belief that p, there is no longer any 
work for (TRUTH) to do: it tells you to do what you were doing anyway.65 
Moreover, doxastic normativism seems to succumb to a version of a related 
objection G&W raise in their original paper (2009). Call this objection the regress 
of motivations argument.66 The idea is that not all belief formation can be rule-
guided if following or being guided by a rule requires the subject to form a belief 
about the antecedent conditions, lest we lapse into regress. According to G&W, 
an intuitive conception of rule-guidance requires a substantive distinction be-
tween being guided by a rule, and simply acting in accordance with one: “For 
there to be guidance the rule has to make a difference to (the formation and 
explanation of) S’s behavior […] it has to be that S acts in accordance with the 
rule because of the rule” (2013: 94). You put one foot in front of the other in order 
                                                 
65 Cf. Shah and Velleman (2005: 519-20), who raise an objection to truth norms that is similar 
to, but distinct from, the no guidance argument. Unlike G&W, however, Shah and Velleman hold 
that this objection shows only that the truth norm cannot guide belief directly. For a reply to 
Shah and Velleman, see Zalabardo (2010). 
66 G&W (2009: 55-9; 2010a: 759; 2013: 94-7). In their 2009, G&W discuss the regress of moti-
vations argument in the context of ‘content-determining’ (CD) normativism (cf. Brandom 1994), 
as opposed to ‘content-engendered’ (CE) normativism (cf. Kripke 1982). CD normativism holds, 
roughly, that there are prior norms in force which determine intentional content; CE norma-
tivism holds, roughly, that norms can be (directly) derived from content. G&W make the CD/CE 
distinction only in the case of content normativism more generally – in addition to a correspond-
ing distinction in the context of semantic normativism – but it is not clear that the distinction 
applies in the context of doxastic normativism. Indeed, G&W seem to have abandoned talk of 
the distinction in their 2010a, 2013, and 2015, which focus solely on doxastic normativism. As 
such, I will not attempt to apply the distinction in the present context, though see Engel (2007: 
184-5) for discussion. Moreover, one might be a doxastic normativist without committing herself 
to content normativism (and vice versa), so it is not clear that the CD/CE distinction is necessary 
in present context. Indeed, G&W are clear to distinguish the regress of motivations – which does 
not rely on a particular theory of content – from what they call the regress of contents, which 
does rely on CD normativism (2009: 57). We need not get into this here. 
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to walk down the corridor. But this does not mean you are being guided by a rule 
such as: “When walking down a corridor, put one foot in front of the other!” Put-
ting one foot in front of the other is just something you typically do; you are 
merely acting in accordance with this rule, not following it. So how should we 
flesh out the relevant notion of rule-guidance? G&W suggest that the most nat-
ural, intuitive picture of rule guidance is as follows: 
(RULE GUIDANCE): Some performance A is guided by a rule R if and only if 
R plays a certain role in S’s motivation for A. The role R plays in S’s moti-
vation for A is such that there will be a certain kind of intentional explana-
tion for A (cf. §3.4 below). 
The ‘intentional explanation’ here involves some kind of acceptance of R (G&W 
2013: 94; cf. Boghossian 2008: 121-4). G&W claim that, if we use a belief-desire 
model of intentional explanation, such an explanation will have (at least) two 
components: (a) acceptance of the rule on the part of S in the ‘motivational slot’; 
and (b) a belief to the effect that some particular performance is in accord with 
the rule. G&W suggest that upshot of these intuitive ideas about rule-guidance 
is a practical syllogism of the following form: 
(P1) I want to believe what is in accordance with R.  
(P2) To believe that p is in accordance with R.  
(C) I want to believe that p.67 
G&W argue that this sort of practical inference causes trouble for the norma-
tivist: 
The trouble is that the practical inference requires S to have another belief, the belief that 
believing that p is in accordance with the norm. However, according to the normativist, 
the further belief would also have to be motivated by a rule, if it is to qualify as a belief, 
which is to say that there would have to be yet another belief in place. Thus, we embark 
on a vicious regress, a regress we have called the regress of motivations. Hence, if guidance 
                                                 
67 G&W (2009: 55; 2013: 94). See also Glüer and Pagin (1999), who suggest a similar model 
regarding practical reasoning in the context of rule-following and meaning. 
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by rules is understood along the lines suggested here, it cannot be that a state is a belief 
only if it is formed as a result of S being guided by certain rules (2013: 94). 
According to G&W, therefore, rules or norms cannot guide belief formation, both 
on pain of regress and because one must have formed the very belief they looked 
to the norm for guidance on in order to get such guidance. 
 3.3 THE NO GUIDANCE ARGUMENT:  SOME CLARIFICATIONS 
It is important to be clear about what the no guidance argument really amounts 
to. According to Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2010: 751), G&W’s main claim is the 
following: 
(1) ‘Do X when in C’ cannot be guiding if ‘X’ and ‘C’ refer to the same condi-
tion. 
But as we shall see in a moment, this is not quite right. Steglich-Petersen gives 
two objections to (1). First, he argues that G&W are wrong to think that norms 
with the form of (1) cannot guide. In fact, he says, “If any norm of this form were 
true, it would be a rather interesting norm with normatively important conse-
quences” (Steglich-Petersen 2010: 751). For example, the norm would entail that 
one ought to preserve C whenever C obtains. The norm would be extremely con-
servative, according to Steglich-Petersen, but it would clearly be capable of 
providing guidance. Second, Steglich-Petersen claims that it is wrong to think of 
(TRUTH) as having the form of (1), since norms with the form of (1) are likely to 
be false: “It is false that believing p is correct whenever one believes that p” 
(2010: 752). 
The problem, however, is that both of these objections miss the mark. For one 
thing, G&W claim that it is a mistake to think that norms with the form of (1) 
can still guide even though they are extremely conservative. For a norm like “If 
you do X, then do X” cannot have any consequences for the future (G&W 2010a: 
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760).68 Suppose that you ought to X whenever you X. It does not follow, according 
to G&W, that you ought to X all the time; nor that you ought to continue X-ing 
after you have started. 
Moreover – and more importantly – G&W do not claim, contra Steglich-Pe-
tersen, that (TRUTH) really has the form of (1). The claim is not that (TRUTH) 
should really be understood as being of the form “If you do X, do X”, since “p is 
true” (C) and “believe that p” (X) are quite obviously distinct (G&W 2010a: 760). 
Steglich-Petersen notes that (TRUTH) is an objective norm (2010: 752) – a norm 
that holds in virtue of what is the case – but G&W point out that the fact that it 
is an objective norm does not necessarily mean that the norm cannot guide.69 
Rather: 
In order to be guided by such norms, one needs to form beliefs as to whether their ante-
cedents are fulfilled, but that does not mean that their antecedents really are ‘about’ be-
liefs. Hence, we never claim, as Steglich-Petersen suggests, that what the truth norm ‘re-
ally recommends is that one should “believe that p only if one believes that p”’ [Steglich-
Petersen 2010: 752]. Our claim, again, is simply that in order to determine whether C is 
fulfilled, S already needs to form a belief as to whether p – the very belief the formation 
of which [TRUTH] was supposed to guide (G&W 2010a: 760). 
Thus it is wrong to attribute to G&W the view that (TRUTH) really has the form 
of (1): the claim is not that the antecedent conditions are really ‘about’ beliefs, 
but that one must form a belief as to whether p in order to determine whether C. 
This is thus a significant challenge to the normativist: the normativist needs to 
                                                 
68 Steglich-Petersen is claiming that, on G&W’s picture, (TRUTH) really has the form “If you 
do X, then do X” because, according to (1), ‘X’ and ‘C’ refer to the same condition: believing or 
disbelieving p. 
69 Some normativists (e.g. Boghossian 2003) construe objective norms in a way that is likely 
to invite confusion. They say that objective norms are such that it is not transparent to the sub-
ject how she might follow them. On the other hand, subjective norms are such that it is trans-
parent to the subject how she is to follow them. But this is misleading. Objective norms hold in 
virtue of what is the case. They do not hold in virtue of anyone’s representation of what is the 
case. So, while it is true that it is not often transparent to subjects how they might follow objec-
tive norms, objective norms are not objective norms because they are sometimes non-transpar-
ent. So, G&W are right to point out that objectivity alone does not prevent belief norms from 
being guiding norms. 
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give an account of the way in which the norms essential to belief can guide our 
belief formation. 
Steglich-Petersen’s (2010) objection, then, is that the no guidance argument 
conflates the conditions under which (TRUTH) makes beliefs correct (p being 
true), with the psychological state one must be in in order to apply the norm (the 
state of believing that p). From G&W’s (2010a) response, however, it is clear that 
the no guidance argument involves no such conflation. Conceding this, Steglich-
Petersen (2013) makes a second attempt at raising difficulties for the no guid-
ance argument. He argues that the no guidance argument fails because it (I) 
“relies on a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influ-
ence behavior” and (II) “falsely assumes that the point of the truth norm is to 
provide guidance in ascertaining the truth of the propositions being considered 
for belief” (2013: 279). In their 2015 paper, G&W argue that, once again, 
Steglich-Petersen’s objections miss the mark. 
Let us start with (II), since G&W read Steglich-Petersen as claiming that the 
relationship between (I) and (II) is that, once we recognize the real point of the 
truth norm, we will be able to see how it can guide belief (G&W 2015: 273). If, 
as Steglich-Petersen argues, it is false to assume that the point of the truth norm 
is to guide us in ascertaining the truth of the propositions being considered for 
belief, then what is the point of the truth norm? Steglich-Petersen suggests that 
we answer this question by considering what question the truth norm might 
provide a helpful answer to: “the truth norm does provide a helpful answer if you 
were wondering what sorts of considerations would be relevant for determining 
whether to believe that p in the first place” (2013: 283). Recall that the no guid-
ance argument says nothing about whether truth norms are “valid” (i.e., whether 
they hold or are in force). It only purports to show that truth norms, if valid, 
cannot guide belief formation. G&W (2015: 274) read Steglich-Petersen as sug-
gesting that we need to take a step back and ask not whether truth norms can 
guide if valid, but whether they are valid. According to G&W, Steglich-Petersen 
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is presupposing that there is a multitude of possible or conceivable norms for 
belief, such as: 
(PLEASANT): S ought to believe that p if and only if it would be pleasant to 
believe that p. 
If there is such a multitude of belief norms, then we need to ask what the cor-
rectness of belief depends on, e.g. we need to ask whether it is truth or pleasant-
ness. Steglich-Petersen suggests that the truth norm can provide a helpful an-
swer to this sort of question: 
The truth norm is intended as a guide for what to believe, where this question is initially 
understood as open to the possibility that something other than truth could decide what 
it would be correct to believe. It answers this open question by telling us that when con-
sidering whether to believe some proposition, one should let this depend on the truth of 
that proposition […] If one were in doubt as to whether the correctness of belief depended 
on truth or pleasantness, it would clearly be guiding to become convinced of the truth 
norm’s validity (2013: 281). 
On this picture, the point of the truth norm is to answer the question of which 
norms are valid or in force for belief. But G&W note that this is problematic, 
both because a truth norm can say nothing about its own validity, and because 
even if it could, it would be obscure how it could convince us of its own validity: 
“If the basic question concerning the norms of belief really is which of all the 
possible norms is in fact valid for belief, it is clearly not any of the norms them-
selves that will provide us with a helpful answer” (2015: 274-5). 
Thus G&W return to (I) above and suggest a second way of interpreting 
Steglich-Petersen. What Steglich-Petersen is after, according to G&W, is a wider 
or more inclusive notion of guidance (“SP-guidance”) than theirs. SP-guidance 
includes the performances which are excluded by G&W’s narrower notion of 
guidance, e.g. it includes becoming convinced that the truth norm (rather than 
the pleasantness norm) is valid for belief (G&W 2015: 275). G&W, by contrast, 
were originally concerned only with first-order belief formation. The no guidance 
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argument concerned the way in which a truth norm might (not) make a differ-
ence in (i.e. guide) a subject’s forming or revising a first-order belief; it did not 
involve discussion of some higher-order belief to the effect that the truth norm 
is valid for first-order believing. Nevertheless, G&W write: “The suggestion we 
want to investigate now is that Steglich-Petersen’s considerations concerning 
the validity of the truth norm are mere props for investigating the right kind of 
contrast between different forms of first-order belief formation” (2015: 275). 
The relevant ‘contrast’ in this context is between the outcomes of different 
procedures for determining whether to believe that p. One such procedure in-
volves following (TRUTH) and figuring out whether p is true; the other involves 
following (PLEASANT) and figuring out whether p is pleasant. It is irrelevant, on 
this picture, whether a new belief is formed after determining whether the rele-
vant antecedent conditions have been satisfied. What is important is whether 
the procedure chosen leads to new beliefs being formed. According to Steglich-
Peterson, the chosen procedure does indeed lead to new beliefs being formed: 
you would end up with a different belief if you followed (TRUTH) than you would 
if you followed (PLEASANT). 
According to G&W, the no guidance argument is part of a larger debate over 
the ‘rule-following considerations’ (cf. Boghossian 1989), which bears on the 
question of whether belief is an essentially rule-guided activity. As noted above, 
we need to make a substantive distinction between being guided by or following 
a rule, and merely acting in accordance with the rule. G&W argue, essentially, 
that (TRUTH) cannot accommodate this distinction: the norm cannot be followed 
because it cannot guide. The question at issue, then, is whether there is a wider 
notion of guidance (SP-guidance) which shows the truth norm can be followed. 
Steglich-Petersen wants to flesh out a notion of norm-influenced behavior, ac-
cording to which it will plausible that the truth norm can guide or be followed. 
G&W (2015: 276) reconstruct Steglich-Petersen’s picture of norm-influenced be-
havior as follows: 
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(D) A norm N of the form “In C, do X” can influence a subject’s behavior 
with respect to X only if S following N can make a difference to S’s X-
ing (cf. Steglich-Petersen 2013: 281). 
Steglich-Petersen fleshes out (D) as follows: 
Given the above comments about the point of the truth norm, it should be clear that it 
could influence one’s behavior, i.e., beliefs, in this sense. For suppose that S instead of 
accepting [TRUTH] accepts [PLEASANT]. In applying this norm, S will first seek to find out 
whether believing p would be pleasant. We can imagine that S comes to the conclusion 
(and thus forms the belief) that believing p would be unpleasant, and, in accordance with 
the norm, does not form the belief that p. Had S instead followed [TRUTH], she would have 
sought to find out whether p. If we suppose that she comes to the conclusion that p, she 
will deem believing p correct. Given that she at this stage in the process already believes 
that p, this will not result in a new belief. But it is nevertheless the case that she would 
have ended up with a different belief, had she followed [TRUTH] rather than [PLEASANT]. 
(2013: 282.) 
The idea is supposed to be that (D) is weaker than the intuitive notion of guid-
ance G&W rely on, but strong enough that it is nevertheless sufficient for rule-
following. However, G&W suggest that the scenario Steglich-Petersen gives to 
flesh out (D) leaves out material he actually uses. Instead, they suggest that 
Steglich-Petersen has something like the following in mind: 
(D*): Acceptance of a norm N of the form “In C, do X” can influence a subject 
S’s behavior with respect to X in the sense of making a difference to 
S’s X-ing only if S can follow N (G&W 2015: 277). 
G&W, however, argue that Steglich-Petersen’s account (D) – even when con-
strued in its ‘causally fortified’ version (D*) – gets things exactly backwards 
(2015: 277). For one thing, it is not clear that Steglich-Petersen’s description of 
(D) establishes that acceptance of (PLEASANT) would influence S’s behavior. You 
accept (PLEASANT), decide that believing p would be unpleasant, and so you do 
not form the belief that p. This is in accordance with (PLEASANT), but it does not 
follow that S has followed the norm. For S might have failed to form the belief 
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that p for some other reason which is unconnected to her acceptance of (PLEAS-
ANT). Thus it is not clear that Steglich-Petersen succeeds in establishing that 
there is a wider notion of guidance on which (TRUTH) can guide. 
Moreover, G&W (2015: 277-8 and fn. 9) suggest that even if we causally fortify 
(D*) in such a way that we can read ‘influence’ as implying some belief-inducing 
causal mechanism which makes a difference in subjects’ belief formation, it is 
intuitively clear that, even if this influence is a necessary condition on rule-fol-
lowing, it is not sufficient. They write: 
This, it seems to us, is just one instance of a point familiar from various attempts at causal 
analyses of intentional phenomena, most prominently maybe in the theories of action and 
perception. To be an instance of rule-following, it is not sufficient that acceptance of the 
rule (causally) influences the relevant performance. It needs to do so in the right way. And 
there just does not seem to be any (informative) way of spelling out what ‘the right way’ 
precisely amounts to (2015: 278, fn. 9).70 
By way of illustration, G&W ask us to imagine the following scenario: 
[A] mad scientist has secretly (and wirelessly) hooked up S’s brain to a computer in such 
a way that if she accepts a norm making the correctness of believing p to depend on prop-
erty F, considers whether believing p would be F, and comes to the conclusion that it would 
not, her ability to believe p is (temporarily) blocked. In such a scenario, [PLEASANT], if 
accepted, influences S’s belief formation in the way amounting to SP-guidance – but intu-
itively, S clearly does not follow [PLEASANT]. Even though accepting the truth norm instead 
of [PLEASANT] would result in a difference to S’s belief formation, the way this difference 
is generated is no longer recognizable as falling under any intuitive notion of rule-guid-
ance. (D*), even in its causally fortified version, gets things backwards. Intuitively, guid-
ance implies influence, but influence can fall short of guidance. While we can derive the 
possibility of influence from the possibility of guidance, there is no reason to think that 
the opposite is true. The proper conclusion of these considerations is not that our concep-
tion of guidance is too narrow but that Steglich-Petersen’s is too wide (2015: 278). 
If G&W are right, then, norms cannot guide belief: there is no wider notion of 
guidance, such as SP-guidance, according to which they can. The normativist, in 
                                                 
70 I say more about this in §3.4.2 below. 
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response to these criticisms, would need an account of the way in which norms 
guide belief that accommodates a substantive distinction between being guided 
by a given rule, and merely acting in accordance with one. In what follows, I 
attempt to provide such an account. 
3.4 BLIND RULE-FOLLOWING 
In this section, I want to suggest a potential way of blocking G&W’s no guidance 
argument. G&W, we have seen, maintain that the no guidance argument 
emerges as one strand of the rule-following considerations. In recent years, the 
philosophy of language and mind has seen much interest in the notion of blind 
rule-following. A foray into this literature will be necessary in order to illustrate 
a way in which we might respond to G&W. 
In the brief outline of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s (KW’s) sceptical argument pre-
sented in Chapter 1, we saw that one of the grounds on which KW rejects se-
mantic dispositionalism is in its failure to account for the normativity of mean-
ing. KW asked what makes it the case that a speaker means one thing rather 
than another by her linguistic expressions, and argued that dispositionalism 
fails as an answer to this question because (among other things) it leaves out 
the oughts essential to meaning. Dispositionalism is a reductionist theory: what 
a speaker means reduces to the way in which she is disposed to use her expres-
sions – she means addition by ‘plus’ when she is disposed to answer addition-
queries with the sum of the numbers added, rather than answer according to 
some other function (such as the ‘quus’ function). By contrast, non-reductionism 
holds (roughly) that meaning is of a more primitive character: it is sui generis 
and cannot be characterized in non-semantic and non-intentional terms. 
KW is not happy with non-reductionism as a response to the sceptic. Suppose 
we want to say that meaning is a primitive state, sui generis and non-reducible. 
KW gives the following objection to a move towards such a view: 
Such a move may in a sense be irrefutable, and if it is taken in an appropriate way Witt-
genstein may even accept it. But it seems desperate: it leaves the nature of this postulated 
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primitive state – the primitive state of ‘meaning addition by “plus”’ – completely mysteri-
ous. It is not supposed to be an introspectible state, yet we supposedly are aware of it with 
some fair degree of certainty whenever it occurs. For how else can each of us be confident 
that he does, at present, mean addition by ‘plus’? (Kripke 1982: 51). 
A number of philosophers have found this objection to non-reductionism inade-
quate. For one thing, KW simply leaves it unargued that non-reductionism is 
desperate and mysterious, as if it were obvious. Here is Colin McGinn: 
[KW’s point is that] once we abandon the idea that meaning is an irreducible experiential 
state we have no account of the nature of our first-person knowledge of meaning – we have 
no conception of how the non-experiential primitive state is an object of distinctively first-
person knowledge […] How to give a philosophical theory of this kind of knowledge is of 
course a difficult and substantive question, but the lack of a theory of a phenomenon is 
not in itself a good reason to doubt the existence of the phenomenon. I therefore see no 
mystery-mongering in the claim that there are primitive non-experiential mental states 
which display a distinctive first-person epistemology (McGinn 1984: 160-61).71 
Likewise, in an influential survey of the literature on KW, Paul Boghossian 
(1989) argues that non-reductionism survives KW’s objections (though he does 
concede that KW’s objections to reductionist theories (such as dispositionalism) 
warrant rejection of those theories). KW’s charge is that we would not be able to 
explain our thoughts if we endorsed a non-reductionist account of mental con-
tent. Boghossian notes that even though the classic problems of self-knowledge 
are extremely difficult, in order for KW’s objection to non-reductionism to be 
convincing, we would need a proof that we could not develop a satisfactory first-
person epistemology. Boghossian writes: 
Kripke, however, provides no such proof. He merely notes that the non-phenomenal char-
acter of contentful states precludes an introspective account of their epistemology. And 
this is problematic for two reasons. First, because there may be non-introspective accounts 
of self-knowledge. And second, because it does not obviously follow from the fact that a 
mental state lacks an individuative phenomenology, that it is not introspectible […] In the 
context of Kripke’s dialectic, the anti-reductionist suggestion emerges as a stable response 
                                                 
71 See Wright (2001: 113 ff.) for an objection to McGinn and further discussion. 
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to the sceptical conclusion, one that is seemingly untouched by all the considerations ad-
duced in the latter’s favor (1989: 42-3). 
Nevertheless, from the fact that Kripke’s objection to non-reductionism is inad-
equate it does not follow that non-reductionism is true. Indeed, Boghossian notes 
that there are a number of significant difficulties with non-reductionism, so that 
even if we endorse a non-reductionist position as a response to Kripke’s sceptic, 
much work still needs to be done (1989: 48-50). Boghossian defines robust real-
ism about meaning, which includes non-reductionism, as the following view: 
(ROBUST REALISM): Judgements about meaning are factual, irreducible, 
and judgement-independent. 
Now, according to Boghossian, even if robust realism/non-reductionism survives 
KW’s objections, it faces at least three significant difficulties of its own: 
Robust realism harbors some unanswered questions, the solutions to which appear not to 
be trivial. There are three main difficulties. First: what sort of room is left for theorizing 
about meaning, if reductionist programs are eschewed? Second: how are we to reconcile 
an anti-reductionism about meaning properties with a satisfying conception of their causal 
or explanatory efficacy? And, finally: how are we to explain our (first-person) knowledge 
of them? (1989: 48).72 
More recently, however, Boghossian has argued that even if these challenges to 
non-reductionism can be met in such a way that we can successfully respond to 
KW’s sceptical challenge, there is still a more fundamental problem with non-
reductionist conceptions of rule-following (Boghossian 2008, 2012).73 Let us look 
at this (alleged) more fundamental problem. 
                                                 
72 We need not go into the details of these difficulties with non-reductionism – I want only to 
note that there are some non-trivial ones. I will say more below about how Boghossian’s appeal 
to a non-reductionist conception of content might diffuse KW’s sceptical challenge. 
73 Wright (2007, 2012) endorses a similar view. To keep things manageable, I will focus only 
on Boghossian’s (more recent) arguments. 
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3.4.1 THE INFERENCE PROBLEM AND A SOLUTION 
According to Boghossian, the most pre-theoretic and intuitive model of rule-fol-
lowing involves four related components (2008: 119; 2012: 32): 
(ACCEPTANCE): If S is following a given rule R (‘If C, do A’), then S has 
somehow accepted R. 
(CORRECTNESS): If S is following rule R, then S acts correctly relative to his 
acceptance if it is the case that C and he does A. 
(EXPLANATION): If S is following rule R by doing A, then S’s acceptance of 
R explains S’s doing A. 
(RATIONALIZATION): If S is following rule R by doing A, then S’s acceptance 
of R rationalizes S’s doing A. 
Following Crispin Wright (2012: 383), call this the ‘ACRE’ model of rule-follow-
ing. Now, suppose that S is following the rule: 
(EMAIL): Answer any email that calls for an answer immediately upon re-
ceipt! 
Boghossian writes: 
[I]t is clear that it would be correct to say that I was following [EMAIL] in replying to the 
email, rather than just coincidentally conforming to it, when it is somehow or other be-
cause of [EMAIL] that I reply immediately […] [F]or me to be following the rule, the ‘be-
cause’ must be that of rational action explanation: I follow [EMAIL] when that rule serves 
as my reason for replying immediately, when that rule rationalizes my behavior. I want to 
suggest, then, that the minimal content of saying that person S follows rule R in doing A 
is that R serves as S’s reason for doing A (2012: 31). 
On our ACRE model, then, if S is following (EMAIL), then S has accepted (EMAIL) 
rather than, for instance, some alternative rule: 
(EMAIL*) Answer any email that calls for an answer, unless it’s from your 
supervisor, immediately upon receipt! 
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Moreover, it is correct, relative to S’s acceptance of (EMAIL) rather than (EMAIL*), 
for S to answer any email that calls for an answer immediately upon receipt 
(even if the email is from S’s supervisor). If S accepted (EMAIL*) rather than 
(EMAIL), then it would be correct, relative to her acceptance of (EMAIL*), to ignore 
the email from her supervisor and answer all others that call for an answer im-
mediately upon receipt. Further, S’s acceptance of (EMAIL) explains why she an-
swered immediately the email she just received – she answered the email be-
cause of the rule, where ‘because’ denotes rational action explanation. And fi-
nally, (EMAIL) rationalizes (i.e. helps us to understand and make sense of) S’s 
immediately answering the email she just received. 
Note that the ACRE model is primarily about personal-level rule-following. 
For sub-personal rule-following, we remove (RATIONALIZATION): “If I say of a cal-
culator that it is adding, then I am saying that its ‘internalization’ of the rule for 
addition (via programming) explains why it gives the answers that it gives. But 
I am obviously not saying that the addition rule rationalizes the calculator’s an-
swers. The calculator doesn’t act for reasons, much less general ones” 
(Boghossian 2012: 32). 
KW’s discussion is primarily about personal-level rule following, and on (AC-
CEPTANCE) as a condition for it. KW’s sceptical challenge, recall, is this: what 
fact about me is constitutive of my meaning one thing rather than another by 
some linguistic expression? To use Kripke’s example, suppose we have two rules: 
(ADDITION): When queried about the answer to the question ‘x + y = ?’ an-
swer with the sum of x and y! 
And: 
(QUADDITION): When queried about the answer to the question ‘x + y = ?’ 
answer with the quum of x and y! 
What fact makes it the case that I am following (ADDITION) rather than (QUAD-
DITION)? Likewise, we might ask what makes it the case that I am following 
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(EMAIL) rather than (EMAIL*). This is the sceptical challenge concerning (AC-
CEPTANCE). 
Now, we have seen that Boghossian (1989) argues we can meet the sceptical 
challenge by appeal to a non-reductionist conception of content, despite the dif-
ficulties with that conception. Boghossian (2008, 2012) now argues that even if 
this is right, there is a more fundamental problem about rule-following. Consider 
the following view, which Boghossian attributes to Wright (2001): 
(INTENTION VIEW): We follow rules by forming intentions to uphold certain 
patterns in our thought or behavior and by acting on those intentions 
(Boghossian 2012: 27).74 
Boghossian holds that we can diffuse KW’s sceptical worry if we combine (IN-
TENTION VIEW) with the rejection of the following view: 
(MEANING ASSUMPTION): Expressions get their meaning by our following 
rules in respect of them (Boghossian 2012: 36). 
How does (INTENTION VIEW) combined with the rejection of (MEANING ASSUMP-
TION) purport to dissolve KW’s sceptical worry?75 We must give up either (IN-
TENTION VIEW) or (MEANING ASSUMPTION) because combining both views yields 
the consequence that rule-following – and with it mental content – is metaphys-
ically impossible: 
[G]iven the two assumptions [i.e. (INTENTION VIEW) and (MEANING ASSUMPTION)], we would 
be able to reason as follows. In order to follow rules, we would antecedently have to have 
intentions. To have intentions, the expressions of our language of thought would have to 
have meaning. For those expressions to have meaning, we would have to use them accord-
ing to rules. For us to use them according to rules, we would antecedently have to have 
                                                 
74 According to Boghossian, (INTENTION VIEW) is really a special instance of a more general 
view, “according to which rule acceptance consists in some intentional state or other, even if it 
is not identified specifically with an intention” (2012: 33). This Boghossian calls the intentional 
view. 
75 Boghossian adds a number of provisos to the idea that we can meet KW’s sceptical challenge 
by appeal to non-reductionism, the details of which need not concern us here (2012: 35 ff). 
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intentions. And so neither content nor rule-following would be able to get off the ground 
(Boghossian 2012: 36). 
So it looks like we must reject either (INTENTION VIEW) or (MEANING ASSUMP-
TION), lest we be forced to concede that rule-following (and therefore content) is 
metaphysically impossible. KW rejects (INTENTION VIEW), since according to 
Boghossian, KW regards (MEANING ASSUMPTION) as non-optional (2012: 36). 
Boghossian himself, however, thinks we should reject (MEANING ASSUMPTION), 
and this is what leaves non-reductionism an open option as an answer to the 
sceptic. If we hold onto non-reductionism about content, then we appear free to 
endorse (INTENTION VIEW), since we can construe meaning as primitive, sui gen-
eris, and not explicable in non-semantic and non-intentional terms. 
But Boghossian now argues that even assuming the (significant) challenges 
to non-reductionism can be met in such a way that we can successfully respond 
to KW’s sceptic, there is still a more fundamental problem about rule-following. 
What is this more fundamental problem? (INTENTION VIEW), according to 
Boghossian, suffers from “a further and seemingly fatal flaw” (2012: 39) which 
concerns (EXPLANATION) and (RATIONALIZATION), rather than (ACCEPTANCE). 
To see the problem, suppose I have adopted the (EMAIL), where this adoption 
consists in my forming an explicit intention to conform to the instructions of the 
(EMAIL) rule: 
(INTENTION): For all e, if e is an email and you have just received e, answer 
it immediately! 
But how should we understand my being guided by these instructions, i.e. my 
following the (EMAIL) rule? Boghossian writes: 
To act on this intention, it would seem, I am going to have to think, even if very fleetingly 
and not very consciously, that its antecedent is satisfied. The rule itself, after all, has a 
conditional content. It doesn’t call on me to just do something, but to always perform some 
action, if I am in a particular kind of circumstance. And it is very hard to see how such a 
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conditional intention could guide my action without my coming to have the belief that its 
antecedent is satisfied (2012: 40). 
That is, in order to follow the (EMAIL) rule, I will need to think to myself (i.e. 
believe that): 
(BELIEF): e is an email I have just received. 
In order to reach the following conclusion, which (following Miller 2015) we 
might call an action-guiding state (AGS) with the content: 
(AGS) Answer e immediately! 
That is, in order to follow (EMAIL), we need (INTENTION) to uphold the instruc-
tions of the rule (“For all e, if e is an email and you have just received e, answer 
e immediately!”) combined with (BELIEF) (“e is an email I have just received”) in 
order to arrive at (AGS), a psychological state in which you are motivated to act 
(i.e. a state with the content: “Answer e immediately!”).76 According to 
Boghossian, in this instance, rule-following on the (INTENTION VIEW) requires 
inference: “it requires the rule-follower to infer what the rule calls for in the cir-
cumstance in which he finds himself” (2012: 40). Call this Boghossian’s inference 
problem. 
However, Boghossian maintains that the (EMAIL) rule is hardly special: “Since 
any rule has a general content, if our acceptance of a rule is pictured as involving 
its representation by a mental state of ours, an inference will always be required 
to determine what action the rule calls for in any particular circumstance” (2012: 
40). The upshot is that, on the (INTENTION VIEW), following a rule will always 
involve inference on the part of the subject. 
To make the problem clear, consider another example. Consider an imperati-
val equivalent to the modus ponens rule: 
                                                 
76 As we did in previous chapters, we can set aside any Humean worries about belief, desire, 
motivation, and the relationship between them. 
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(MP*): From ‘If C, do A’ and C, conclude ‘do A’! 
Boghossian’s claim is that the inference problem proceeds from a pattern of rea-
soning which – again following Wright (2007: 491) – we might call the modus 
ponens model. Following (EMAIL) is like following (MP*). Boghossian writes: 
On the Intention View, applying the Email Rule requires, as we have seen, having an 
intention with the rule as its content and inferring from it a certain course of action. How-
ever, inference, we have said, involves following a rule, in this case, MP*. Now, if the 
Intention View is correct, then following the rule MP* itself requires having an intention 
with MP* as its content and inferring from it a certain course of action. And now we would 
be off on a vicious regress: inference rules whose operation cannot be captured by the in-
tention-based model are presupposed by that model itself (2012: 41). 
Boghossian’s main contention is that the following five propositions form an in-
consistent set (2012: 42): 
(1) Rule-following is possible. 
(2) Following a rule consists in acting on one’s acceptance (or ‘internaliza-
tion’) of a rule. 
(3) Accepting a rule consists in an intentional state with general (prescriptive 
or normative) content. 
(4) Acting under particular circumstances on an intentional state with gen-
eral (prescriptive or normative) content involves some sort of inference to 
what the content calls for under the circumstances. 
(5) Inference involves following a rule. 
If Boghossian is right, then we must give up on one of these claims. But which 
one? Denying (1) would amount to scepticism about rule-following of the sort 
KW’s sceptic endorses. (2) is true if our ACRE model is indeed the most pre-
theoretic and intuitive picture of rule-following – it is the “minimal content of 
saying that someone is following a rule” (Boghossian 2012: 42). (3) is just the 
general intentional view, of which (INTENTION VIEW) is one particular instance. 
And (4) also seems true: consider what it takes to follow (EMAIL) – we need an 
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inference from (for example) the rule and (BELIEF) in order to reach (AGS). Fi-
nally, (5) seems obvious: inference is an example of rule following par excellence, 
and so Boghossian maintains that (5) is “analytic of the very idea of deductive 
inference” (Boghossian (2012: 42).77 
Now, according to Boghossian, the only plausible option seems to be to give 
up on (3) – the intentional view, and with it (INTENTION VIEW). Thus in order to 
avoid the conclusion that rule-following is impossible, “we must find a way of 
understanding the notion of accepting or internalizing a rule that does not con-
sist in our having some intentional state in which that rule’s requirements are 
explicitly represented” (Boghossian 2012: 42).78 Boghossian suggests that Witt-
genstein arrived at the same conclusion in the Philosophical Investigations: 
“All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once 
stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed 
through the whole of space. – But if something of this sort really were the case, how would 
it help me? 
No; my description made sense only if it was to be understood symbolically. – I should 
say: this is how it strikes me. 
When I follow the rule, I do not choose. 
I follow the rule blindly (1953: §219). 
The upshot, according to Boghossian, is that some rule-following must be blind: 
“in its most fundamental incarnation, rule acceptance cannot consist in the for-
                                                 
77 G&W disagree: “it is not clear to us at all that inference involves following a rule. What 
Boghossian’s argument shows, at most, is that inference is yet another controversial case creat-
ing trouble for any substantive understanding of rule-following” (2010b: 163). G&W suggest re-
jecting (5), since they do not share the intuition that inference always involves following a rule. 
According to them, one reason we might deny that (5) is a conceptual truth is that it may have 
unpalatable consequences, such as the consequence that rule-following is impossible. But as we 
shall see below, we need not abandon the idea that rule-following involves following a rule (5), 
nor the intentional view (3). Rather, we may only need to make a slight modification to (4). 
78 For an alternative, purportedly Fregean account of non-intentional rule-following, see §1.12 
and §3.15 of Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013). There are likely to be highly contentious issues with 
this, and I cannot properly explore them here. 
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mation of a propositional attitude in which the requirements of the rule are ex-
plicitly encoded” (2012: 43). It is not an option to embrace rule-following scepti-
cism, Boghossian suggests, since this seems false about reasoning in general and 
about the intelligibility of deductive inference: the reasons a subject has for mov-
ing from certain premises to certain conclusions are in general of the essence of 
deductive inference. But this brings us into an ‘antinomy of pure reason’: 
So what we are contemplating, when we contemplate giving up on the Rulish picture of 
deductive inference, is not so much giving up on a Rulish construal of deductive inference 
as giving up on deductive inference itself. But that is surely not a stable resting point – 
didn’t we arrive at the present conclusion through the application of several instances of 
deductive inference? Hence we have what I have somewhat grandly called an “antinomy 
of pure reason”: we both must – and cannot – make sense of the notion of someone’s fol-
lowing a rule. The only non-skeptical option that seems open to us is to try taking the 
notion of following – or applying – a rule as primitive, effectively a rejection of proposition 
(4) above (Boghossian 2012: 47). 
Note that Boghossian’s ultimate conclusion goes beyond the anti-reductionism 
about content (endorsed in Boghossian 1989) as a response to KW’s sceptic. The 
present view involves primitivism about rule-following or rule-application itself: 
“we would have to take as primitive a general (often conditional) content serving 
as the reason for which one believes something, without this being mediated by 
inference of any kind” (2012: 47). 
Thus if Boghossian is right, then even if the difficulties with non-reductionism 
can be met in order to successfully respond to KW’s sceptic, then there is a fur-
ther problem – the inference problem – for rule-following. This problem would 
seem to require us to abandon the intentional view, and with it (INTENTION 
VIEW), lest we give up either some highly intuitive assumptions about rule-fol-
lowing, or the idea that rule-following is so much as possible. In response to 
Boghossian (and Wright 2012), however, Alex Miller (2015) argues that there is 
no further problem about rule-following of the sort Boghossian raises. Miller’s 
response, I want to suggest, may allow us to block some of G&W’s arguments 
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against normativism. First, we need to look at Miller’s solution to the inference 
problem. 
Boghossian’s ‘antinomy of pure reason’ was that we must, and at the same 
time cannot, make sense of someone’s following a rule. Miller argues that we can 
avoid the antinomy by appeal to Wittgenstein’s idea that, in order to avoid cer-
tain paradoxical implications of rule-following, we need to abandon the idea that 
following a rule is a matter of interpretation. As Wittgenstein (somewhat crypti-
cally) puts it: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course 
of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict 
with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of 
reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least 
for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. For what we thereby show 
is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from 
case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following a rule” and “going against 
it” (1953: §201). 
The idea is that, if we hold on to the idea that rule-following requires interpre-
tation, then in order to apply rule R in a given case, we will need to apply a 
further rule R* in order to determine what R amounts to in the given case. This 
seems to have the paradoxical upshot that rule-following is impossible. For un-
der the idea that rule-following requires interpretation, we seem to get an infi-
nite regress: 
Applying rule R in a given case on the basis of interpretation requires the 
application of rule R* in order to determine what R amounts to in this case. 
Applying rule R* in a given case on the basis of interpretation requires the 




Applying rule R** in a given case on the basis of interpretation requires 
the application of rule R*** in order to determine what R** amounts to in 
this case. 
… 
And so on ad infinitum. Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem is to reject the 
idea that rule-following always requires interpretation. Miller writes: 
Against the idea that rule-following necessarily involves interpretation, Wittgenstein’s 
suggestion seems to be that in applying a rule R in a particular case there need be no 
further inferential step – over and above that involving R itself – mediating between ac-
ceptance of R and that particular application. As Wittgenstein puts it in §228 of Philo-
sophical Investigations, ‘[W]e look to the rule for instruction and do something, without 
appealing to anything else for guidance’ (Miller 2015: 405). 
How might this help to deal with the inference problem? Miller’s argument is 
that, once we abandon the idea that rule-following requires interpretation, we 
need not apply MP* in order to apply (EMAIL): we need only to apply (EMAIL). 
According to Miller: 
When we say that there is a way of following [EMAIL] that is not an interpretation we are 
saying that between acceptance and application of the [EMAIL] rule there is no additional 
application of a further rule (such as MP*). We might say: we look to the [EMAIL] rule for 
instruction and so something – reply to the email – without appealing to anything else for 
guidance, a fortiori without appealing to MP* for guidance. Following Wittgenstein’s lead 
by rejecting the idea that rule-following always involves interpretation thus stops 
Boghossian’s regress in its tracks (2015: 406). 
As per Wittgenstein’s suggestion, there need not be any further inferential step, 
“over and above” that involving the (EMAIL) rule itself, which mediates between 
one’s acceptance of the (EMAIL) rule and a particular application of it. Upon re-
ceiving some email e that calls for an answer, we look to (EMAIL) for instruction 
and ‘do something’ – reply to the email. We need not appeal to a further rule, 
such as MP*, in order to be guided by (EMAIL). If Miller is right, then, to give up 
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on the idea that rule-following always requires interpretation is to block 
Boghossian’s inference problem. 
But what does this mean for the ACRE model? Miller argues that, if we reject 
the conception of rule-following as interpretation, we can still preserve each com-
ponent of the ACRE model, as well as propositions (2)-(5) of Boghossian’s incon-
sistent set (though with a slight modification). First, Miller claims that there is 
no inference, based on the application of a further rule (such as MP*), which 
mediates between acceptance and application of the (EMAIL) rule. What, then, 
does mediate between acceptance and application of the rule? Recall that, on 
Boghossian’s picture, we first need an intention to comply with the instructions 
of the (EMAIL) rule, combined with a belief to the effect that the antecedent of 
the conditional rule is satisfied, in order to reach a psychological state the con-
tent of which complies with the instructions of the rule. That is, we first need an 
intention to comply with the instructions: 
(INTENTION): For all e, if e is an email and you have just received e, answer 
it immediately! 
And we combine (INTENTION) with the following belief: 
(BELIEF): e is an email I have just received. 
In order to reach an action-guiding state with the content: 
(AGS): Answer e immediately! 
But what, Miller asks, mediates the “causal transition” from (INTENTION) and 
(BELIEF) to (AGS), when we give up on the conception of rule-following as inter-
pretation (2015: 407)? Miller appeals to Wittgenstein’s answer to questions of 
this sort. Wittgenstein’s well-known answer to questions of this sort appeals to 
the ideas of training and initiation into a practice or custom. Take two repre-
sentative passages from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: 
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Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained to do so, and one reacts 
to an order in a particular way (1953: §206). 
The absent-minded man who at the order “Right turn!” turns left, and then, clutching his 
forehead, says “Oh! Right turn”, and does a right turn. – What has struck him? An inter-
pretation? (1953: §506). 
When viewed in light of the Wittgensteinian ideas of training and initiation into 
a practice or custom, we have an account of the mediation between acceptance 
of a given rule and a given application of that rule. On the present example, 
Miller writes: 
What happens in the [EMAIL] case is that the agent S is in an intentional state [INTENTION] 
with the content If you receive an email, answer it! which together with his belief that e is 
an email (in the right kind of way) causes S to reply to the email (or more precisely to have 
an action-guiding state with the content answer e!). This causal relation is set up and 
sustained by facts about custom, practice and training (2015: 407).79 
Now, we are in a position to see the way in which Miller’s account allows us to 
preserve Boghossian’s propositions (2)-(5), though with one slight modification. 
Boghossian’s second proposition was this: 
(2) Following a rule consists in acting on one’s acceptance (or internalization) 
of a rule. 
According to Miller, (2) can be dealt with in a straightforward way, since – cour-
tesy of a non-reductionist conception of content – we can help ourselves to the 
notion of intentional content. In following (EMAIL), the (BELIEF) (that e is an 
email I just received) and (INTENTION) cause the subject to be in the action-guid-
ing state: “following rule R is a matter of being caused (in the right kind of way) 
                                                 
79 Miller notes that the point is not that we want to recover the intentional content of the 
relevant states (i.e. the intention, the belief, and the action-guiding state) in terms of their causal 
relations to other states. Rather, the point is that – assuming non-reductionism about content 
allows us to secure the notion of intentional content against KW’s sceptical challenge – there is 
no further problem (such as Boghossian’s inference problem) concerning rule-following. Moreo-
ver, Miller uses ‘in the right kind of way’ in order to exclude deviant causal chains. This is im-
portant, but I want to postpone discussion of it until §3.4.2 below. 
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to act in a way that conforms to R inter alia by the having of an intentional state 
with the rule R as its content” (Miller 2015: 408). Proposition (3) is also straight-
forward: 
(3) Accepting a rule consists in an intentional state with a general (prescrip-
tive or normative) content. 
Proposition (3) can be dealt with straightforwardly because we can say that “ac-
cepting the [EMAIL] rule consists in being in an intentional state with the content 
If you receive an email, answer it!” (Miller 2015: 408). Since the content of the 
intentional state (“If you receive an email, answer it!”) is imperatival in form, it 
should be clear that the content of the state is indeed prescriptive or normative 
in character. 
Now, Miller argues that proposition (4) needs a slight modification. 
Boghossian’s proposition (4) was this: 
(4) Acting under particular circumstances on an intentional state with a gen-
eral (prescriptive or normative) content involves some sort of inference to 
what the content calls for under the circumstances. 
Given our foregoing Wittgensteinian considerations, Miller suggests we modify 
this as follows: 
(4*) Acting under particular circumstances on an intentional state with a 
general (prescriptive or normative) content involves some sort of rule-me-
diated transition to what the content calls for under the circumstances. 
Thus according to (4*), the (EMAIL) rule is what mediates the transition from the 
belief (i.e. the state with the content: “e is an email”) to the action-guiding state 
(i.e. the state with the content: “Answer e!”). In this instance, S follows (EMAIL) 
rather than MP*. Granted, the transition between the belief and the action-guid-
ing state conforms to MP*, but S is not required to follow MP* in order to bring 
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about the action-guiding state via (INTENTION) and (BELIEF) (Miller 2015: 408).80 
This is noteworthy, since as we have already seen, any plausible account of rule-
following must accommodate a substantive distinction between following or be-
ing guided by a rule, and merely conforming to or acting in accordance with one 
(more on this below). 
Finally, what of proposition (5)? This was: 
(5) Inference involves following a rule. 
There should be nothing preventing us from accepting (5) if we can view “infer-
ence qua psychological process in terms of being caused (in the right kind of way) 
to draw a conclusion by an intention to uphold a rule of inference like MP*” 
(Miller 2015: 408). Moreover, as Boghossian points out, inference is an example 
of rule-following par excellence, so (5) looks intuitively plausible. 
Now, as for our ACRE model, Miller points out that there is no problem with 
(ACCEPTANCE) and (CORRECTNESS): “My following the [EMAIL] rule certainly in-
volves my acceptance of the rule, and if I reply to a recently received email I act 
correctly relative to my acceptance of the rule, and incorrectly otherwise” (2015: 
408-9). Miller’s account also seems to capture (EXPLANATION) and (RATIONALI-
ZATION). For acceptance of the (EMAIL) rule, for example, consists in an inten-
tional state (INTENTION) “from which there is a causal route (of the right kind) 
to my having an action-guiding state with the content answer e!” (Miller 2015: 
409). This is a causal explanation, and so it captures (EXPLANATION) and, it 
seems, (RATIONALIZATION). It captures (RATIONALIZATION) because our causal 
story about the movement from (INTENTION), to the belief that the antecedent of 
the rule is satisfied, to the action-guiding state rationalizes (i.e. makes sense of) 
my answering the recently received email. 
                                                 
80 As Miller points out, it follows that what Wright calls ‘the modus ponens model’ is some-
thing of a misnomer. 
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Thus it looks like Boghossian’s inference problem can be met. If Miller is right, 
then – courtesy of a non-reductionist conception of content – there is no further 
problem about rule-following. But does this mean we need to reject the idea of 
blind rule-following? In one sense, yes; in another, no. For there seem to be two 
ways in which we might understand the notion of blind rule-following. The first 
way of understanding blind rule-following – which, if Miller is right, we can re-
ject – is Boghossian’s interpretation of Wittgenstein: 
[W]e have shown that, in its most fundamental incarnation, rule-acceptance cannot con-
sist in the formation of a propositional attitude in which the requirements of the rule are 
explicitly encoded. Such a picture would be one according to which rule-following is always 
fully sighted, always fully informed by some recognition of the requirements of the rule 
being followed. And the point that Wittgenstein seems to be making [at §219 of Philosoph-
ical Investigations, quoted above] is that, in its most fundamental incarnation, not all rule-
following can be like that – some rule-following must simply be blind (Boghossian 2008: 
130). 
According to Boghossian’s reading of Wittgenstein, then, the idea that rule-fol-
lowing is blind means we must reject the intentional view, and with it (INTEN-
TION VIEW). This lands us in the ‘antinomy of pure reason’ when we combine 
rejection of the (INTENTION VIEW) with KW’s arguments against the possibility 
of non-intentional rule-following. But Miller argues that Boghossian’s reading of 
Wittgenstein is mistaken: 
[Boghossian’s] reading of Wittgenstein’s use of ‘blind’, however, seems to me to be mis-
taken. When Wittgenstein speaks of rule-following as ‘blind’, ‘blind’ does not contrast with 
‘intentional’ (as in Boghossian’s reading). Wittgenstein is not arguing that acceptance of a 
rule is not an intentional state. Rather, ‘blind’ contrasts with ‘based on an interpretation’. 
To say that following a rule is ultimately blind is to say that at the fundamental level 
following a rule is not based on interpretation (2015: 411).81 
To see this, consider again our (EMAIL) rule. Suppose that S’s application of 
(EMAIL) is based on interpretation, and she is asked for a reason or justification 
                                                 
81 This reading of Wittgenstein is shared by John McDowell (1998: Chapters 11 and 12). See 
also Wright (2001: Chapters 5 and 6) for responses to McDowell and exegesis of Wittgenstein. 
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for why, upon receiving an email, she applied it in the way she did. In order to 
supply such a justification for her application of (EMAIL), S would need to cite a 
further rule over and above (EMAIL) – perhaps she cites MP*, combined with her 
belief to the effect that the antecedent of the rule is satisfied (“e is an email I 
have just received”) in order to explain why she answered the email. But this is 
not what happens when we abandon the idea that rule-following requires inter-
pretation: 
[S]ince my following the [EMAIL] rule is not based on an interpretation, when I’m asked 
for a justification or reason for why I applied it in the way that I did in that situation I can 
tell no such story: all I can say is This is how it strikes me (or, with Wittgenstein [1953]: 
§217, This is simply what I do). In the passage in §219 of Philosophical Investigations, 
therefore, Wittgenstein is not raising a difficulty for the construal of rule-acceptance as 
an intentional state: rather, he is reiterating the need to reject the conception of rule-
following as interpretation if we are to avoid the conclusion that there are no determinate 
facts about which rule an agent is following (Miller 2015: 412). 
If Miller is right, then courtesy of a non-reductionist conception of content, there 
is no further problem concerning rule-following; we can appeal to the notions of 
practice/custom/training and blind rule-following (where ‘blind’ contrasts with 
‘based on interpretation’) in order to preserve our ACRE model of rule-following 
and (INTENTION VIEW). I want to suggest that this provides us with the tools for 
responding to Glüer and Wikforss. 
3.4.2 REPLY TO GLÜER AND WIKFORSS 
Given our foray into recent literature on the rule-following considerations, we 
are now in a position to sketch a way in which an appeal to blind rule-following 
(where ‘blind’ contrasts with ‘based on interpretation’) might enable us to block 
G&W’s arguments against normativism. To begin with, note that there are 
structural similarities between both G&W’s no guidance argument and the re-
gress of motivations argument, and Boghossian’s inference problem. Consider a 
rule of the form: 
(R) Do X when in C 
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According to the no guidance argument, norms or rules cannot guide belief, be-
cause in order to determine whether C, the subject needs to form a belief as to 
whether C. That is, in order to determine whether to believe that p on the basis 
of a norm like (TRUTH), you need to form a belief as to whether the antecedent 
conditions of the norm are satisfied, i.e. as to whether p. But since the question 
of whether to believe that p is precisely the question on which the subject looks 
to (TRUTH) for guidance, the norm can offer no such guidance, because the sub-
ject needs to form the very belief she wanted guidance on in order to be guided 
by that norm. 
Lurking in the no guidance argument is the regress of motivations problem, 
according to which not all belief formation can be rule guided, because if it were, 
it would set us on a vicious infinite regress. Consider again the following practi-
cal syllogism: 
(P1) I want to believe what is in accordance with R. 
(P2) To believe that p is in accordance with R. 
(C) I want to believe that p. 
The problem was that (P2) is a second-order belief (i.e. a belief about a belief) to 
the effect that believing that p is in accordance with R. If all belief is rule- or 
norm-guided, then we must appeal to a further rule R* to guide the second-order 
belief (P2), and yet another belief about whether the antecedent of R* is satisfied, 
in order to be motivated to believe that p. But then we must appeal to yet another 
rule R**, then another R*** and so on ad infinitum. We land on a vicious infinite 
regress. 
Boghossian’s inference problem is similar in spirit to the regress of motiva-
tions argument. According to Boghossian, we have seen, the move from (INTEN-
TION) and (BELIEF) to (AGS) requires inference. But inference itself involves fol-
lowing a rule: inference is an example of rule-following par excellence. In our 
(EMAIL) example, the relevant inference involves following MP* as the rule. But 
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if the (INTENTION VIEW) is correct, then following MP* too requires inference: it 
requires forming an intention with MP* as its content, and then a belief to the 
effect that the antecedent of the rule is satisfied. But this lands us, once again, 
on a vicious infinite regress. 
We have seen, moreover, that Miller’s solution to the inference problem is the 
Wittgensteinian one of giving up on the idea that rule-following requires inter-
pretation. Once we give up on the idea that rule-following requires interpreta-
tion, we need not appeal to a rule over and above (EMAIL) such as MP*: we look 
to (EMAIL) in a given case and do something – respond to the email. It is this 
solution which might give us the tools to respond to G&W. 
Recall that, as G&W stress, any plausible account of rule-following must ac-
commodate a substantive distinction between being guided by a rule, on the one 
hand, and merely acting in accordance with one, on the other. It is the (INTEN-
TION VIEW) which provides us with this distinction: we follow rules by forming 
intentions to uphold patterns in our thought or behavior and then acting on 
those intentions. In following the (EMAIL) rule blindly (where ‘blind’ contrasts 
with ‘based on interpretation’), the subject follows (EMAIL) and coincidentally 
conforms to MP*: she is not ‘really’ following MP* as she would be on 
Boghossian’s account. 
Recall further that G&W’s (2015) exchange with Steglich-Petersen (2013) 
ends in G&W disputing the idea that there is a wider or more inclusive notion of 
guidance on which norms can guide belief. Consider again (D*), the ‘causally 
fortified’ version of (D): 
(D*): Acceptance of a norm N of the form “In C, do X” can influence a subject 
S’s behavior with respect to X in the sense of making a difference to 
S’s X-ing only if S can follow N. 
G&W’s objection to (D*) was that even if we read ‘influence’ as implying some 
belief-inducing causal mechanism which makes a difference in belief formation, 
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it is intuitively unclear that this influence is sufficient for rule-following, even if 
it is necessary. (This is suggested by the ‘only if’ formulation in (D*).) G&W, we 
have seen, take this point to be one more instance of another point familiar from 
attempts at causal analyses of intentional phenomena. The idea is that, for 
something to be instance of rule-following, it is not sufficient for acceptance of 
the rule to causally influence the subject’s behavior: rather, acceptance of the 
rule needs to influence subjects’ behavior in the right way. But ‘the right way’, 
G&W maintain, is imprecise, and so without further argument they cannot 
grant the normativist (or at least Steglich-Petersen) the idea that there is a 
wider notion of guidance on which norms can guide.82 
Miller’s solution to the inference problem might help us flesh out ‘the right 
way’ in such a way that allows us to block G&W’s argument against the idea 
that there is a wider notion of guidance on which norms can guide. Recall that 
Miller asks what, if not interpretation of the rule, mediates the ‘causal transi-
tion’ between (INTENTION) and (BELIEF) to (AGS). In our (EMAIL) example, ac-
cording to Miller (2015: 407), what happens is this: S is in an intentional state 
(INTENTION) with the content “If you receive an email, answer it!” which com-
bined with (BELIEF) (i.e. “e is an email”) causes S to reply to the email in the 
right kind of way. This causal relation is “set up and sustained by facts about 
custom, practice and training” (Miller 2015: 407). If we can give an account of 
the way in which acceptance of the rule can causally influence the subject’s be-
havior in the right kind of way, then we should be able see how acceptance of the 
rule is – contra G&W – sufficient for rule-following. 
                                                 
82 Note that Steglich-Petersen (2006) has defended the teleological view on which ‘belief aims 
at truth’ is interpreted literally. As such, he accepts the truth norm, only denies that it is cate-
gorical. I think we can appeal to blind rule-following (where ‘blind’ contrasts with ‘based on in-
terpretation’) in order to block G&W’s argument against SP-guidance. If the below considera-
tions are correct, then we will have an account of the way in which norms might guide belief, 
though the question of whether norms can guide belief is quite independent of the question 
whether they are categorical. 
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What, then, do we mean by ‘the right kind of way’? In fleshing this out, Miller 
considers a potential objection to his account, according to which the role as-
signed to the acceptance of a given rule does not provide a satisfactory response 
to Boghossian’s inference problem. Miller (2015: 412) suggests that there are 
three different ways to understand the role an intention plays when applying a 
rule in a given case: 
(a) It is something to be interpreted; or 
(b) It is something that merely causes an action; or 
(c) It is something that is not interpreted and something that does not merely 
cause an action, but rationally results in an action. 
The objection, then, is that our story about blind rule-following (where ‘blind’ 
contrasts with ‘based on interpretation’ rather than ‘intentional’) entitles us only 
to (b). What we require for a satisfactory response to Boghossian, however, is (c). 
According to Miller, the question whether we are entitled to (c) or at most (b) 
“would be urgent for a view on which following a general rule in a given instance 
consisted in that intention combining with a belief that its triggering condition 
obtains to cause an action of the sort the rule demands” (2015: 413). For we 
might get deviant causal chains in following rules. To use our (EMAIL) example, 
suppose I have (INTENTION) and (BELIEF), but that I get confused or flustered 
when I have to respond to emails immediately upon receipt, and so start to get 
upset. Not wanting to be upset, and knowing that I can get rid of the feeling by 
hitting random keys in the email box and then hitting reply, I do so. Now, Miller 
points out that in this case, while (INTENTION) and (BELIEF) cause me to reply to 
the email, I do not follow the (EMAIL) rule. That is, my action (replying to the 
email) is caused by (INTENTION) and (BELIEF), but (INTENTION) and (BELIEF) do 
not rationalize my action. How, then, can our story about the causal mediation 
of (INTENTION) and (BELIEF) to (AGS) entitle us to (c) rather than merely (b)? 
In response to this worry, Miller (2015: 413-14) argues that the foregoing story 
does entitle us to (c). For the possibility of deviant causal chains is precluded by 
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the presence of ‘in the right kind of way’: “This requirement excludes cases of 
deviant causal chains and ensures that the relevant intentional states do not 
merely cause the relevant action, but rather rationally result in it” (Miller 2015: 
413). Miller notes that there are two pertinent questions here: 
(i) Is the inclusion of ‘in the right kind of way’ problematic in the context of 
our replies to Boghossian? 
(ii) How does the inclusion of ‘in the right kind of way’ square with the em-
phasis given to the notions of training, custom and practice in the Witt-
gensteinian alternative to the conception of rule-following as necessarily 
involving interpretation? 
Miller begins with (ii). Consider first the following passage from Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations: 
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule – say a signpost – got to do with my 
actions? What sort of connection obtains here? – Well, this one, for example: I have been 
trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it. 
But with this you have pointed out only a causal connection; only explained how it has 
come about that we now go by the signpost; not what this following-the-sign really consists 
in. Not so; I have further indicated that a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there 
is an established usage, a custom (1953: §198). 
Miller (2015: 413-14) suggests that what Wittgenstein has in mind here is that 
we earn the right to think of the ‘causal transactions’ involved in one’s encoun-
ters with the signpost as genuine instances of rule-following (rather than in-
stances of a mere causal process) when we place an appropriate emphasis on the 
notions of training and custom. Miller writes: 
An intention to uphold a rule combining with a suitable belief to cause an action ‘in the 
right kind of way’ is a matter of the relevant agent’s having been suitably trained or initi-
ated into an appropriate custom or practice. So the exclusion of deviant causal chains via 
the inclusion of ‘in the right kind of way’ in the story above meshes well with an account 
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of rule-following in which interpretation is superseded by training, custom and practice 
(2015: 414).83 
This answer to question (ii) gives way to an answer to question (i). We are not 
attempting to give a causal analysis of the notion of intentional action, Miller 
notes, and so the key question is really this: “Does availing ourselves of a notion 
of training (or custom or practice) which excludes deviant causal chains in our 
account of rule-following incur philosophical obligations in addition to those that 
we already have in virtue of subscribing to a non-reductionist view of what con-
stitutes the fact that we are following one rule rather than another?” (2015: 414). 
The answer to this question, according to Miller, is negative, since difficulties 
non-reductionist conceptions of content face are far from trivial. 
Now, how exactly do the foregoing considerations help us to respond to G&W? 
Recall that Steglich-Petersen contrasts the truth norm with a ‘pleasantness 
norm’: 
(PLEASANT): S ought to believe that p if and only if believing that p would 
be pleasant. 
Steglich-Petersen’s point was that, when subjects accept (TRUTH), rather than 
(PLEASANT), they end up with different beliefs. Therefore the norms in question 
can influence S’s behavior. Therefore norms can guide belief (SP-guidance). In 
order to deal with G&W’s objections to this wider notion of guidance, we can tell 
a story similar to our (EMAIL) case. Suppose the subject forms her beliefs by fol-
lowing (TRUTH). First, she will need to form the following intention to comply 
with the instructions of the norm: 
(INTENTION*): For all p, if p is true, believe that p! 
                                                 
83 Miller notes that, given that we are assuming the challenges to a non-reductionist concep-
tion of content as a response to KW’s sceptic can be met, the notions of training and custom 
employed here need not be characterized in terms that do not presuppose the notions of meaning 
and understanding (2015: 414). See also McDowell (1998: 276). 
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And we combine (INTENTION*) with the following belief: 
(BELIEF*): p is true. 
The combination of (INTENTION*) and (BELIEF*) yields the action-guiding state, 
i.e. a state with the content: 
(AGS*): Believe that p! 
When we give up on the idea that rule-following requires interpretation, we can 
say that subjects have been trained to follow norms like the truth norm in the 
appropriate way.84 What mediates the causal transition ‘in the right kind of way’ 
from (INTENTION*) and (BELIEF*) to (AGS*) is a matter of the subject’s having 
been initiated into a custom or practice of believing only the truth. If, by contrast, 
she were initiated into the custom or practice of only believing what it would be 
pleasant to believe, then she would end up with wildly different beliefs.85 It 
seems to me, then, that Miller’s story about the causal transition between the 
relevant intention and the relevant belief to the action guiding state – when the 
causal mediation occurs ‘in the right kind of way’ – allows us to block G&W’s 
argument against a wider or more inclusive notion of guidance. For having 
fleshed out ‘the right kind of way’, it may be that acceptance of the rule causally 
                                                 
84 Granted, I don’t think objective norms like (TRUTH) guide directly. Rather, as hinted at in 
Chapter 2, I think objective doxastic norms guide indirectly via the epistemic norms. Moreover, 
I think normativism is more plausible when construed in terms of the knowledge norm, rather 
than the truth norm. I only rely on (TRUTH) at present for illustrative purposes. I’ll offer an 
(albeit brief) account of guidance and the knowledge norm in §3.6 below. 
85 It is plausible, however, that there are cases in which some proposition p is both true and 
pleasant to believe, and cases in which p is true but unpleasant to believe. Suppose, for instance, 
that you are diagnosed with cancer. Presumably, while it is true to believe that you have cancer, 
believing that you have cancer would be unpleasant to believe. Your being initiated into a prac-
tice of believing only the truth means you follow (TRUTH) and do not conform to (PLEASANT). 
Suppose, on the other hand, that your doctor gives you a clean bill of health. Believing that you 
are healthy in this case is both true and presumably pleasant to believe. In this case, you follow 
(TRUTH) because you have been initiated into the practice of believing the truth, and therefore 
form an intention to comply with the instructions of the rule. However, you also coincidentally 
conform to (PLEASANT) in this case. However, I actually do not think we can follow (TRUTH) in 
such a direct way, but we are assuming (TRUTH) for the sake of argument. In §3.6 below, I will 
give a sketch of the way in which the knowledge norm defended previously might guide belief 
indirectly via the epistemic norms. 
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influencing the subject’s behavior is jointly necessary and sufficient for rule-fol-
lowing. We might, therefore, modify (D*) accordingly (note the biconditional): 
(D**): Acceptance of a norm N of the form “In C, do X” can influence a sub-
ject S’s behavior with respect to X in the sense of making a difference 
to S’s X-ing if and only if S can follow N. 
G&W maintain that (D*) gets things backwards: “guidance implies influence, 
but influence can fall short of guidance” (2015: 278). But if our foregoing story 
about acceptance of a given rule causally influencing the subject’s behavior (in 
the right kind of way) is correct, then as per (D**), influence implies guidance. 
Just as Miller argued that giving up on the idea that rule-following requires 
interpretation stops Boghossian’s inference problem in its tracks, to give up on 
the conception of rule-following as interpretation likewise stops in its tracks 
G&W’s argument that there is no wider notion of guidance on which norms can 
guide belief. 
To conclude our response to G&W, then, it is worth noting that G&W reject 
an appeal to blind rule-following as a response to their arguments against nor-
mativism. They write: 
Although the detailed exegesis of Wittgenstein’s discussion is much disputed, it is clear 
that he puts forth a regress argument of some sort, arguing that if one takes rule-following 
always to involve interpretation then following a rule will be impossible. In response to 
this problem, it has been suggested that there is a form of rule-following that does not 
involve any sense of intentionally conforming to the rule: blind rule-following. Blind rule-
following does not involve any intentional condition, and yet is supposed to be a genuine 
species of rule-following, distinct from mere brute reactions […] Giving up on the inten-
tional condition on rule-guidance, however, brings us back to square one. There must, we 
said, be a substantive distinction between mere accordance with a rule, mere regularity, 
and genuine rule-guidance. How is this distinction to be substantiated once we give up on 
the most natural and intuitive understanding of it? (2013: 96; cf. 2010b: 160-64). 
It is quite clear from this passage, however, that for G&W, ‘blind’ contrasts with 
‘intentional’. If we follow rules blindly in this sense, then we lose the distinction 
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between being guided by a rule and merely acting in accordance with one. But if 
our foregoing considerations are correct, then we should read ‘blind’ as con-
trasting with ‘based on interpretation’. Doing so allows us to preserve the inten-
tional condition on rule-following, and so it accommodates the sought-after dis-
tinction between being guided by a rule and merely acting in accordance with 
one. An appeal to blind rule-following, then, might allow us to block some of 
G&W’s arguments against normativism, at least when ‘blind’ contrasts with 
‘based on interpretation’ (which if Miller (2015) and McDowell (1998) are right, 
is the proper way to read Wittgenstein).86 
3.5 TOPPINEN ON NORM GUIDANCE 
As we saw in the last section, an appeal to blind rule-following might provide us 
with the tools to block some of G&W’s arguments against normativism. In this 
section, let us look at another potential way of blocking their arguments, due to 
Teemu Toppinen (2015). Toppinen (2015: 398) reconstructs G&W’s no guidance 
argument as follows (assuming, again, that (TRUTH) is the proper way to formu-
late the truth norm): 
(1) If (TRUTH) is constitutive of belief, then it must be possible for (TRUTH) to 
guide belief formation. 
(2) In order for (TRUTH) to guide belief formation, it must be possible for one 
to form a belief as to whether p on the basis of (TRUTH). 
(3) In order to form a belief as to whether p on the basis of some conditional 
norm such as (TRUTH), one would first have to form a belief as to whether 
the ‘antecedent condition’ of the relevant norm holds.87 
                                                 
86 Again, we are assuming that a non-reductionist conception of content in this account of 
blind rule-following. We have seen that there are non-trivial issues with this, and so the present 
account is necessarily incomplete. Since I could not hope to deal with these issues properly here, 
I am only attempting to put the ball in the anti-normativists’ court. 
87 Likewise, in order to act on the basis of a norm such as ‘Buy low, sell high’, one would need 
to form (among other things) a belief about whether the market is at a low. 
127 
 
(4) So, in order to form a belief as to whether p on the basis of (TRUTH), one 
would first have to form a belief as to whether the antecedent condition of 
(TRUTH) holds; that is, as to whether p. 
(5) But (TRUTH) cannot offer any guidance for belief formation for someone 
who has already formed a belief as to whether p. 
(6) Therefore, (TRUTH) cannot guide belief formation. 
(7) Therefore, (TRUTH) is not constitutive of belief. 
As we saw in the foregoing sections, a number of defenders of normativism argue 
that we do not follow (TRUTH) directly; rather, (TRUTH) guides belief formation 
indirectly via the subjective epistemic norms (e.g. Boghossian 2003, 2005). Call 
this the indirect guidance argument. The idea is that you ought to believe in 
accordance with your evidence, for example, because doing so is more likely to 
yield true beliefs, i.e. believing in accordance with evidence is the best means of 
conforming to norms like (TRUTH). But G&W give the following objection to this 
sort of strategy: 
Of course, there is good reason to believe that there is a connection between truth (in the 
actual world) and the ‘epistemic norms’: normally, following the epistemic norms will lead 
to truth. For instance, I am more likely to end up with true beliefs if I believe that which 
I have evidence for, than that which I do not have evidence for. But this connection is 
purely contingent, whereas what is needed here is a constitutive, or metaphysical, connec-
tion such that it can be held that being guided by the objective norm just is being guided 
by the subjective norms (2009: 44-5). 
To make matters simple, call this the contingency objection. G&W also lodge an-
other, related objection to the indirect guidance argument. They argue that truth 
norms and epistemic norms imply two different notions of correctness (2009: 44). 
Recall our evidential norm: 




It is possible for me to believe that which is false on excellent evidential grounds, 
or that which is true on flimsy evidential grounds. But in both cases, (TRUTH) 
and (EVIDENCE) give different answers to the question of whether my belief is 
correct. The normativist wants to show that false beliefs are incorrect. But this 
conclusion is not supported by (EVIDENCE). For according to (TRUTH), a belief is 
incorrect when its propositional content is false; whereas according to (EVI-
DENCE), a belief is incorrect when it is not supported by the evidence. Therefore, 
according to G&W, the indirect guidance strategy does not support the norma-
tivist’s view that false beliefs are incorrect, “since the notion of incorrectness 
implied by [EVIDENCE] does not coincide with that of falsity” (G&W 2009: 44). 
Toppinen argues that the contingency objection to the indirect guidance ar-
gument is unpersuasive. Suppose that the relevant epistemic norms – such as 
(EVIDENCE) – are contingent, i.e. they vary from one possible world to another.88 
If we assume this, it is true that being guided by (TRUTH) cannot consist in being 
guided by a particular epistemic norm like (EVIDENCE). Moreover, the relevant 
epistemic norms are not on this assumption constitutive of belief. Toppinen 
writes: 
Yet it could be that to be guided by [TRUTH] just is, roughly, to be disposed to follow which-
ever epistemic norms turn out to provide effective means of getting at the truth, where 
this would also involve being disposed to readjust one’s habits of belief formation in case 
one would be doing badly in terms of tracking the truth. The fact (if it is a fact) that the 
relevant epistemic norms are contingent, varying from one possible world to another, 
seems simply irrelevant to the question of whether [TRUTH] can guide us through them 
(2015: 399). 
Consider an analogy with objective consequentialism. According to the objective 
consequentialist, the morally right course of action is the one which in fact pro-
duces the best consequences.89 The objective standard of right action, then, is a 
                                                 
88 Granted, G&W say here that the connection between the objective norm of truth and the 
subjective epistemic norms is contingent. In more recent work, however, they do claim that the 
epistemic rules themselves vary from one possible world to another (2013: 88). 
89 See Railton (1984) and Driver (2012: Chapter 5) for discussion. 
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standard according to which actions are to be evaluated – the morally right ones 
are the ones which do in fact produce the best results. Objective consequential-
ism has been criticized on the grounds that agents could not or should not be 
guided by the objective standard. For one thing, we are epistemically limited 
creatures, and so we are not always in a position to choose the course of action 
which will in fact produce the best results. Moreover, one might think that being 
guided by the objective standard is incompatible with being a virtuous or admi-
rable person. For example, you might fail to perform acts of friendship for the 
right reasons; there might be cases in which you perform those actions only be-
cause doing so produces the best results. 
Objective consequentialists – in response to these criticisms – typically sug-
gest that the objective standard guides indirectly via other norms. They distin-
guish between a criterion of rightness and a decision-making procedure (as we 
briefly saw in Chapter 2 with Hattiangadi’s defense of (KNOWLEDGE***)). For 
example, you might decide that the best means of conforming to the objective 
standard is to maximize expected value; or you might decide to rarely pay atten-
tion to moral norms and instead cultivate dispositions to be motivated by, for 
example, responsiveness to the needs of one’s friends (Toppinen 2015: 400). Top-
pinen writes: 
The objective standard could still have a role to play. Acting on other sorts of grounds 
could be justified with reference to this standard; it would be possible to occasionally check 
whether one’s motivational structures are acceptable by evaluating them against this 
standard. Now, it is far from clear, of course, that objective consequentialism has the re-
sources to offer a wholly acceptable account of the action-guiding role of moral theory. But 
if it is so much as possible to be indirectly guided by the objective consequentialist’s stand-
ard of rightness, then a similar story should be available also in the case of belief-guidance 
through [TRUTH] (2015: 400). 
In their 2013 paper, G&W frame the contingency objection somewhat differ-
ently. On their view, one of the reasons the indirect guidance approach is prob-
lematic is that it turns norms like (EVIDENCE) into mere instrumental rules: 
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[I]f we try to construe the matter in terms of rules, this means that the rules in question 
not only vary from world to world but are bound to be purely instrumental rules. On the 
assumption that the rules of rationality actually are truth-conducive, the normative 
force derivable from the aim of truth be would be no different in principle from that of 
‘imperatives’ like ‘If you want to go for a ride, you ought to fill up the car’. Since there 
are instrumental rules contingent on any aims whatsoever, this would trivialize the 
claim that belief is essentially rule-guided (G&W 2013: 88).90 
But Toppinen argues that this objection to the indirect guidance argument is 
also unsuccessful. Suppose that your aim is to always believe what you want to 
be true. Granted, there are instrumental rules which are contingent on this aim. 
Toppinen argues, however, that this does not mean that the rules which derive 
from the aim of believing what you want to be true are on a par with the rules 
that derive from (TRUTH): 
The normative force derivable from the aim of believing the truth is very different from 
that derivable from the aim of believing what one would want to be true. This is so quite 
simply because [TRUTH] is true (or so we are supposing), whereas the claim that one always 
ought to believe what one wants to be true is not. The relevant epistemic rules are contin-
gent and instrumental, alright. But they are not contingent on what aims we happen to 
have; they derive their normative authority from a true normative principle which is es-
sentially linked to belief. Or that is the idea (Toppinen 2015: 400). 
Toppinen again draws an analogy with objective consequentialism. The objective 
consequentialist says that we ought to perform the action with will in fact max-
imize the good or produce the best consequences. But suppose that the principle 
according to which we ought to maximize the good can only guide us indirectly 
via contingently true principles which might require us to maximize expected 
value or follow the Ten Commandments (for example); but this depends of course 
on the consequences of following these principles. According to Toppinen, the 
                                                 
90 David Papineau (1999, 2013) endorses a similar view. According to him, there is no distinct 
species of doxastic normativity; rather, what appear to be doxastic norms just reduce to instru-
mental norms. On Papineau’s view, prescriptions arise when some end is valuable, only there is 
no distinct species of doxastic value that yields doxastic oughts. Rather, doxastic oughts arise 
from moral, personal, or even aesthetic value. See Tanney (1999) for a response to Papineau 
(though not for a defense of normativism). 
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fact that these principles are contingent “would not trivialize the link between 
moral rightness and action-guiding rules” (2015: 400). It may be that we ought 
to maximize expected value, or it may be that we ought to follow the Ten Com-
mandments, depending on the consequences of following the rules in question, 
“Yet the normative force of these rules would be very different from that of any 
old hypothetical imperatives, thanks to its deriving from the non-contingent re-
quirement to do the right thing, or to maximize the good, as the objective conse-
quentialist believes” (Toppinen 2015: 400-401). 
Thus it looks like one of G&W’s main objections to the indirect guidance ar-
gument – specifically their contingency objection – is unsuccessful. Toppinen 
also criticizes the regress of motivations argument and offers his own account of 
how norms can guide belief. Here is how Toppinen (2015: 402-3) reconstructs the 
regress of motivations argument: 
(i) If certain norms of rationality, R, are essential to belief, then believing that 
p must be guided by R. 
(ii) If believing that p is guided by R, then the R-norms play a role in an in-
tentional explanation of believing that p. 
(iii) The R-norms play a role in an intentional explanation of believing that p 
by playing a role in motivating believing that p. 
(iv) Any motivational explanation, in terms of R, for believing that p will ap-
peal to a prior belief that believing that p is in accordance with R. 
(v) The formation of this prior belief, too, must be guided by the rules of ra-
tionality, and so an infinite regress ensues. This is bad, and so: 
(vi) Norms R are not essential to belief. 
Toppinen claims that premises (i) and (ii) of the regress of motivations argument 
are, on the face of it, highly dubious: “It is not plausible that normativists would 
be committed to holding that any belief must be guided by the R-norms in the 
sense of having been formed on the basis of R” (2015: 403). However, it is not 
clear why Toppinen thinks this. Nevertheless, Toppinen suggests what he takes 
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to be a more plausible way of understanding guidance: in order for S to believe 
that p under the guidance of R, S’s belief that p “must be ‘based’ on S’s ac-
ceptance of R in the sense that S could arrive at a belief that p, and is disposed 
to maintain this belief, thanks to her accepting R” (2015: 403). Understood this 
way, Toppinen grants (i) and (ii). 
Toppinen suggests rejecting premise (iii). Recall that, according to G&W 
(2013: 94), on the belief-desire model of intentional explanation, an intentional 
explanation of believing something requires at least two components: the agent’s 
acceptance of the rule in the ‘motivational slot’, and a belief to the effect that 
some specific performance is in accordance with the rule. The way in which 
norms guide belief can then be represented as follows (where the attitude types 
are in small caps, the contents of the attitudes in the brackets, and the arrow 
signals a relation of rational explanation): 
(P1) DESIRE (I believe what is in accordance with R) 
(P2) BELIEF (Believing that p is in accordance with R) 
→ 
(P3) DESIRE (Believing that p) 
→ 
(C) BELIEF (p). 
But the problem G&W raise arises from (P1). A desire needs to be ‘channeled’ 
through a belief (P2) in order to have motivational impact, and this leads to a 
problematic regress. The normativist’s idea is that belief formation is rule- or 
norm-guided, and since (P2) is a belief, we need to tell a story about how we are 
motivated to have it. That is, we need: 




(P4): BELIEF (Believing that (believing that p is in accordance with R) is in 
accordance with R). 
And so we need: 
(C2): DESIRE (Believing that (P4)). 
But then we need: 
(P5): BELIEF (Believing that (P4) is in accordance with R). 
But again, we need: 
(C3): DESIRE (I believe that (P5)). 
And so on ad infinitum. We can never reach (C): an infinite regress ensues. Top-
pinen suggests, in order to deal with this problem, that rule-acceptance in the 
present context should be understood as a kind of inferential habit: 
[I]nferential habits are intentional states which are in one important respect like desires 
or wants, and in another respect unlike them. They are like desires in that they, too, seem 
to be ‘pro-attitudes’ which have the ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’. Very roughly, whereas 
a central function of a belief is to fit the facts, a central function of a desire is to produce 
action which would change the facts so as to be in accordance with its content. Likewise, 
the function of the modus ponens inferential habit is to change the facts – those concerning 
the belief patterns of the thinker – so as to accord with what is required by the habit. 
However, unlike desires, habits of inference are not belief-channeled. If I have the modus 
ponens habit of inference, I do not need, in order to believe that p on the basis of my be-
lieving that q and that if q then p, to believe that by believing that p I believe in accordance 
with modus ponens (Toppinen 2015: 404; cf. Pettit 1993: 18-19). 
Toppinen’s idea is that, in light of R, thinking that one ought to believe that p 
can be understood as having some inferential habit functioning to produce the 
belief that p, given a ‘suitable input’. For example, S might believe that p and 
that p implies q, and so think that, in virtue of having the habit of inferring in 
accordance with modus ponens, she ought to believe that q. 
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But Toppinen points out that we still need to distinguish being guided by/fol-
lowing a norm and merely acting in accordance with it. If, for example, one 
thinks that one ought to follow modus ponens, this cannot simply consist in being 
disposed to form beliefs in accordance with modus ponens. Rather, as G&W are 
wont to point out, the modus ponens rule would need to make a difference in 
belief formation; that is, the belief must be formed because of the rule. Toppinen 
writes: 
What more is needed [to distinguish conformity to the rule from genuine guidance]? A 
suggestion roughly along the following lines would seem to hold some promise: following 
the modus ponens rule, rather than simply conforming to it, consists in having a complex 
dispositional state, which involves not only being disposed to conform to the rule, but also 
being disposed to ‘go Oops!’ and to correct one’s beliefs upon failing to do so. This picture 
could be supplemented in various ways. Going Oops! might be taken to involve having 
certain kinds of feelings as well as directing one’s attention in various ways. Also, perhaps 
further dispositions should be appealed to in order to distinguish between being guided by 
a rule in the light of normative thought, on one hand, and following a rule without engag-
ing in any specifically normative thinking, on the other (2015: 404). 
According to Toppinen, this suggestion would amount to an expressivist account 
of ‘epistemic ought thought’. This, Toppinen acknowledges, would be highly con-
troversial. Nevertheless, Toppinen claims that this might be a way in which 
norms guide belief. Suppose I believe that p on the basis of my thinking that I 
ought to believe that p, where the judgement that I ought to believe that p is 
understood as a state of a habit of inference such as modus ponens. Now we have 
the following reasoning: 
(P1*) INFERENTIAL HABIT (When in states BELIEF (If q then p) and BELIEF 
(q), form BELIEF (p)). 
(P2*) BELIEF (If q then p). 
(P3*) BELIEF (q) 
       → 
(C*) BELIEF (p) 
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On this model, believing that p on the basis of having the relevant inferential 
habit does not require that I have some instrumental belief (e.g. (P2) above), and 
so we do not lapse into regress. Thus Toppinen has offered an account of the way 
in which truth norms might guide belief which does not succumb to the objec-
tions of G&W. 
However, Toppinen’s own positive account of the way in which norms might 
guide belief is likely to face significant difficulties. We can accept his replies to 
G&W’s objections to normativism, but we will run into trouble if we accept his 
positive account. For one thing, Toppinen relies on the truth norm. In the previ-
ous Chapter, we saw that truth norms face significant difficulties: even if, as 
Toppinen argues, the truth norm does not succumb to the no guidance argument, 
it will still succumb to the formulation problem. The upshot of this, recall, was 
that truth norms are not conceptual truths because they are not truths. In the 
previous Chapter, I argued that the knowledge norm (KNOWLEDGE**) does not 
succumb to the formulation problem (see also §3.6 below). 
Even if Toppinen could somehow dissolve the formulation problem, there is a 
further difficulty with his account. The difficulty is that, according to him, the 
way in which norms guide belief amounts to a kind of expressivism. As Toppinen 
says in the passage quoted above (2015: 404), his picture of guidance could be 
supplemented in various ways. But where exactly does the expressivism come 
in – in the picture of guidance, or the supplement to the picture? We might find 
the expressivism in at least three places: 
(i) The relevant doxastic judgement expresses a disposition to conform to the 
norm; or 
(ii) The doxastic judgement expresses a disposition to correct one’s belief and 
‘go Oops!’ if the belief doesn’t conform to the norm; or 
(iii) When ‘Oops’ expresses some conative feeling or sentiment. 
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However, regardless of where exactly the expressivism surfaces,91 Toppinen’s 
positive account of how norms guide belief is likely to face significant difficulties 
simply in virtue of its expressivism. For expressivism – a form of non-cognitivism 
– faces a number of well-known difficulties. I will not rehearse these difficulties 
here, though it is perhaps worth mentioning just one of the more significant 
ones. 
Perhaps the most influential objection to non-cognitivism, and expressivism, 
is the so-called Frege-Geach problem, which Peter Geach (1960, 1965) attributes 
to Frege’s Begriffsschrift. The idea is that a non-cognitivist construal of moral 
language in ‘unasserted contexts’ (e.g., in the antecedents of conditionals) un-
dermines obviously valid patterns of inference, such as modus ponens. Since, 
according to the non-cognitivist, moral language is not cognitive (i.e. it does not 
express propositions), we equivocate different senses of moral terms in ordinarily 
valid arguments. For example, according to the non-cognitivist, in the sentence: 
(1) Murder is wrong 
‘Wrong’ expresses some conative feeling or sentiment. But when ‘wrong’ occurs 
in the following unasserted context: 
(2) If murder is wrong, then getting little brother to murder is wrong. 
‘Wrong’ does not express a conative attitude – it is unasserted, embedded within 
a conditional, and so (2) itself does express a cognitive attitude. If (1) expresses 
a conative attitude, and (2) a belief, then it does not follow that: 
(3) Getting little brother to murder is wrong. 
                                                 
91 In personal correspondence, Toppinen suggests the expressivism in his account surfaces in 
all three places; that is, in (i), (ii), and (iii). 
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For we equivocate two different senses of ‘wrong’ in (1) and (2), respectively.92  
Whereas the meaning of (1) is given in terms of the conative mental state ex-
pressed by the judgement that murder is wrong, the meaning of (2) is given in 
terms of its truth-conditions. More, of course, needs to be said, but this is one 
non-trivial problem for expressivism/non-cognitivism. And others abound.93 It 
seems to me, then, that if normativists must appeal to expressivism in order to 
give a plausible account of the way in which norms guide belief, then so much 
the worse for normativism. 
3.6 INDIRECT GUIDANCE: THE KNOWLEDGE NORM 
In the last two sections, we saw that there might be two ways of blocking some 
of G&W’s arguments against normativism. In this section, I want to sketch – 
albeit briefly – a cognitivist (that is, non-expressivist) account of the way in 
which norms might guide belief.94 This account is only provisional, and as such 
will be subject to a number of provisos. 
To begin with, recall that many normativists (such as Boghossian 2005) do 
not think we follow the truth norm directly; rather, the norm can only be fol-
lowed by following the subjective epistemic norms, such as norms of evidence or 
rationality. But as others have pointed out (Hattiangadi 2010; Glüer and Wik-
forss 2013; Gibbons 2013: Chapter 1), the biggest hurdle this strategy faces is 
                                                 
92 Blackburn (1984) and Gibbard (1990) each have highly controversial responses (respec-
tively) to the Frege-Geach problem. I cannot go into the details of these responses here, though 
see Miller (2013: Chapters 4 and 5). 
93 See, e.g., Jackson and Pettit (1998) and Miller (2013). As noted in Chapter 1, Jackson (2000) 
argues that the combination of non-cognitivism and the normativity of belief yields the paradox-
ical result that there are no beliefs and no believers. If Jackson is right, Toppinen is likely to 
face this difficulty too, since Toppinen combines expressivism with normativism about belief 
(though I cannot go into the details of this objection here). See also Hazlett (2013: §9.2.2) for a 
(sympathetic) discussion of epistemic expressivism. 
94 For reasons of space, this account is necessarily incomplete; I am forced to leave things 
somewhat vague and speculative. However, leaving things open-ended like this shouldn’t be too 
problematic given the goal of this (and the last) chapter, which is that of defending normativism 
against objections, rather than providing a substantial positive normativist theory. Moreover, I 
conclude this section with a sketch of the sort of philosophical work that would need to be done 
in order to make the present account convincing. 
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the fact that (TRUTH) and its variants can clash with the epistemic norms. Evi-
dence, for example, can be misleading: you might have excellent evidence for a 
falsehood, and this casts doubt on the idea that the objective norm of truth 
grounds the epistemic norms and supplies their ‘rationale’. 
In Chapter 2, we saw that the knowledge norm defended does not succumb to 
this difficulty in the ‘hard cases’ – coin-toss and lottery cases in particular. That 
knowledge norm was: 
(KNOWLEDGE**) If S considers whether p, then 
(i) S ought to (believe that p) if S is in a position to know that p; and 
(ii) S ought not to (believe that p) if S is not in a position to know that p. 
Unlike its alethic equivalent (TRUTH+), (KNOWLEDGE**) gives the right results 
in the hard cases. Even if (KNOWLEDGE**) is a constitutive doxastic norm, we 
might still think of it as an objective standard or criterion of rightness which 
sets the standard for which epistemic methods to follow. I think it is plausible, 
based on our foregoing discussion of blind rule-following – and subject to a num-
ber of provisos to be outlined below – that (KNOWLEDGE**) guides belief indi-
rectly via the epistemic norms with which, we have seen, it does not clash. The 
account will be cognitivist, and so will not run into the difficulties that Toppi-
nen’s account will. 
To see how the objective norm (KNOWLEDGE**) might guide belief indirectly 
via the epistemic norms, consider our norm of evidence: 




In general, evidence is truth-conducive, but it is also knowledge-conducive (cf. 
McHugh 2011).95 If you have overwhelming evidence that p, then it is likely that 
p is true, but it is also likely that you are in a position to know that p. For p is 
likely to be true, and you obviously have evidential justification for believing 
that p. It is plausible, therefore, that if you were to believe that p, you would 
know that p. 
Now, given our foregoing discussion of blind rule-following (where ‘blind’ con-
trasts with ‘based on interpretation’) we might give the following account. Sup-
pose the subject has been initiated into a practice of only believing what the 
evidence supports. She might then form an intention to comply with the instruc-
tions of the rule: 
(INTENTION**): For all p, if the evidence strongly supports p, believe that p! 
And we can combine (INTENTION**) with the following belief: 
(BELIEF**): The evidence strongly supports p. 
The combination of (INTENTION**) and (BELIEF**) brings the subject into an ac-
tion-guiding state – a state with the content: 
(AGS): Believe that p! 
There might be a rule-mediated transition between (INTENTION**) and (BE-
LIEF**) which causes the subject ‘in the right kind of way’ to be in an action-
guiding state with “Believe that p!” as its content. This accommodates the dis-
tinction between being guided by a rule and merely acting in accordance with 
one – acceptance of the rule and intention is what gives us that distinction. In 
                                                 
95 According to Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first approach to epistemology, the totality 
of one’s evidence just is the totality of one’s knowledge (2000: Chapter 9). I do not think, however, 
that we need to endorse such a radical view in order to give an account of the way in which the 
knowledge norm might guide indirectly. It is enough to note that, in general, evidence is 
knowledge-conducive. Moreover, I will leave vague the notion of evidence we are working with, 
since whatever view of evidence we endorse is likely to be controversial, and I cannot offer a 
proper discussion here. For discussion of evidence in the present context, as well as further read-
ings, see Olson (2011) and Shah (2011). 
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this case, you follow (EVIDENCE), and might coincidentally conform to other 
rules. But it is plausible that following (EVIDENCE) is a means of following 
(KNOWLEDGE**), since evidence is in general knowledge-conducive, and we have 
seen (in Chapter 2) that (KNOWLEDGE**) does not clash with the epistemic norms 
in the hard cases. And if this is right, then (KNOWLEDGE**) guides belief for-
mation and revision indirectly, via the subjective epistemic norms. 
I have said that this account would be cognitivist. But what exactly about it 
is cognitivist? It is cognitivist insofar as doxastic judgements would express 
propositions; they would not express some conative mental state. Suppose I 
judge that: 
Sarah believes that snow is white. 
My judgement expresses the belief or proposition that Sarah believes that snow 
is white, and the judgement has the truth-value true just in case Sarah does 
believe that snow is white. This, however, is where we need to bring in provisos, 
and where substantive philosophical work remains to be done. 
In fleshing out the present indirect guidance argument, I have helped myself 
to the notions of meaning, intention, belief, understanding, and so on. I have 
assumed that these notions are primitive, sui generis, and irreducible: that is, I 
have assumed a non-reductionist conception of content as an answer to KW’s 
sceptic. This, after all, underlies Miller’s debate with Boghossian: the latter 
wanted to argue that, even assuming the challenges to non-reductionism can be 
met, there is a further ‘fatal flaw’ concerning the intentional view of rule-follow-
ing. Miller, we have seen, argued that there is no such further problem. 
Even so, we are left with the familiar problems concerning the non-reduction-
ist conception of content. The main proviso I want to add to the present account 
is that it only works (if it works) given a non-reductionist conception of content. 
But as Boghossian points out, there are still non-trivial difficulties with (ROBUST 
REALISM) and non-reductionism in general (1989: 48; 2012: 35-6). We need to 
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explain, for one thing, what room is left for theorizing about meaning and con-
tent once we eschew reductionist theories (such as dispositionalism). Moreover, 
we need an account of the ‘casual and explanatory efficacy’ of content properties. 
And finally, we need to explain our first-person knowledge of them. 
Furthermore, there are difficulties with (INTENTION VIEW). For one thing, in-
tentionality has been hard to square with naturalism: the naturalist insists that 
intentions must be shown to be naturalistically reducible. Second, Boghossian 
claims that there seem to be counterexamples to (INTENTION VIEW), though we 
need not rehearse them here (2012: 35). And finally, we have already seen that 
(INTENTION VIEW) seems to require us to reject (MEANING ASSUMPTION), but it 
is not clear that we can reject it. After all, KW regards (MEANING ASSUMPTION) 
as non-optional. 
In order to complete our present account of guidance, therefore, one would 
need to show how these difficulties can be met. I think it is plausible that 
(KNOWLEDGE**) guides belief formation indirectly in the way sketched above, 
but this will not be satisfactory until the difficulties with non-reductionism that 
underlie the idea of blind rule-following we are working with are indeed met. 
 3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered two potential ways of blocking some of G&W’s ar-
guments against normativism. First, we might appeal to blind rule-following 
(where ‘blind’ contrasts with ‘based on interpretation’ rather than ‘intentional’) 
in order to block G&W’s arguments against the idea that there is a wider notion 
of guidance on which norms can guide belief. Since this account allows us to 
preserve (INTENTION VIEW), we can accommodate the distinction between fol-
lowing a rule and merely acting in accordance with one. Second, as Toppinen 
argued, the fact that the connection between the objective doxastic norm and the 
subjective epistemic ones is contingent does not mean the former is not capable 
of guiding us through the latter. However, Toppinen’s own account is likely to 
face difficulties. This chapter concluded with a sketch of a cognitivist account of 
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the way in which (KNOWLEDGE**) might guide belief indirectly, though signifi-







According to the moral error theory, there are no moral facts: moral judgements 
are systematically and uniformly false. Moral realism, by contrast, is the theory 
that moral judgements purport to state facts, and that some of them are facts: 
some moral judgements have true contents. This thesis has deployed a compan-
ions in guilt argument in order to defend moral realism against Mackie’s argu-
ment for the error theory: the argument from queerness. 
Chapter 1 presented the threat to the error theory. After giving an overview 
of the argument from queerness and contrasting the error theory with moral 
realism and ethical non-cognitivism, I appealed to doxastic normativism in order 
to flesh out the threat. That threat was that, if normativism is true, then the 
argument from queerness can be run in the case of belief. If a doxastic analogue 
of the argument from queerness – based on normativism – were sound, then it 
would support the implausible error theoretic conclusion that doxastic judge-
ments are systematically and uniformly false. The upshot of this is the paradox-
ical one that there are no beliefs and no believers. To commit to this conclusion 
would be to commit cognitive suicide; and we saw that a defender of the moral 
error theory cannot appeal to hypothetical doxastic imperatives in order to as-
suage the consequences of our doxastic argument from queerness. 
Whether the arguments of Chapter 1 succeed, however, depends in large part 
on whether normativism is true. In Chapters 2 and 3, therefore, I defended nor-
mativism against some influential objections to it. Following clarification of 
what normativism amounts to, Chapter 2 looked at the objections Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi raise against truth norms for belief. I argued that a particular iter-
ation of the knowledge norm does not succumb to these objections, that it is a 
plausible candidate for a constitutive norm which serves to distinguish belief 
from other attitudes, and that it explains why the epistemic norms hold, i.e. it 
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explains why we ought to seek evidential justification for our beliefs, why our 
belief formation ought to be rational, and so on. Moreover, the objective 
knowledge norm defended does not clash with the epistemic norms in the ‘hard 
cases’ – in particular, coin-toss and lottery cases. 
Chapter 3 examined the objections Glüer and Wikforss raise against norma-
tivism. I considered two ways we might block some of their arguments against 
normativism. The first appealed to blind rule-following (where ‘blind’ contrasts 
with ‘based on interpretation’). If these considerations are correct, then it is not 
the case that Glüer and Wikforss have succeeded in establishing that there is no 
wider or more inclusive conception of rule- or norm-guidance on which norms 
can guide belief. The second comes from Teemu Toppinen. If Toppinen is right, 
then Glüer and Wikforss do not succeed in refuting the idea that norms can 
guide belief indirectly. However, Toppinen’s own positive account of the way in 
which norms might guide belief is likely to face difficulties – in particular, it 
amounts to a problematic expressivist treatment of ‘epistemic ought thought’. I 
concluded with a brief sketch of the way in which the knowledge norm defended 
in Chapter 2 might guide belief formation indirectly, via the epistemic norms. 
This account, however, is only provisional, and much philosophical work re-
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